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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As accountability for schools has shifted from inputs such as resource provisions to outcomes 
such as student achievement, the emphasis for education research and policy has been toward 
evidence-based reforms to improve the excellence of overall academic performance as well as 
the equity of opportunities to succeed granted to all students. These shifts have been both 
reflected in, and driven by, changes in the provision of funding to K-12 schools under 
reauthorizations of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) since its 
initial passing in 1965. Revisions to this predominant federal education legislation have 
contained reforms with large influence on the funding, organization, and practice of schools. 
While Title I of ESEA has always focused on more equitable funding of schools by providing 
additional financial resources on the basis of student poverty, it has become increasingly 
prescriptive toward equalizing not only the resources provided to students but also their 
academic outcomes. The increasing centrality of student outcomes in ESEA is underscored by 
the mandatory achievement testing in reading and mathematics for students in grades 3 through 8 
and one year of high school mandated by the 2001 “No Child Left Behind” reauthorization. 
Simultaneously, Title I has explicitly called for “evidence-based” proposals for School 
Improvement Grant (SIG) plans. The emphasis on evidence-based school reform is also codified 
in the US Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences’ (IES) grant standards, 
which are ordered from Goal 1 “Exploration” studies to Goal 5 “Measurement,” with eligibility 
for funding under each goal predicated upon proposals potentially leading to improved “student 
education outcomes.”   
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Given the increased accountability focus on outcomes and calls for evidence-based 
reforms, many states have greatly increased the amount and quality of data collected and 
maintained a focus on objective academic performance outcomes as well as subjective ratings of 
school operations, personnel performance, and working conditions from stakeholders including 
administrators, teachers, and students. In turn, this proliferation of data on elementary and 
secondary schools has been a boon to educational research. North Carolina is a state at the 
forefront of this improved data collection and maintenance. Specifically, the Education Policy 
Initiative at Carolina (EPIC), a state-university research partnership housed at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, maintains large administrative datasets provided by the state’s 
Department of Public Instruction (NC DPI) as well as data collected independently through its 
research initiatives.  
 The following dissertation consists of three studies using data from EPIC and seeking to 
leverage advancements in the availability of student, teacher, and school-level data to advance 
the measurement and evaluation of K-12 teacher and school effectiveness. The studies align with 
the first three IES grant standards. The first chapter is a Goal 3 (Efficacy Trial) study which 
estimates the effects of North Carolina’s school turnaround efforts for students in the bottom 5% 
of the state’s K-12 schools. This program, known as Turning Around Low-Achieving Schools 
(TALAS), is one of several reforms undertaken with funding received by NC DPI from the DOE 
as part of the state’s successful application for a Race to the Top (RttT) grant in 2010. The 
TALAS initiative addresses the concentration of student failure, as measured by achievement 
and attainment, in chronically low-performing schools. School turnaround efforts under state 
RttT grants are unique in that they represent the first of such reforms to place administrative 
oversight with state education agencies (SEA), where previous programs have situated control at 
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either the school or district level. North Carolina provides an especially compelling context 
within which to estimate the potential effects of state-level school turnaround, as two-thirds of all 
schools undergoing state-driven turnaround interventions under Race to the Top nationwide are 
located in North Carolina. The study employs a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate 
the effects of TALAS on school-level proficiency rates, school-level graduation rates, school 
value-added, and student-level achievement scores. Multiple model specifications and separate 
estimates across levels of schooling (i.e. elementary, middle, and secondary) and years of 
outcomes allow for a thorough discussion of potential heterogeneity of effects across time and 
setting, as well as recognition of the potential limitations of the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) estimated by RD designs. 
 The second chapter, a Goal 2 (Measurement) study, advances the framework and 
methodology of an ongoing research and policy discussion regarding performance-based teacher 
retention policy. The existing body of research estimates large system-wide improvements in 
student achievement from policies in which teacher retention and dismissal decisions are based 
on teacher value-added performance. My approach first introduces the statistical framework of 
diagnostic accuracy (DA) to this conversation, recognizing each binary retention/dismissal 
decision as a diagnostic test in which the outcome can be classified as true positive, true 
negative, false positive, or false negative depending on the decision made and the teacher’s 
future performance. These classifications as well as a number of metrics designed to measure 
their respective frequencies have been most developed in the field of epidemiology. I argue that 
shortcomings and omissions in prior research on performance-based retention are illuminated 
and corrected by the DA framing. Advocates and skeptics of retention reform will find in this 
framework a set of metrics to express their goals and concerns in a common language currently 
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missing in this policy debate. The study also marks the first efforts to incorporate multiple 
measures of teacher performance to improve this classification accuracy, and to fully specify a 
framework that accounts for the limited benefits of performance-based retention due to natural 
labor force dynamics. The results suggest that a policy successful in replacing a third of the 
bottom 5% of the teacher performance distribution will have a minimum false discovery rate 
(that is, replace teachers who would have performed well if retained) of one-in-six. 
 The third chapter, a Goal 1 (Exploration) study, makes use of student-level achievement 
data to consider how student achievement gains are distributed within teachers’ classrooms, how 
these distributions differ across subject areas, and how they change as teachers gain experience. 
The chapter begins with the mechanics of teacher value-added models, in which a student’s 
achievement scores are modeled as functions of his or her prior performance and observable 
characteristics, and systematic deviations (residuals) from scores predicted by these models are 
attributed to the student’s teacher. Although value-added scores as currently estimated represent 
the mean of these residuals1 for all students assigned to a given teacher, the variance and 
skewness of these residuals across the same students may contain information important for 
understanding both the nature of effective instruction and what value-added may or may not 
reflect about teacher performance. Specifically, I examine how the mean, variance, and skew of 
individual student residuals change with teacher experience, across grades and subjects, and 
between teachers at varying levels of estimated effectiveness. Most notably, I find that the 
distribution of student learning gains and dynamics of teacher improvement are different for 
teachers of English-Language Arts than mathematics or science. 
                                                            
1 Regression residuals are necessarily scaled with a mean of zero. By estimating models using the state-wide sample 
of tested students by grade and subject, the average residual for all students statewide is zero but can differ between 
teachers, schools, and districts. 
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 Taken together, the chapters take three distinct methodological approaches to span a 
range of research goals, from the exploration of how individual student learning gains are 
distributed within classrooms, to the development of more efficient performance-based teacher 
retention measures, to the evaluation of the efficacy of a state-led school turnaround initiative. 
Within each, contextual knowledge of an unsettled policy debate is used to advance the measures 
and methods used to evaluate K-12 teacher and school effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
RACE TO THE TOP SCHOOL TURNAROUND IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether attributed to increasing income inequality, resegregation, bureaucratic mismanagement, or 
failed social policies, failing schools have become a target of public concern as indicated by the 
media focus on “dropout factories” (see for example 
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/dropout/index.html) and educational policy initiatives 
aimed at school turnaround. Emphasis on “failing schools” as a primary unit of educational reform 
grew out of the school accountability movement of the 1990s (Murphy & Meyers, 2008). School-
level measures of academic achievement and attainment show concentrated and chronic under-
performance in some schools, especially those serving high percentages of economically 
disadvantaged and minority students (Balfanz & Legters, 2004). In the face of political resistance and 
legal restriction to undertake school integration or desegregation efforts (Rothstein, 2013), federal 
education reform has focused on what Rothstein (2013) terms “compensatory education,” targeting 
conditions and academic performance in low-achieving schools in a set of efforts collectively known 
as school turnaround (Murphy & Meyers, 2008).  
Over the past several years, major federal initiatives focused on school reform drew funds 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for both School Improvement Grants 
(SIG) and the Race to the Top (RttT) state competition. In addition to district applications for SIG, 
RttT offered states the opportunity to compete for grants by proposing K-12 educational reforms to 
address areas identified as priorities by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). One of the four main 
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reform priorities was to turn around performance in low-achieving schools and districts. In the call 
for grant applications, ED specified that applicants must submit a plan to significantly improve 
performance in schools in the lowest five percent of student proficiency and further stipulated that 
RttT and SIG reform efforts in these low-achieving schools follow one of four federally-approved 
turnaround models—transformation model, turnaround model, closure model, or restart model. 
Although the latter two models divest districts of traditional control either through dissolution of the 
school and reassignment of its students (closure) or transfer of school oversight to a charter 
management or educational management organization (restart), the former two prescribe specific, 
structural reform features within the traditional district-school governance and management structure. 
In 2010, ED awarded North Carolina $400 million to implement their proposal submitted for 
the federal RttT program. To fulfill the school turnaround commitment of North Carolina’s successful 
application for funding, the District & School Transformation (DST) division of the North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) used a share of the state’s RttT funds to support Turning 
Around Low-Achieving Schools (TALAS). Beginning with the 2010-2011 school year (SY2011), 
TALAS reformed 106 schools under the transformation and turnaround models and closed 12 more 
(ED, 2014). The present study estimates the effects of the initiative’s school reform efforts on school-
level passing rate, graduation rate, school value-added, and student achievement. 
The present study examines the effects of the school turnaround efforts implemented by 
TALAS, which required among other reforms: leadership change, staff replacement, increased efforts 
to recruit and retain effective educators, and coaching and other job-embedded professional 
development. Designation for school turnaround followed strict assignment criteria with 2009-2010 
(SY2010) school-level passing rate (pass rate for end-of-grade and end-of-course exams) determining 
the lowest achieving five percent of schools in the state. This strict assignment to treatment creates an 
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opportunity to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) using a regression discontinuity 
design, which exploits the exogenous threshold between treatment and control to support strong 
causal inferences from differences in outcomes between treated and untreated observations near the 
assignment threshold (Cook, 2008; van der Klauww, 2008; Lee and Lemiuex, 2009). Specifically, 
this study uses regression discontinuity to estimate the impact of North Carolina’s school turnaround 
efforts on student outcomes including passing rate, graduation rate, school value-added, and 
achievement in the years following state intervention for schools closest to the assignment threshold. 
BACKGROUND 
ED first prioritized school turnaround with the Comprehensive School Reform (CSR) 
program in 1998, noting a lack of research or understanding regarding the processes most successful 
in raising achievement in chronically low-performing schools (ED, 2001). The program awarded 
grants to low-performing schools with an expectation that these schools would implement 
comprehensive reform efforts consisting of “scientifically-proven” methods to address all aspects of 
school operation. However, even the most promising reform features were no more likely to be 
implemented in CSR reward schools than in other schools, and the reforms implemented generally 
lacked a scientific research basis (ED, 2008). Not surprisingly given this lack of evidence-based 
choices for CSR models and subsequent low implementation fidelity, CSR awards generally failed to 
improve student outcomes in award schools (ED, 2008). 
 School accountability sanctions under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) beginning in 2003 also 
included prescriptive school turnaround reforms. These sanctions include forcing schools to submit a 
School Improvement Plan (SIP), allowing students to transfer to higher-performing schools, replacing 
leadership and staff, and reorganizing and restructuring the school. Like CSR, the reform 
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prescriptions of NCLB were not enacted as intended and have failed to produce their desired results. 
Specifically, SIPs have tended to be unworkable reform models with little faculty buy-in (Mintrop & 
MacLellan, 2002; Mintrop, MacLellan, & Quintero, 2001), few students have exercised choice 
options (Brownstein, 2003), and states and districts typically lacked evidence about the effectiveness 
of alternative reform strategies to guide their choice of strategies or the human capital to effectively 
reconstitute entire schools (Herman et al., 2008).  
Turning around failing schools has been an increased priority of the ED’s federal reform 
efforts under Secretary of Education Arne Duncan. Within six months of his speech in June 2009 on 
the importance of improving student outcomes in “chronically low-achieving schools” (Duncan, 
2009), ED allocated funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to state 
education agencies for school turnaround efforts through competitive grants under State Fiscal 
Stabilization Funds, RttT, and increased support for a pre-existing  but previously underfunded SIG 
program authorized under Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. 
In addition, in specifying the selection criteria for RttT, ED included school turnaround among the 
reforms state education agencies must agree to enact in order to be awarded funding. This section of 
the application asked states to propose a plan to identify their lowest-achieving schools, demonstrate 
the authority and capacity to intervene, and commit to reforming each intervention school with one of 
the four department-approved turnaround models—the turnaround model, restart model, closure 
model, and transformation model. ED first expressed its belief in these models when it stipulated that 
schools select and follow one of the four models in order to receive SIG awards and the department 
has consistently endorsed these turnaround models in subsequent reform initiatives.  
 The closure model is the most extreme and disruptive of the four reform models, as the school 
is permanently closed, its students re-enrolled elsewhere in the district, and the leadership and faculty 
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laid off with no guarantee of being rehired by another school. The restart model involves fundamental 
change to schools by transferring to management to an approved charter management organization 
(CMO) or education management organization (EMO). Restarts also required that schools allow any 
student enrolled in the school prior to restart to re-enroll in the new, independently-managed school.  
Under the turnaround and transformation models, schools remained open and under district 
management but undergo significant reconstitution and comprehensive reform. Both the turnaround 
and transformation models involved replacing the school principal, but differ in the amount of staff 
replacement and number of other reforms required. Turnaround required that in addition to replacing 
the principal, the LEA rehire no more than half of the school’s staff from the previous year. Beyond 
the staff reconstitution, however, the principal has greater autonomy to enact reform measures. The 
transformation model does not require staff replacement beyond the principal, but requires the school 
to accept management oversight of the implementation of specific reforms including more rigorous 
and evidence-based teacher evaluation, job-embedded professional development, curricular overhaul, 
and increased learning time through extension of either the school day or school year. The least 
disruptive of the four models, transformation, has been the dominant choice for reform models, 
implemented in almost 70% of RttT turnaround schools and over 70% of SIG schools nationwide 
(Dee, 2012; ED, 2011, 2014). 
Features of Race to the Top’s turnaround programs make them distinct from prior school 
turnaround initiatives and offer reasons to anticipate more successful outcomes. Unlike reform 
prescriptions under Comprehensive School Reform or NCLB sanctions, school turnaround under 
RttT and SIG require commitments to substantial and immediate change at the school level under one 
of the four available turnaround models. School turnaround efforts under RttT grants are further 
distinct from SIG awards in that they call for state education agencies to oversee reform 
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implementation rather than schools or districts themselves. This structure of oversight, in which 
organizational needs are assessed by external actors who then also monitor the fidelity of reform 
implementation, may have more power to effect change than elective measures lacking such external 
accountability. The 118 turnaround schools in North Carolina represent almost one-third of the 380 
schools falling under state-led RttT turnaround programs nationwide (ED, 2014), and thus present an 
important opportunity to evaluate the potential for state education agencies to manage successful 
school turnaround initiatives. 
 North Carolina’s plan for school turnaround was a strength in its application for RttT funding, 
scoring 40 out of 50 possible points in this section of its grant application. The federal grant 
reviewers noted favorably the state’s legal authority to intervene in districts and schools as well as a 
capacity for turnaround efforts demonstrated by its “Turnaround Schools” program that operated 
from 2006 to 2010. The District and School Transformation (DST) division of NCDPI administered 
the previous school transformation initiative, which was charged with improving proficiency and 
graduation outcomes of every school in the state below 60% in either measure (Thompson, Brown, 
Townsend, Henry, & Fortner, 2011). The state’s new turnaround initiative under RttT, known as 
TALAS (Turning Around Low-Achieving Schools), would operate under the DST and enact the 
prescribed reform models in the lowest five percent of schools in the state as measured by SY2010 
proficiency rate on required state tests (passing rate), also known as the School Performance 
Composite.  
DATA 
This study draws primarily from publically-available data on the composition and performance of 
North Carolina schools. Schools’ achievement as measured by the passing rate for end-of grade and 
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end-of-course standardized tests, attainment as measured by graduation rate, percentage of students 
eligible for free and reduced-price lunch, and minority composition are all reported annually by 
NCDPI as part of the state’s accountability model. For school value-added and student-level 
achievement measures, the analysis data draw from a comprehensive, longitudinal statewide dataset 
maintained by the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill’s Educational Policy Initiative at 
Carolina (EPIC). Proprietary school value-added measures, which became a formal part of the state’s 
accountability system in 2014-2015, are calculated by SAS Institute and provided to EPIC by 
NCDPI. For student achievement, the sample includes student-level test scores on math, English, and 
biology end-of-course (EOC) and end-of-grade (EOG) achievement exams in reading and math for 
grades 3-8 as well as science EOG for 5th and 8th grades. 
The dependent variables in this analysis are school-level passing rate,1 graduation rate, school 
value-added, and student-level achievement scores on EOG and EOC exams. School-level graduation 
rate data uses the state’s official graduation statistics which represent the proportion of entering 9th 
graders who graduate within four years (North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 2015). 
passing rate, graduation rate, and school value-added each provide just one data point for each school 
per year, limiting the statistical power of effect estimates for these measures. This low power is 
                                                            
1 In North Carolina, students take end-of-grade (EOG) tests in reading and mathematics in grades 3-8, and end-of-course 
(EOC) tests in a number of courses usually taken during 9th or 10th grade. For each EOC and unique subject-grade EOG 
exam, cut scores demarcate the level of command a student demonstrates over the tested knowledge and skills as 
“Limited” (Level 1), “Partial” (Level 2), “Sufficient” (Level 3), “Solid” (Level 4), or “Superior” (Level 5). See Table 2 
for a summary of exams included in the calculation of passing rates by year. Passing rates are calculated as the percentage 
of all EOC and EOG tests taken in a school each year which meet a standard of at least “Sufficient” (Level 3), the level 
demarking proficiency for school accountability under NCLB (North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 2010). 
However, unlike NCLB reporting in which proficiency is reported as the percentage of students achieving proficiency by 
subject and grade, for schools’ overall passing rate it is the total number of tests taken and not the number of students 
tested which serves as the denominator because individual students often take tests in multiple subjects each year, creating 
multiple student-level observations within schools. For 2,489 North Carolina schools in the 2009-2010 school year, the 
year used to determine assignment to TALAS, the average passing rate was 73.8%. By school level, the average passing 
rates were 73.8% for elementary schools, 70.9% for middle schools, and 76.9% for secondary schools. A summary of 
specific tests included in the passing rates by outcome year is provided in Table 10. 
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especially pronounced for graduation rate, which are only available for secondary schools. The utility 
of a passing rate in measuring effects is also limited in that it measures effects at just one point in the 
distribution of student learning—near the test-specific cutoff for proficiency—and thereby ignores 
gains among students who improve without reaching proficiency or who improve but were above the 
cutoff prior to treatment. This issue could be particularly problematic in the present context, as the 
low passing rates of the treatment schools suggest especially large proportions of students below the 
proficiency threshold.  
School value-added scores offer measures sensitive to changes in student performance 
throughout the achievement distribution, though they are still measured at the school level and thus 
offer limited statistical power. These analyses use schools’ EVAAS (Education Value-Added 
Assessment System) scores, the official value-added measures estimated by SAS Institute. School 
EVAAS are first available for the 2011-2012 school year. While this allows for school value-added 
estimations in each of the outcome years, there is no baseline control from 2009-2010. The absence 
of data from the baseline year also precludes several of the WWC standards checks that involve 
observations of the outcome in the absence of treatment. As reflected in Table 1, school value-added 
data are incomplete and more likely to be missing among TALAS schools than in non-treated schools 
also near the assignment threshold. The significant differences in the rate of missing outcome data 
between treatment and comparison schools may compromise inferences in treatment effects based on 
school value-added.  
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Table 1: School value-added data availability by assignment, 2011-2012 through 2013-2014. 
Year All Comparison1 TALAS
 Correlation w/ 
passing rate2 
2011-2012 98.7% 98.9% 95.0% ** -0.006  
2012-2013 99.5% 99.2% 94.0% ** 0.092 *** 
2013-2014 90.0% 90.6% 90.6%  0.028  
1 Comparison sample includes schools within 1.25 standard deviations of the assignment threshold. 
2 Correlation coefficient between school value-added data availability and school passing rate, within 
treatment and comparison samples. 
    * p < 0.05,  ** p  < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Passing rates and school value-added are both calculated using student achievement scores. 
Given the lack of sensitivity of the passing rate variable, the missing data for school value-added, and 
the lower power of both, the student achievement models are more informative in the evaluation of 
TALAS’s effect on student learning in the turnaround schools. 
School-level covariates included in the models using school-level outcomes include the 
proportion of students who are black or Hispanic, the proportion of students who are economically 
disadvantaged (as identified by qualifying for federal lunch assistance), the proportion identified as 
English Language Learners (ELL), and the proportion identified as having an academically relevant 
disability (IEP). These school characteristics are the same as those included in Dee's (2012) study of 
SIG grant effects in California. Given the assumption under regression discontinuity that conditional 
on the forcing variable observations near the assignment threshold are equal in expected outcomes, 
covariates should not affect the estimates but are included to improve precision.  
For the student achievement models, covariate adjustments are made at the student level 
rather than at the school level to more precisely identify treatment effects on individual student 
performance. Covariates include binary indicators for student race, gender, ELL status, economic 
disadvantage, academic or intellectual giftedness, being either overage or underage, mid-year movers. 
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The model also includes indicators for students in advanced and remedial tracks for the subject tested, 
same-subject prior year scores, and days absent during the current school year. 
TALAS began implementation midway through the 2010-2011 school year (SY2011), but 
was not fully implemented in all turnaround schools until 2011-2012 (SY2012). The effects of the 
TALAS intervention are estimated in terms of school passing rate, school graduation rate, school 
school value-added, and student achievement in the 2011-2012 (SY2012), 2012-2013 (SY2013), and 
2013-2014 (SY2014) school years.  
SAMPLE 
The DST applied several exclusion criteria to determine eligibility before identifying schools for 
TALAS treatment. Schools ineligible for participation in TALAS included charter schools, state-run 
schools (without a local education agency), schools serving special populations of students such as 
students with disabilities or under correction or rehabilitation, and schools with non-traditional 
themes. Of the 2,756 schools with performance data for SY2010, the exclusion criteria identify 307 
schools ineligible for turnaround assignment and 2,449 eligible. These categorical exclusion criteria 
restrict the sample to only those schools potentially eligible for turnaround intervention.  
Because passing rate vary systematically by grade level, the DST identified the bottom five 
percent of elementary, middle, and secondary schools separately. Because of the systematically 
higher passing rate of high schools, simply taking the lowest 5% of all schools would have resulted in 
an over-representation of elementary schools and an under-representation of high schools in the 
treatment group. Treatment within each level followed strict assignment with SY2010 passing rate act 
as the forcing variable, referred to as a “forcing variable” or “assignment variable” as it forced 
schools into TALAS assignment. Due to the separate identification of the lowest five-percent of 
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schools by level, the numeric cut-point for assignment varies between elementary, middle, and 
secondary schools. For elementary schools, the cut-point is 52.4%; for middle schools 53.3%; and for 
high schools 58.1%. These thresholds forced an assignment to treatment of 65 elementary schools 
(4.80% of eligible elementary schools), 24 middle schools (5.35%), and 19 high schools (4.11%). 
Excluding schools which followed the closure model, these cut points result in an assignment to 
treatment of 59 elementary schools, 21 middle schools, and 14 high schools. Of these 94 schools, 85 
followed the “transformation” model, with only 9 schools (all in one district) following the 
“turnaround” model. No schools in North Carolina underwent restart. 
Additionally, the original TALAS treatment group included seven high schools above the 
passing rate threshold that were selected for turnaround based a second forcing variable threshold, 
graduation rate below 60%. One of these schools closed while the others followed the transformation 
model. The inclusion of these schools is significant for the design of this study because it 
compromises the otherwise strict assignment of the forcing variable. Multiple strategies can address 
these crossover schools—a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity or two potential frontier regression 
discontinuity models, one for each of the assignment variables. These methods are discussed further 
in the method section. 
Another potential confounder exists in the concurrent School Improvement Grants (SIG) 
awarded to 24 North Carolina schools based on similar performance criteria to the TALAS 
assignment (US Department of Education, 2011). Though SIG recipients follow identical reform 
models to those implemented by the DST, their turnaround efforts fall under the purview of their 
districts and not the DST office of NCDPI. For this reason, they are not considered treatment schools 
in this evaluation. SIG schools present minimal threat to bias the effect estimates of this study as a 
majority of the grants were awarded to alternative schools ineligible for TALAS due to the exclusion 
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criteria detailed above. Of the 24 SIG schools in the state, only two were in the pool of schools 
eligible for TALAS. Either considering the SIG high schools as treated or excluding them from the 
sample, changes to point estimates are negligible and the main results are unchanged. 
Only six schools identified as lowest-achieving initially followed the closure model, and as a 
result of their immediate closures they have no outcome data in the years in which this study 
estimates program effects. An additional six TALAS schools eventually followed the closure 
model—four after SY2011 and two more following SY2012. These schools are included in the 
treatment samples for the years in which they were open. That is, a school that closed after the 2012-
2013 school years would be included in models for outcomes from SY2012 and SY2013, but not 
SY2014. 
 As noted, no schools in North Carolina adopted a restart model and schools following the 
closure model have no outcome data for analysis. This study therefore examines the effects of the 
transformation and turnaround models, which required, among other reforms: leadership change, 
curricular overhaul, increased recruitment and retention efforts, and coaching-intensive professional 
development.2 Specific model-by-year counts for only those schools selected based on passing rate 
are shown in Table 2. Similar model-by-year counts including high schools assigned to turnaround 
services based on graduation rate are shown in Table 3. 
  
                                                            
2 Although research on the implementation of these models under the SIG program in California finds greater impact from 
the turnaround model than the transformation model (Dee, 2012), this report does not differentiate the two because the 
turnaround model was used primarily by only one district, confounding the impacts of the model itself with the specific 
context and capacity of the district. In a separate, co-authored study, we specifically explore the contrast in treatment 
effects between these two models within this district.  
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Table 2: North Carolina school turnaround models by year (2010-2011 through 2013-2014), restricted 
to schools identified based on passing rate only. 
 
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Transformation 94 90 88 88
Turnaround 9 10 11 11
Closure1 6 3 2 0
Restart 1 1 0 0
TOTAL 110 104 101 99
1 Schools assigned for closure are not counted in years following closure. 
 
 
 
Table 3: North Carolina school turnaround models by year (2010-2011 through 2013-2014), schools 
identified based on passing or graduation rates 
 
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Transformation 102 97 95 95
Turnaround 9 10 11 11
Closure1 6 4 2 0
Restart 1 1 0 0
TOTAL 118 112 108 106
1 Schools assigned for closure are not counted in years following closure. 
 
 
METHOD 
Assignment to treatment based on prior passing rate creates an opportunity to estimate a local average 
treatment effect (LATE) at the threshold between treatment and control using a regression 
discontinuity design, which exploits local exogeneity in non-random assignment to infer causal 
impacts from quasi-experimental data (Cook, 2008; van der Klauww, 2008; Lee and Lemiuex, 2009). 
In the regression discontinuity framework, an outcome variable (often subsequent measures of the 
assignment variable) is modeled as a function of the assignment variable. A break, or discontinuity, in 
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this functional relationship at the threshold value of the forcing variable is inferred to be the local 
treatment effect at the assignment threshold. Notably, this LATE is not an average treatment effect 
(ATE) and thus cannot be inferred as an overall treatment effect unless treatment effects are assumed 
to be homogenous, thus findings from this study may not generalize to all treated schools, including 
those lowest-achieving schools furthest from the assignment threshold. The Institute of Education 
Science’s (IES) What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) specifies several conditions which must be met 
in order for causal inferences to be valid (Schochet et al., 2010). These conditions include integrity of 
the forcing variable, limited attrition, continuity of the outcome-forcing variable relationship, and the 
correct identification of the functional form and optimal bandwidth. The next section of this chapter 
describes the extent to which this study meets these standards.  
In the TALAS analysis, schools’ passing rate and graduation rate in the post-intervention 
years are modeled as functions of the SY2010 passing rate upon which assignment to treatment was 
determined. The threshold of the SY2010 passing rate refers to the value below which schools were 
assigned to school turnaround, and above which schools were exempt. Because the threshold of the 
SY2010 passing rate varied by elementary, middle, and secondary grade levels, the forcing variable is 
centered within each of these grade levels by subtracting from each school’s passing rate the 
threshold value for its grade level. As a result, an adjusted composite of zero represents the threshold 
value in each level and the observations across all three school levels can be combined into an 
equation specified as: 
(1) ݕ௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ݔ௝௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܨሺܴܲଵ଴௖௝ሻ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ݖ௝ ൅ ߚସ ∗ ݖ௝ ∗ ܨሺܴܲଵ଴௖௝ሻ ൅ ߝ௝௧ 
Where yjt represents the standardized outcome for school j in year t, xjt is a vector of school 
characteristics in year t. F(PR10cj) is a function of the threshold-centered standardized SY2010 
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passing rate for school j which is optimized to fit the functional form of the data for each model, and z 
is the treatment indicator equal to 1 for schools receiving turnaround services and 0 for schools that 
did not qualify. The main effect of treatment is captured by β3, the coefficient on the treatment 
indicator z, and captures the discontinuity in the linear relationship between the forcing variable PR10c 
and the outcome y at the threshold. The interaction term between the treatment indicator and the 
forcing variable allows the slope (relationship between pre- and post-treatment outcomes) represented 
by β4 to vary between treatment and control in addition to the discontinuity main effect represented by 
β3. This model is used to estimate each school-level outcome by year and grade level.   
The model for student achievement outcomes is specified as: 
(2) ݕ௜௝௞௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ݓ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ݕ௜௝௞௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଷ ∗ ܨሺܴܲଵ଴௖௝ሻ ൅ ߚସ ∗ ݖ௝ ൅ ߚହ ∗ ݖ௝ ∗ ܨሺܴܲଵ଴௖௝ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
Where yijkt represents a standardized outcome for student i in school j in subject k in year t, yikjt 
is student i’s prior year score34 in the same subject, k, in year t-1, and wit is a vector of student 
characteristics in year t. Because prior year scores are used as controls in the model, students in 
treatment schools in both t and t-1 have post-treatment outcomes as baseline controls, meaning any 
results identified in a given year are above and beyond treatment effects from the prior year. This may 
                                                            
3 For all EOG tests in 4th through 8th grade reading and mathematics, same-subject scores from the prior year are used as 
controls. For high school End-of-Course exams, prior scores are taken from students’ 8th-grade EOG tests. In some cases, 
this is a two-year lag. For science tests in 5th and 8th grades as well as high school biology, students’ ELA scores from the 
prior year are used as controls, as ELA scores were found to be more predictive than prior math scores for future science 
performance. 
4 Including prior scores as a control variable case-wise deletes all observations without such prior scores. To the extent 
that students without prior test scores, such as out-of-state movers or migrants, are over-represented in treatment schools, 
this has the potential to bias estimates. As a robustness check, alternative models are tested in which prior scores are 
interacted with a binary indicator for having data. As a result, missing prior data results in an intercept adjustment for 
predicted achievement. The results were similar in direction, magnitude, and significance levels, suggesting that missing 
prior test scores in the sample is not a source of significant bias. 
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attenuate estimated treatment effects, with attenuation increasing in later years as student baseline 
controls include up to three years of prior treatment effects.  
As in the school-level outcome models, F(PR10cj) is once again a function of the threshold-
centered standardized SY2010 passing rate for school j which is optimized to fit the functional form 
of the data for each model, and z is the treatment indicator equal to 1 for students in schools receiving 
turnaround services and 0 for students in schools that did not qualify. The main effect of treatment in 
the student achievement models is represented by β4, the coefficient on the treatment indicator z, and 
captures the discontinuity in the linear relationship between the forcing variable PR10c and the 
outcome y at the threshold. The interaction term between the treatment indicator and the forcing 
variable allows the slope (relationship between pre- and post-treatment outcomes) represented by β5 
to vary between treatment and control in addition to the discontinuity main effect represented by β4. 
Error terms in the student achievement models are expressed as ߝ௜௝௧, without the k subject indicators 
because errors are clustered at the student level for all tests to account for serial correlation of errors 
across subjects for individual students. 
Although assignment to TALAS followed strict assignment to treatment based on SY2010 
school passing rate, the addition of seven high schools based on their graduation rate which fell below 
the 60 percent graduation rate threshold even though they had passing rate above the passing rate 
cutoff, and two SIG-recipient high schools above the passing rate threshold constitute potential 
confounders to the effect estimates. Because all non-compliance to the passing rate-based assignment 
threshold pertains to secondary schools, for models limited to only elementary and middle school 
outcomes, strict regression discontinuity designs apply as specified above. For effect estimates 
specific to secondary schools or including secondary schools, the following models address non-
compliance in three ways. First is a fuzzy regression discontinuity, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
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model. In the first stage, each school’s probability of assignment, P(z), is expressed as a function of 
its SY2010 passing rate, ܴܲଵ଴௖௝: 
(3) ܲሺz௝ሻ ൌ 	ߙ଴଴ ൅	 ௝ܺߙ௫௝ 	൅ ߙ௉ோܨሺܴܲଵ଴௖௝ሻ ൅		ݒ௝௧ 
In this first stage equation, the probability of assignment for school j is estimated as a function of the 
school’s student body characteristics x, and its SY2010 standardized and threshold-centered passing 
rate, ܴܲଵ଴௖௝.   
 The second and third methods for addressing the violation of strict treatment assignment are 
frontier regression discontinuity designs. Secondary schools, which could be assigned to turnaround 
for either passing rate or graduation rate, present a multiple rating-score scenario which can be 
addressed using a “frontier” regression discontinuity approach described by Reardon and Robinson 
(2012) and earlier implemented by Dee (2012) to evaluate the effects of another school turnaround 
program, SIG. In Dee’s study, California schools needed to fall below thresholds of both performance 
and progress in order to be eligible for SIG awards. By using one criterion to define a “frontier space” 
of eligible schools and the other as the assignment threshold, this created two separate discontinuities. 
That is, among all schools below the performance threshold, progress acted as the forcing variable; 
among all schools below the progress threshold, performance acted as the forcing variable. Because 
the North Carolina context offers “either” rather than “and” criteria, it presents two analogous 
opportunities to analyze one of the two assignment variables in isolation within the frontier space of 
schools identified as eligible by the other. Figure 1 illustrates the frontiers created by the multiple 
forcing variables for North Carolina high schools, with passing rate on the x-axis, graduation rate on 
the y-axis, and reference lines indicating the assignment threshold for each measure. The frontiers 
between quadrant I. and quadrant II., and between quadrant I. and quadrant III. both represent strict 
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assignment thresholds between treated and untreated schools. First, taking the subset of secondary 
schools with SY2010 graduation rate above 60% (quadrants I. and II. in Figure 1), excludes schools 
above the passing rate threshold which received treatment in violation of the passing rate forcing 
variable (quadrant IV.), as well as the two schools falling below both the passing rate and graduation 
rate thresholds (quadrant II.). The strict treatment assignment among the remaining schools based on 
SY2010 passing rate as a single forcing variable (the x-axis reference line separating quadrants I. and 
II.) simplifies the identification strategy within the restricted sample space (above the y-axis reference 
line). Similarly, among all schools above the passing rate threshold (to the right of the x-axis 
reference line), the 60% graduation rate threshold strictly differentiates treatment (quadrant IV.) and 
untreated (quadrant I.) high schools. The North Carolina context thus supports the estimation of 
frontier regression discontinuity treatment effects at the passing rate threshold among high schools 
with SY2010 graduation rate above 60% (labeled “Frontier A”), and at the graduation rate threshold 
among high schools with SY2010 passing rate above the 58.1% assignment threshold (labeled 
“Frontier B”). Elementary schools and middle schools without a graduation rate are considered as 
falling within the Frontier A sample space for all-levels effect estimates for outcomes, but are 
excluded from Frontier B models for secondary schools that fall on the SY2010 graduation rate 
forcing variable continuum.  
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Figure 1. Treatment high schools by assignment variable.  
  
I. Non-treated schools 
II. Schools treated based on Passing Rate 
III. Schools treated based on Passing Rate or Graduation Rate 
IV. Schools treated based on Graduation Rate 
 
CHECKS FOR VIOLATIONS OF REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY ASSUMPTIONS 
Before estimation of the treatment effects, the validity of the assumptions needed for regression 
discontinuity designs to yield unbiased local average treatment effects must be analyzed. The What 
Works Clearinghouse (WWC) published by ED’s Institute of Education Sciences (IES) provides a set 
of standards to use in testing the assumptions made in regression discontinuity studies, which serve as 
a guide for efforts to check against potential validity threats. Before stating its four quality standards 
for regression discontinuity studies, the What Works Clearinghouse (Schochet et al., 2010), first 
defines an regression discontinuity study as one which meets each of the following criteria:  
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• Treatment assignments are based on a forcing variable; units with scores at or above (or 
below) a cutoff value are assigned to the treatment group while units with scores on the 
other side of the cutoff are assigned to the comparison group.  
• The forcing variable must be ordinal with a sufficient number of unique values.  
• There must be no factor confounded with the forcing variable. 
The TALAS program satisfies the first two criteria by schools’ assignment status being 
determined by their 2009-2010 passing rate, which represents the percentage of end-of-grade and 
end-of-course tests that met the state’s proficiency standards. Though the cutoff varies by school level 
(elementary, middle, secondary), after centering the forcing variable within level by subtracting the 
cutoff value from each observed values, all elementary and middle schools with a value below zero 
on the forcing variable were assigned to treatment and all schools with values above zero were 
excluded. The multiple forcing variables for secondary schools necessitates a qualifying statement 
that among schools not assigned to treatment by one forcing variable, assignment is strict with respect 
to the other forcing variable.  
The first quality standard specified by the WWC standards pertains to the integrity of the 
forcing variable and defines two criteria: non-manipulability of the forcing variable, and statistical 
and graphical evidence of non-manipulation. If units of analysis were able to manipulate their status 
relative to the treatment threshold, by either manipulating their value on the forcing variable or the 
threshold used as the cutoff for treatment assignment, this manipulability introduces the threat of 
selection bias. The WWC standards require a description of the assignment process that reflects that 
these standards are not violated. In the case of TALAS, this concern is muted by a number of factors. 
The forcing variable, school passing rate, represents the collective actions of a large number of 
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individuals. NCDPI selected this measure of school performance as the forcing variable, but the 
definition of the cutoff score (bottom five percent of performance) was specified by ED in its call for 
RttT grant proposals before state testing in the spring of 2010. Though assignment was determined by 
a cut-point in the passing rate, this threshold was determined based on the relative ranking of schools 
(5th percentile and below) and not a predetermined cut-point, and the numerical value of the passing 
rate corresponding with the 5th percentile was only determined after testing. Because this required that 
the school personnel know the placement of their score in the statewide distribution of scores, this 
process prevented any school from knowing the threshold before testing students in the spring 
semester of 2010, assessing their likely treatment status, and taking any unusual steps to manipulate 
their assignment. Additionally, the use of passing rate for accountability under NCLB provides a 
strong, and likely predominant, incentive for schools to perform as well on this measure as they can, 
regardless of the potential for assignment to turnaround.  
When a threshold is determined before the values of the assignment variable are calculated, 
the potential exists for sample subjects to manipulate their standing relative to the threshold and thus 
introduce selection bias; conversely, when a threshold is determined prior to calculation of the 
assignment variable, the potential for manipulation lies with the program architects to set a threshold 
that selectively excludes or includes specific units. In the case of TALAS, however, the two-step 
definition of the assignment threshold, in which the percentile-rank to be used to determine 
assignment was first chosen before testing by federal officials, and then values of the passing rate 
associated with the selected percentile were identified after testing, makes it especially unlikely that 
any school could manipulate either the threshold or its passing rate to influence treatment status. 
Unlike a subjective rating assigned by one evaluator or a small group of evaluators, the manipulation 
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of a passing rate by a school would require large effect on the scores of students or collusion on a 
scale that would likely be unattainable.  
In addition to these theoretical arguments, empirical evidence strongly supports the 
assumption of non-manipulation in the form of density and frequency plots of the values of the 
forcing variable. This information is displayed in Figure 2. These plots provide visual support that the 
forcing variable was not subject to manipulation near the treatment threshold. Additionally, a 
McCrary density test, which tests for discontinuities in the assignment variable density function that 
would be indicative of manipulation around the assignment threshold (McCrary, 2008), finds an 
nonsignificant log difference in height of the density function at the threshold (p=0.96), failing to 
reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the distribution. 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of 2009-2010 passing rates for schools eligible for assignment, centered at 
assignment threshold. 
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The second WWC quality standard for regression discontinuity studies specifies acceptable 
levels of attrition, both overall in the sample as well as differential attrition between the treated and 
untreated population.  In a study wherein the units of assignment and analysis are public schools and 
the outcome measure is mandated by the state, attrition is limited to school closure or non-reported 
data. Closure is rare overall, as 95% of schools that had data in the baseline year also have outcome 
data for the four years after assignment to treatment. However, the nature of the treatment could 
plausibly cause differential attrition rates, as school closure was one of the reform models involved in 
the program. Indeed, differences in attrition are statistically significant between treatment and 
comparison groups (see Table 4), but these differences shrink within the bandwidths used in the 
analysis (see Table 5). The combination of overall and differential attrition rates satisfies WWC 
attrition standards for the SY2011 and SY2012 outcomes, and for all outcome years within the 
bandwidths around the assignment threshold used for these models. 
 
Table 4. Overall and differential school-level attrition rates by year. 
      
 NON-TALAS TALAS  TOTAL DIFF.  
2010-2011 0.004 0.000  0.004 0.004  
2011-2012 0.010 0.083  0.014 -0.073 3
2012-2013 0.060 0.119  0.063 -0.059 1
2013-2014 0.040 0.119  0.044 -0.079 3
N 2,150 109  2,259
 
1 p<0.05, 2 p<0.01, 3 p<0.001 
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Table 5. Differential attrition within bandwidths around assignment threshold. 
 
 ALL bw=2.0 bw=1.5 bw=1.0 bw=0.5 
2010-11 0.003  0.007  0.010 -0.006 0.000
2011-12 -0.064 3 -0.062 3 -0.055 2 -0.057 2 -0.045
2012-13 -0.068 1 -0.065 3 -0.058 2 -0.058 1 -0.045
2013-14 -0.104 3 -0.092 3 -0.055 3 -0.086 2 -0.082 1
N (TALAS) 2,260 (110) 1,181 (107) 776 (105) 594 (102) 355 (95) 
Differences calculated by subtracting attrition rate (schools not present in a given year that were 
present in the 2009-2010 baseline year) among TALAS schools from the attrition of non-TALAS 
schools. 
Bandwidths stated in standard deviation units. 
1 p<0.05, 2 p<0.01, 3 p<0.001 
 
Standard 3 from the WWC states that a regression discontinuity study must provide evidence 
that, in the absence of treatment, the relationship between the forcing and outcome variables would be 
continuous. Continuity of the outcome-forcing variable relationship is established in a number of 
ways. The availability of multiple years of pre-observation data allows the demonstration of 
continuity of the outcome-forcing variable relationship in the absence of the intervention. Figure 3 
demonstrates the continuity between 2008-2009 passing rate and the 2009-2010 passing rate with a 
scatterplot that shows visual continuity as well as a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) 
line that shows a strong and continuous linear relationship.  
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Figure 3. Relationship between 2008-2009 and 2009-10 passing rates.  
 
 
Continuity in the forcing-outcome relationship can also be tested indirectly through an 
assessment of the balance between the treated and comparison samples on key baseline covariates 
between treatment and control, conditional on the forcing variable (Schochet et al., 2010). To 
consider the potential that pre-treatment differences in the demographic composition of treatment and 
non-treatment schools occur at random at the assignment threshold and drive any observed treatment 
effects, school demographic characteristics known to be associated with student achievement are 
regressed as outcomes and tested for discontinuities at the treatment threshold. That is, each school 
demographic variable, such as economic disadvantage (measured as the percentage of students 
qualifying for free and reduced-price lunch), is modeled as an outcome and tested for discontinuity in 
the relationship between the forcing variable and school demographic variable at the threshold. Such 
a discontinuity could not be attributable to treatment, especially when modeling pre-treatment school 
characteristics, and would call into question any findings of treatment effects on other outcomes of 
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interest. Demographic variables tested include the proportion of students who are black, Hispanic, 
Asian, qualify for federal lunch assistance, are classified as English Language Learners (ELL), or 
have a disability (IEP). As evidenced in Table 6, these regressions do not find statistically significant 
discontinuity in these covariates at the cutoff of the forcing variable, suggesting pre-treatment balance 
between treatment and comparison schools.  
 
Table 6. Discontinuity of forcing variable-covariate relationship at assignment threshold. 
 
Covariate (2011-2012) β S.E. 
Per-pupil expenditure 0.036 (0.03) 
Free or reduced-price lunch 0.089 (0.11) 
Minority 0.051 (0.60) 
Average daily membership -0.227 (0.14) 
Effects and standard errors are in standard deviation units 
 
 
 
Standard 3 also stipulates that in order to interpret a discontinuity in the forcing-outcome 
variable relationship at the cut-off as a causal estimate of the treatment effect, there must be no un-
explained discontinuities in the outcome variable at values of the forcing variable away from the 
assignment threshold. To satisfy this criterion, treatment effects at placebo values of the forcing 
variable are tested on both sides of the assignment threshold, where discontinuities in the forcing-
outcome variable relation could not be attributed to assignment. Since the true cutoff values were 
selected to identify the fifth percentile of school performance and below, the treatment sample shrinks 
quickly when this threshold is lowered further, and estimates of cutoffs more than 0.7 standard 
deviations below the true threshold value produce treatment samples too small (less than 25 schools) 
for stable effect estimates. As demonstrated in Figure 4 with 2014 student achievement scores, results 
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appear to be robust across a range of values of the forcing variable. This is consistent for outcomes 
with significant effects, and less relevant for models with no discontinuity in the outcome (effect) 
detected at the assignment threshold. The models also control for baseline school covariates, though 
their inclusion is expected to have a negligible impact on the estimates if the functional form 
specification is correct (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008), but may increase precision. 
 The fourth and final WWC standard pertains to the functional form specification of the 
forcing-outcome variable relationship and the bandwidth of the forcing variable around the 
assignment threshold within which the analysis sample is drawn. As stated by the standards, both the 
correct model specification and correct bandwidth selection are essential in order for regression 
discontinuity designs to produce unbiased effect estimates. Standard 4’s criterion that the statistical 
model control for the assignment variable is satisfied by the model as described above, which 
includes both the assignment variable as well as higher-order terms if determined needed during 
model fitting. Standard 4 also states that, at a minimum, slopes of the assignment-outcome variable 
relationship must be allowed to vary on either side of the assignment threshold. The models in this 
study meet this standard by interacting the assignment variable with the treatment indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Figure 4. Effect size by cut-score adjustment, 2014 student achievement, all schools (fuzzy regression 
discontinuity) 
 
 
 Optimal model fit is determined by outcome (passing rate, graduation rate, school value-
added, and student achievement), sample (all schools, elementary and middle, or secondary), and year 
(SY2012, SY2013, and SY2014) by estimating models including up to a fourth polynomial term of 
the threshold-centered forcing variable as well as an interaction with the treatment indicator, and 
preferring a model in which either the polynomial term or its interaction is significant at p<0.05. A 
summary of these preferred models for the passing rate models is given in Table 7. To maintain 
consistency across models, the highest ordered term by outcome-and-sample across the three years is 
applied across all years by outcome. Retention of the highest ordered term by outcome-and-sample 
across all years, as well as taking a functional form fit to all data and applying it in models using a 
restricted sample falling within restricted bandwidths as discussed in the following paragraph, in 
several cases results in the retention of more terms than would have been retained otherwise. These 
additional terms reduce bias, though this reduction in bias necessarily comes at the expense of 
decreased precision. 
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Table 7. Highest significant polynomial order of forcing variable by sample and model. 
 
PASSING RATE 2012 2013 2014 Highest 
All schools (Fuzzy) 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
All schools (Frontier A) 2nd  2nd 2nd 2nd  
     
Elementary & Middle 2nd 2nd  2nd 2nd 
     
Secondary (Fuzzy)  2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 
Secondary (Frontier A)  2nd 3rd 2nd 2nd 
Secondary (Frontier B) 1st 1st  1st  1st  
     
SCHOOL VALUE-ADDED 2012 2013 2014 Highest 
All schools (Fuzzy) 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
All schools (Frontier A) 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
     
Elementary & Middle 2nd 1st 2nd 2nd 
     
Secondary (Fuzzy) 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Secondary (Frontier A) 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Secondary (Frontier B) 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
     
GRADUATION RATE 2012 2013 2014 Highest 
Secondary (Fuzzy) 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 
Secondary (Frontier A) 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 
Secondary (Frontier B) 1st 1st 1st 1st 
     
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 2012 2013 2014 Highest 
All schools (Fuzzy) 2nd 3rd 3rd 3rd 
All schools (Frontier A) 2nd 3rd 3rd 3rd 
     
Elementary & Middle 3rd 3rd 3rd 3rd 
     
Secondary (Fuzzy) 4th 3rd 3rd 4th 
Secondary (Frontier A) 3rd 4th 4th 4th 
Secondary (Frontier B) 2nd 4th 2nd 4th 
 
Within the regression discontinuity framework, bandwidths refer to symmetrical ranges 
around the threshold value of the forcing variable within which sub-samples of observations (all 
within the bandwidth) are included in the analytical sample. The bandwidth restriction improves the 
accuracy of the effect estimate at the assignment threshold by eliminating the influence of 
observations far from the threshold on the local treatment effect. Because restricted bandwidths limit 
the sample space within which the LATE estimate is drawn rather than using model parameters to 
specify outcomes across the full range of the forcing variable, bandwidth-restricted estimates are 
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referred to as nonparametric localized linear regressions (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012). 
Narrower bandwidths create more similar groups of treated and untreated observations near the 
threshold and rely less on the specification of the correct functional form between the forcing variable 
and outcome to yield unbiased estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE). However, the 
inherent sample restriction imposed by narrower bandwidths results in a corresponding loss of 
statistical power. Alternatively, because the lowest performance composites among eligible schools 
fell within 3.02 standard deviations of the assignment threshold, bandwidths larger than +/- 3.02 add 
only untreated schools, and no treated schools, which add no additional support to causal inference of 
the LATE. Figure 5 displays the size of the effect estimates on 2014 student achievement in the all-
school fuzzy regression discontinuity by bandwidth, and suggests that small bandwidths yield small 
negative effect estimate, but when the bandwidth is expanded to the optimal range (represented by the 
vertical reference line), results are positive. As with the cut-score adjustment robustness checks, this 
is consistent for outcomes with significant effects, and less relevant for models with no discontinuity 
in the outcome detected at the assignment threshold. 
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Figure 5. Lowess fit of effect sizes by bandwidth: 2014 student achievement, all schools (fuzzy 
regression discontinuity) 
 
 
 
 Identification of optimal bandwidths by year and outcome follows the method developed by 
Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2011), using the “IKbandwidth” operation in the “rdd” package in R 
(Dimmery, 2015). The Imbens & Kalyanaraman method suggested optimal bandwidths across all 
outcomes in which passing rate acts as the forcing variable average roughly 1.2 standard deviations of 
the threshold-centered assignment variable. For Frontier B models in which graduation rate acts as 
the forcing variable, the optimal bandwidth is identified as about +/-0.5. For each model, the results 
table (Table 9) reports the optimal bandwidths selected as well as the number of treatment schools 
that fall within the bandwidth. Standard 4 also requires graphical analysis of the forcing-outcome 
variable relationship to support the selection of model specification and bandwidth. This graphical 
analysis is presented using both bins and fitted curve depictions of the forcing-outcome variable 
relationship in Figure 6. The comparative gaps estimated at the threshold between localized weighted 
sum of squares (lowess) and simple linear fits support a functional form specification with higher 
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order terms of the forcing variable. Optimal bandwidths for each outcome by year and model are 
listed in the results summary in Table 9 under the columns labeled “OB” for optimal bandwidth. 
 
Figure 6. Lowess and scatter plot: 2013-2014 Passing Rates, all grade levels 
  
 
Finally, Standard 4 states that impacts should be estimated separately in each site of a multi-
site treatment program. This standard covers the potential that intervention success may 
systematically vary due to programmatic differences when multiple parties are responsible for 
implementation, or due to inherent differences in the context or culture of the sites themselves. With 
regard to the concern for differences in implementation fidelity across multiple sites, the DST 
division acted as the sole overseer of program implementation. The distinction between these levels 
of schools and differences in the respective cut-scores applied to each level is potentially relevant for 
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a number of reasons. The age of students, differences in pedagogical and leadership methods, and 
parental expectations each have the potential to bare endemic differences across these school levels. 
Each of these characteristics thus have the potential to differentially mediate the effects of the 
intervention program, the features of which did not differ significantly across schooling levels. High 
school performance has been specifically motivated by research on “dropout factories” (Balfanz & 
Legters, 2004) in which fewer than sixty percent of students earn a diploma within four years. 
Further, research on U.S. high school performance on national and international assessments has 
found that secondary school achievement has stalled over the past several decades, and fallen further 
behind in international rankings than US elementary or middle school performance (Grigg, Donahue, 
& Dion, 2007; Provasnik, Gonzales, & Miller, 2009). Fuhrman and Elmore (2004) identify several 
features of high schools that distinguish both their organization and purpose from that of schools 
serving younger pupils, including their larger enrollments, subject-area departmentalization of 
faculty, more diverse student bodies resulting from larger catchment areas, and their unique mission 
in helping students transition into college, the workforce, and adulthood. These distinguishing 
characteristics may reflect a need for different features in reform programs than those found to be 
successful in schools serving younger students. 
A summary of What Works Clearinghouse standards for regression discontinuity studies and 
the evidence of compliance for the present study is provided in Table 8. 
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Table 8: IES What Works Clearinghouse regression discontinuity standards compliance. 
CRITERIA COMPLIANCE SUMMARY 
Treatment assignments based on a 
forcing variable 
Schools selected on basis of 2009-2010 passing rate. Additional 
seven high schools selected based on 2009-2010 graduation rates 
Forcing variable ordinal with 
sufficient number of unique values 
Passing rates and graduation rates provide unique values of a 
ratio measure, which supersedes ordinal measurement. 
No factor confounded with the 
forcing variable 
SIG grants were only other state intervention specific to low-
performing schools, but went to alternative schools not in sample. 
  
STANDARD COMPLIANCE SUMMARY 
1. Integrity of Forcing Variable  
   A. Institutional Integrity * 5% norm-referenced forcing variable harder to manipulate than 
criterion-referenced 
* Schools not aware of threshold prior to testing 
* Threshold specified by ED, not NCDPI 
* Schools already had incentive to maximize forcing variable 
   B. Statistical Integrity McCrary density test shows no discontinuity of the density of 
schools on either side of the threshold, supporting no 
manipulation of treatment status 
2. Attrition Attrition rates not significant different between treatment and 
control within optimal bandwidths for the regression 
discontinuity 
3. Continuous relationship 
between forcing variable and 
outcome in absence of treatment 
* Continuous relationship in years prior to treatment 
* No discontinuity in relationship between forcing variable and 
key school demographic variables 
* Results consistent with “placebo” cutoffs, meaning no 
unexplained discontinuities at other points on the forcing variable 
4. Specification  
   A. Functional form * Highest-order polynomial terms of the forcing variable found to 
be significant in full sample are applied within restricted 
bandwidths, overfitting model 
* Highest-order term for model and outcome across years applied 
for all years. 
B. Optimal bandwidth * Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2011) method for optimal bandwidth 
identification applied 
* Where insufficient observations for IK method, models use 
smallest bandwidth that included all treatment observations 
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RESULTS 
Table 9 summarizes the effect estimates of treatment by year, outcome, and model. In regard to 
passing rate outcomes in rows 1-6, none of the models find consistent evidence of a treatment effect 
on school passing rates in any of the outcome years. That is, the regression discontinuity does not 
suggest that TALAS has been successful in increasing overall passing rate for schools close to the 
assignment threshold. Of the six models across three years of passing rate, only one of the point 
estimates is statistically significant at p < .05, with the Frontier B model for secondary schools (in 
which graduation rate acts as the forcing variable among schools above the passing rate threshold) 
finding a significant positive effect of 0.809 sdu. The all-schools Frontier A model (which excludes 
high schools with SY2010 graduation rate below 60% including seven that received treatment) and 
the elementary & middle school (in which assignment was strict with respect to the cut-off value of 
the forcing variable) models estimate positive effects as large as 0.20sdu, but they are not statistically 
significant. The secondary models estimate effects ranging from -0.406 to +0.736 that fail to reach 
statistical significance due to the small sample size of secondary schools. The lack of significant 
results for later years casts specific doubt that TALAS has sustained increased proficiency rates in 
treated schools closest to the assignment cutoff.  
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Table 9: Effect estimates by outcome and model. 
 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 
PASSING RATE β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB 
All schools (Fuzzy) 0.047  1.78 -0.136  2.27 -0.053  2.15 
 (0.75)   (0.21)   (0.63)   
All schools (Frontier A) 0.261  1.74 0.002  2.51 0.179  1.89 
 (0.22)   (0.99)   (0.29)   
Elementary & Middle 0.243  1.71 -0.072  1.56 0.165  1.70 
 (0.33)   (0.71)   (0.44)   
Secondary (Fuzzy) -0.166  1.95 -0.085  1.95 -0.275  1.95 
 (0.56)   (0.72)   (0.22)   
Secondary (Frontier A) 0.570  1.47 -0.012  1.47 -0.406  1.47 
 (0.29)   (0.98)   (0.36)   
Secondary (Frontier B) 0.736  0.54 0.809 * 0.54 0.153  0.54 
 (0.07)   (0.04)   (0.60)   
SCHOOL VALUE-ADDED β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB 
All schools (Fuzzy) -0.328  1.81 0.247  1.39 -0.200  1.40 
 (0.13)   (0.31)   (0.40)   
All schools (Frontier A) -0.396  1.84 0.442  1.38 -0.354  1.38 
 (0.15)   (0.16)   (0.25)   
Elementary & Middle -0.306  1.40 -0.007  1.27 -0.372  1.77 
 (0.33)   (0.98)   (0.21)   
Secondary (Fuzzy) -0.374  1.95 -0.186  1.95 -1.193 * 1.95 
 (0.57)   (0.78)   (0.04)   
Secondary (Frontier A) 0.722  1.47 2.342  1.47 -0.532  1.47 
 (0.53)   (0.10)   (0.65)   
Secondary (Frontier B) 2.531  0.62 4.105  0.62 -7.385 * 0.62 
 (0.37)   (0.06)   (0.02)   
GRADUATION RATE β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB 
Secondary (Fuzzy) -0.474  1.95 -0.148  1.95 -0.102  1.95 
 (0.08)   (0.62)   (0.74)   
Secondary (Frontier A) 0.741  1.47 0.366  1.47 0.854  1.47 
 (0.19)   (0.58)   (0.21)   
Secondary (Frontier B) -0.083  0.59 0.687  0.59 0.143  0.59 
 (0.86)   (0.20)   (0.76)   
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB β/(p)  OB 
All schools (Fuzzy) 0.036 *** 1.12 0.033 *** 1.31 0.016 * 1.31 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   
All schools (Frontier A) -0.050 *** 0.98 -0.030 ** 1.28 -0.031 *** 1.28 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Elementary & Middle -0.081 *** 1.32 -0.036 *** 1.01 -0.043 *** 1.01 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Secondary (Fuzzy) 0.065 *** 0.96 0.023  1.74 0.140 *** 1.74 
 (0.00)   (0.19)   (0.00)   
Secondary (Frontier A) 0.054 * 0.98 0.078 ** 1.27 -0.011  1.27 
 (0.04)   (0.00)   (0.61)   
Secondary (Frontier B) 0.510 *** 0.42 0.731 *** 0.42 0.689 ** 0.42 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   
    * p < 0.05;  ** p  < 0.01; *** p < 0.001  
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School value-added outcome effects are summarized in rows 7-12 of Table 9. With missing 
data compounding the issues of sample size found in passing rate outcomes, school value-added 
effect estimates are unstable across years and models, especially in the secondary school models. The 
all-school models generally estimate negative effects, though none approach statistical significance: 
the smallest p-value is 0.13. Given that school value-added estimates are based on the EOG and EOC 
scores used in the student achievement analyses and use similar methodology, the achievement 
analyses represent more valid estimates of the LATE of TALAS on student achievement outcomes 
than the school value-added analyses. 
 Results of the graduation rate are listed in rows 13-15 of Table 9. These models provide some 
evidence of positive treatment effects at the high school level, as hypothesized based on the state’s 
experience with earlier turnaround efforts. Both frontier regression discontinuity models find larger 
and positive effects of TALAS on graduation than do the fuzzy regression discontinuity models, 
which are close to -0.20 in each of the three years. Though the effect estimates from the frontier 
regression discontinuity models are not significant at traditional thresholds, this is the result of large 
standard errors as the magnitude of the estimates are generally large; four of the six estimates are 0.36 
or higher, and three are above 0.68. However, due to the inclusion of schools selected based on low 
graduation rate, the fuzzy regression discontinuity models show a significant negative effect in 2011-
2012 that shrinks by over 0.30sdu in 2012-2013 and falls again by almost 0.05 in 2013-2014. Since 
the schools selected on low graduation rate are by definition bivariate outliers—schools with the 
lowest graduation rate among schools with passing rate above the fifth percentile, the significant 
negative coefficient when regressing 2011-2012 graduation rate on prior passing rate likely represents 
the continuation of a trend in which these schools’ graduation rate are significantly lower than 
schools with comparable passing rate.  
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 Rows 16-21 of Table 9 summarize estimates of TALAS effects on student-level achievement 
scores. Given the much larger sample sizes analyzing student outcomes rather than school outcomes, 
estimates are both more consistent across years by model and more precise. Four of the six models 
find positive effects, while the other two estimate negative effects. Notably, the elementary and 
middle school strict regression discontinuity estimates negative effects of -0.05 in SY2012 and -0.03 
in SY2013 and SY2014. Contrastingly, all three models for secondary student achievement find 
positive effects, with largest effects found in the Frontier B model in which treatment schools were all 
selected on the basis of their low graduation rates in SY2010. The secondary Frontier A model, which 
excludes those treatment schools, finds positive effects of 0.054 and 0.078 in SY2012 and SY2013, 
respectively, but a statistically nonsignificant -0.011 effect in SY2014. If TALAS’s largest 
achievement gains were found in the high schools selected for their graduation rates, those gains 
would not be reflected in the Frontier A models which exclude all schools with graduation rates 
below 60%, or the elementary and middle model which includes no secondary schools.  
DISCUSSION 
The DST’s implementation of its TALAS initiative presents an important early opportunity to 
evaluate the potential for state education agencies to implement current federally-approved 
turnaround models to improve academic outcomes in chronically low-achieving schools. Such 
initiatives have gained greater priority status in federal education reform efforts over the past decades, 
with policymakers still eager to find evidence of effective strategies. Where other initiatives have 
lacked ambitious reforms, implementation fidelity, stakeholder commitment, or agency support, 
North Carolina’s previously-established division for school turnaround, stakeholder commitment, and 
implementation fidelity to comprehensive turnaround efforts present a more ideal situation in which 
to test the potential efficacy of comprehensive school turnaround efforts. 
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Overall, results are mixed across outcome measure, school level, and model. The student 
achievement models, which provided the most precise and consistent estimates, suggest that student 
achievement suffered in TALAS elementary and middle schools at the assignment threshold, but 
increased for high school students in TALAS schools. The graduation rate outcomes also generally 
support positive treatment effects among high schools, though the school-level results are not precise 
enough to establish statistical significance. Neither the passing rate nor school value-added results are 
as consistent in the pattern of positive secondary results. As noted earlier in describing these 
measures, this could result from issues of power when analyzing school-level results, that passing 
rates only consider growth for student achievement near the cutoff score for proficiency, and that 
school-value added measures (for which data are incomplete) require additional gains each year on 
top of any gains already realized the previous year. 
The history of DST’s service in school turnaround in North Carolina may affect the finding of 
positive effects at the secondary level and negative effects for elementary and middle. As previously 
mentioned, North Carolina’s lowest performing high schools had been the focus of a previous round 
of turnaround that was court ordered. While some middle schools and elementary schools were also 
placed in turnaround, high schools received more turnaround services over a longer period. In fact, 
the state’s turnaround intervention was designed specifically for high schools. For example, the 
original turnaround framework included a freshman academy, which is only applicable to high 
schools. It may be that the results for TALAS were greater for high schools due to coaches’ 
experience working with high schools. These strategies developed and implemented for the first 
round of turnaround in the state may not have worked well in the TALAS elementary and middle 
schools because they were designed and developed for schools serving older students and organized 
around subject-specific departments.  
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 Before making definitive conclusions on the overall effects of TALAS, the nature of the effect 
estimates in this study must be considered carefully. Regression discontinuity designs only estimate 
local average treatment effects (LATE) at the assignment threshold. Although the regression 
discontinuity design supports strong causal inferences of effects at the assignment threshold, in the 
case of turning around low-achieving schools, stakeholders might be most interested in effects on 
treated schools furthest away from the assignment threshold rather than those closest to the threshold. 
In other words, those stakeholders may be more concerned about turning around the lowest-
performing of low-performing schools rather than the highest-performing of low-performing schools. 
If this is the case, regression discontinuity estimates may have reduced value as their generalizability 
to schools further from the assignment threshold depends on an assumption of homogenous treatment 
effects. Average treatment effects (ATE) on the treated, such as estimates obtained from OLS, 
difference-in-differences, or interrupted time series models, though offering weaker causal warrant 
for internal validity, may be of greater relevance if they differ from the LATE estimates offered here. 
For instance, if the lowest-performing schools were most responsive to the intervention, or if 
effective intervention efforts were concentrated in schools demonstrating greatest need, as measured 
by the forcing variable, an ATE estimate would be more sensitive to these types of patterns since it 
would measure an effect closer to the middle of the distribution of schools and, therefore, closer to 
the lowest performing schools in the state than a LATE estimate.   
 If the LATE estimates do generalize to all treated schools, the difference in findings by levels 
of schooling suggests that programs like TALAS can be successful in secondary schools, but 
turnaround efforts should either adapt different strategies for elementary and middle schools or focus 
only on secondary schools. 
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 Future work is needed on the average treatment effects of TALAS in all school levels to 
determine whether this program was successful improving student outcomes in North Carolina’s 
lowest-achieving schools. The present study provides an important part of this analysis, highlighting 
issues that should be considered in future turnaround research and uncovering several issues 
necessitating further exploration. First, estimation of turnaround effects must consider the limitations 
of the outcome variables of interest. Measuring outcomes at the school level limits power. The power 
issue is compounded for school-level graduation rates, as secondary schools are generally 
outnumbered by elementary and middle schools. Proficiency rates only capture student effects near 
the cut-score for proficiency on state tests, which may ignore significant growth for lowest-achieving 
students who still do not reach proficiency. School value-added captures single-year growth, at best 
ignoring prior gains and at worst handicapping schools for those prior gains. The same is true of 
student achievement measures, when models control for prior years’ achievement. Finally, though 
regression discontinuity designs offer the strongest statistical inference at the threshold for means-
tested interventions, they may not provide the estimates of greatest policy interest for programs 
targeting the lowest achieving schools for turnaround. Future work should continue to improve 
measurement of outcomes with the potential to reflect benefits of turnaround efforts and to create 
study designs capable of offering not only strong causal warrant, but also results of greatest relevance 
to educators, policymakers, and K-12 learners.  
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Table 10. Tests included in school performance composites by year. 
 
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
End of Grade      
Reading – 3rd Grade X X X X X 
Reading – 4th Grade X X X X X 
Reading – 5th Grade X X X X X 
Reading – 6th Grade X X X X X 
Reading – 7th Grade X X X X X 
Reading – 8th Grade X X X X X 
      
Math – 3rd Grade X X X X X 
Math – 4th Grade X X X X X 
Math – 5th Grade X X X X X 
Math – 6th Grade X X X X X 
Math – 7th Grade X X X X X 
Math – 8th Grade X X X X X 
      
Science – 5th Grade X X X X X 
Science – 8th Grade X X X X X 
      
End of Course      
Algebra I X X X X  
Algebra II X X    
Biology X X X X X 
Civics & Economics X X    
English I X X X   
English II    X X 
Geometry X     
Math I     X 
Physical Science X X    
US History X X    
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CHAPTER III 
 
EVALUATING TEACHER RETENTION POLICIES FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF DIAGNOSTIC ACCURACY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The recognition that teacher quality is the most important in-school determinant 
of student achievement has led to a great interest in improving the effectiveness of the 
teacher labor force. Prominent among proposed methods for accomplishing this 
improvement is replacing “last in, first out” (LIFO) dismissal policies with performance-
based retention policies that selectively replace low-performing teachers. Although a 
growing body of research estimates large benefits to basing teacher retention on value-
added performance estimates, it has not systematically addressed a critical factor 
determining the efficiency of such policies: the accurate identification of teachers most 
likely to be ineffective in improving student achievement. Instead, research in this field 
often presents estimates that ignore error rates in the application of retention decisions or 
overstate the extent to which these policies accomplish their stated objectives. In the 
present study, the statistical framework of diagnostic accuracy (DA) is used to estimate 
the benefits and detrimental effects of selective retention policies using measures of 
identification accuracy developed for the field of epidemiology. In addition to assessing 
strengths and weaknesses of performance-based retention, DA provides common metrics 
and language for both advocates and critics of such policies who may otherwise speak in 
disparate terms that fail to address one another’s chief concerns. A final contribution of 
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the study is that it examines the influence of multiple years of observation, multiple 
measures of performance, and varying performance thresholds on the efficacy and 
efficiency of performance-based retention policies. 
BACKGROUND 
Teacher Retention Policy 
Teacher quality is the most important in-school determinant of student achievement 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005), can have a significant impact on students’ future 
earnings (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2013), and teachers vary significantly in  their 
ability to increase student learning (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007; Gordon, Kane, 
& Staiger, 2006; Rivkin et al., 2005; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). The impact of teachers on 
student achievement makes teacher quality a focus of education reform policies and the 
between-teacher variation in effectiveness implies that differences in teacher quality 
across schools and students have important impacts on student outcomes. These three 
findings of education research jointly underpin an argument that replacing performance-
neutral (and often seniority-based, such as “last-in, first-out”) personnel policies with 
policies that support staffing decisions based on teacher effectiveness would lead to 
significant system-wide gains in student achievement (Goldhaber, 2015; Goldhaber & 
Hansen, 2010; Gordon et al., 2006; Hanushek, 2009, 2011). This study focuses on the 
potential of such alternative policies. Specifically, it estimates the accuracy and effects of 
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policies designed to selectively replace1 teachers ineffective at promoting student 
achievement growth in their current assignments.2 
Early and accurate identification of teachers’ potential performance3 is essential to 
the efficacy of tenure or retention reform policies to increase overall student 
achievement. Earlier identification of effective teachers by local education agencies can 
lead to earlier offers of incentives to continue teaching, preventing their attrition, and 
exposing more students to effective instruction. Likewise, early and accurate 
identification of ineffective teachers can help education agencies intervene earlier in 
teachers’ careers with support services or selective replacements, increasing achievement 
by exposing fewer students to low-performing teachers. Early identification is made even 
more crucial because the main policy tool currently used to increase retention—tenure—
largely precludes policies involving mid-career teacher dismissal because protections 
afforded to tenured teachers make it difficult to remove them from their positions for 
poor performance. Where tenure protects teachers from dismissal, teachers’ pre-tenure 
years—the years of employment prior to the decision to offer tenure—offer a short time 
horizon to predict teachers’ future effectiveness, provide incentives to continue in the 
																																																								
1	This	study	uses	the	term	“replacement”	as	the	alternative	to	retention	and	the	consequence	of	being	
flagged	as	low‐performing	under	alternative	retention	policies.	Replacement	may	include	
reassignment	or	dismissal.	Prior	research	on	performance‐based	retention	has	focused	on	dismissal,	
but	Grissom,	Loeb,	and	Nakashima	(2014)	find	that	involuntary	reassignments	can	improve	the	
equity	of	the	distribution	of	teachers	even	if	low‐performing	teachers	remain	employed	within	the	
system.	
2	Teachers	ineffective	at	promoting	student	growth	on	achievement	tests,	as	measured	by	value‐
added,	in	their	current	assignments	are	hereafter	referred	to	simply	as	“ineffective”	or	“low‐
performing,”	while	teachers	measured	as	effective	in	promoting	student	achievement	growth	are	
referred	to	as	“effective.”	
3	“Performance”	refers	to	teachers’	value‐added	measure	of	contribution	to	student	growth	on	
achievement	tests.		
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field to teachers who will be effective, and either remediate or replace teachers who will 
be ineffective in the future.  
Difficulty in predicting future effectiveness during the recruitment and hiring 
process based on observable teacher characteristics places increased importance on the 
early identification of teacher performance in maintaining a productive teaching force. A 
body of empirical evidence indicates that observable pre-hire information such as college 
major or master’s degrees is largely unrelated to future productivity, which renders the 
screening of effective teachers an almost blind process (Ballou, 1996; Clotfelter et al., 
2007, 2010; Hanushek, 1986; Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2008) and places even greater 
pressure on early career performance to inform personnel decisions. Without the ability 
to screen effective teachers based on pre-hire characteristics, it would appear that, 
collectively, schools can expect to do little better than to draw new hires randomly from 
the distribution of novice teacher effectiveness and put the entire burden for personnel 
decisions on post-hire job performance (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010).  
Although research has contrasted the potential effects of retention policies based 
on various value-added performance thresholds, this line of inquiry has not yet formally 
considered the accuracy of identification or how other measures of teacher performance 
can be incorporated to improve the efficiency with which policies identify teachers for 
retention or replacement. Researchers currently offer simulation-based estimates of the 
effects of performance-based retention in terms of overall student learning impacts, 
finding potential improvements in the distribution of teacher effectiveness of around 
three percent of a standard deviation (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Winters & Cowen, 
2013b). However, education administrators and policymakers are also interested in the 
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accuracy of the binary classification of teachers for retention or replacement, which more 
directly answers the concerns of critics and skeptics of retention reform. To this end, the 
statistical framework of diagnostic accuracy (DA) and its four potential outcomes—true 
positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives—offers a set of quantitative 
measures of the impacts of teacher removal that have not yet been applied in this policy 
area but could prove useful in quantifying the effects and efficiency of proposed retention 
policies in improving student achievement. That is, a more thorough accounting of the 
accuracy of retention policies may result in larger improvements in the distribution of 
teacher effectiveness, or improve efficiency by producing similar improvements with 
reduced negative consequences.  
DA metrics are based on four potential outcomes of selective retention: true 
positives4 (replacement of ineffective teachers), true negatives (retention of effective 
teachers), false positives (replacement of effective teachers), and false negatives 
(retention of ineffective teachers).  Ratios of these measures allow comparisons of the 
efficiency of retention policies on the basis of their rates of success and failure in 
categorically identifying teachers’ future performance potential. Using these measures, 
this paper addresses the following questions:  
																																																								
4	As is common with diagnostic tests, a “positive” test result is often a flag for a condition with 
subjectively negative personal consequences; a positive test result on a screening for a disease is associated 
with subjectively negative health consequences. In this study, a positive test condition indicates a level of 
teacher performance below the threshold for retention, and a negative test condition indicates teacher 
performance measured above the threshold for retention. To avoid confusion between positive and negative 
results on the diagnostic test and subjective valuation of the educational and professional outcomes with 
which these results are associated, we exclusively use the words “positive” and “negative” in reference to 
whether teachers satisfy performance criteria defined by the test condition and not to subjective 
descriptions of the implications of classification into either category.  
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1.) When using value-added alone, what performance threshold has the highest 
diagnostic accuracy in identifying ineffective teachers for replacement? 
2.) To what extent does including multiple years of performance data affect the 
diagnostic accuracy of the identification of ineffective teachers? 
3.) To what extent does including multiple measures of teacher performance 
affect the diagnostic accuracy of the identification of ineffective teachers? 
4.) What are the simulated effects of implementing retention policies based on 
various performance thresholds? 
The main contributions of this study will be: 
1. To fully frame the discussion of performance-based teacher retention within 
diagnostic accuracy, including specifying performance thresholds in a given year 
as test criteria, performance the following year as target criteria, and 
understanding the resulting classifications of true positives, true negatives, false 
positives, and false negatives in terms of their policy implications; 
2. To select appropriate diagnostic accuracy measures of the intended and 
unintended consequences of selective retention policies in order to balance 
intended effects against adverse, unintended consequences and directly consider 
efficiency; 
3.  To specify measures of accuracy such that they account for the limitations of 
effects imposed by non-random natural teacher attrition, not only in terms of its 
diminution of intended consequences, but also its reduction of unintended 
consequences; 
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4. To examine alternative test criteria to contrast their retention accuracy through 
improved reliability of multiple performance measures, including multiple years 
of prior value-added performance, evaluation ratings, and student surveys. 
FRAMEWORK 
Current conceptualizations of retention policies’ intended and unintended effects 
Although defenders of either seniority-based or performance-based retention policies 
both rely on strength-of-association measures and predictions of average student 
outcomes to advocate their positions, opposition to both sides is based on fear of 
inaccurate identification in specific cases which are better considered using categorical 
data analysis. Proposed performance-based retention reform is motivated by the effects 
on students of chronically low-performing but difficult-to-fire tenured teachers, leading 
to the infamous “rubber rooms” of New York City and “dance of the lemons” as the least 
effective employees are shielded by their unions and shuffled by their districts. Judge 
Treu, in the court decision for Vergara v. California which repealed a number of the 
state’s key tenure protections, refers to “grossly ineffective teachers obtaining and 
retaining permanent employment” (Vergara v. California, 2014). Conversely, opposition 
to performance-based retention reform focuses on cases in which these reforms label 
seemingly effective teachers as ineffective. Placing these dualistic concerns into a single 
framework in which they can be simultaneously assessed is critical in both the research 
and policy discussions surrounding performance-based teacher retention policies.  
As research on the potential impacts of performance-based retention policies 
grows more sophisticated, the benefits are assessed in different terms than the potential 
unintended consequences often raised by skeptics. In fact, even the intended effects are 
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usually stated in different terms than are used to motivate reform. Specifically, policy 
evaluations motivated by warnings of the deleterious influence of the bottom five percent 
of teachers (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek, 2011) make no effort to 
consider the success of policies in replacing these specific teachers. Instead, research 
(Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Hanushek, 2009; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; Winters & 
Cowen, 2013a, 2013b) assessing the potential effects of retention reform often does so by 
simulating the effects of retention policies on students in terms of system-wide 
achievement levels under contrasting decision rules. This assessment of effects does not 
account for consequences on the level of individual retention decisions. Specifically, they 
account for neither true nor false positives in the identification of low-performing 
teachers, based on whether teachers replaced under their retention rules would have 
performed at acceptable levels the following year.  
As a result, these simulations do not consider the efficacy of proposed policies in 
correctly identifying the teachers they aim to replace, and they cannot consider the 
efficiency of marginal improvements, such as replacing a teacher who would have 
performed at the 51st percentile with one who performs at the 53rd percentile. Simulations 
seeking to maximize student achievement gains thus set the average performance of 
replacement teachers5 as an artificially high threshold for retention and cannot make 
judgments on the marginal value of small differences in learning gains against the cost to 
teachers of being removed from their assignments, the resulting disruption to these 
teachers’ schools (Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013), or the costs of recruitment and 
																																																								
5	The	average	first‐year	teacher	in	North	Carolina	falls	at	the	40th	percentile	of	value‐added	in	2011‐
2012,	2012‐2013,	and	2013‐2014.	
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replacement incurred by districts (Barnes & Crowe, 2007). In summary, prior simulations 
of potential policy effects have focused on measures of results that ignore the motivation 
for the studies as well as potential unintended consequences, both of which would be 
more suitably analyzed under the DA framework. 
In spite of findings that performance-based retention policies would lead to 
overall improvements in student achievement, concern over their unintended 
consequences and limited potential persist, often rooted in indirectly related research on 
the unreliability of the value-added measures of teacher effects on student achievement 
(VAM) that would be used to identify teachers to be removed. This research shows 
considerable instability in the quantile-rank of individual teachers’ VAM over time 
(Aaronson et al., 2007; D. Ballou, 2005; Koedel & Betts, 2007; McCaffrey, Sass, 
Lockwood, & Mihaly, 2009).  Underscoring concerns that VAM estimates are not stable 
enough to inform personnel decisions, case studies report instances in which seemingly 
effective teachers have been replaced where performance-based policies are already in 
effect (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Just as the correlation between teacher 
experience and VAM does not justify a LIFO dismissal policy to its detractors, 
correlations between VAM in consecutive years are not enough to assuage resistance to 
performance-based retention; on both sides, where correlations are interpreted to imply a 
rule, exceptions motivate opposition. 
If the conflict between those touting on-average benefits to performance-based 
retention and those warning of unintended consequences associated with misidentified 
individuals seems irreconcilable, it is due to an incomplete conceptualization of the 
individual-level decisions underlying the policies’ potential effects. Accurate 
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identification of individual teachers to be replaced is crucial to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of performance-based retention policies, as binary decisions on which 
teachers to retain or replace ultimately determine the impact of such policies (Hanushek, 
2009; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). Stated in terms of error rates, the misidentification of 
teachers’ performance levels can reduce the efficacy of performance-based personnel 
policies by replacing effective teachers misclassified as ineffective (false positives, akin 
to Type I errors), or retaining ineffective teachers misclassified as effective (false 
negatives, akin to Type II errors). The fewer of these errors a policy can make, the more 
benefit it can have with a given number of policy-induced teacher replacements. 
Accuracy also has important indirect impacts beyond the effectiveness of replaced 
and replacing teachers. For example, retention and dismissal policies that teachers do not 
see as credible will fail to motivate teachers who do not feel their efforts can affect their 
performance measures and, therefore, lose any sense of agency over retention decisions 
that are based on these measures (McCaffrey et al., 2009). Rather than motivating 
teachers to perform at higher levels, policies based on measures teachers view as arbitrary 
could instead lower morale, increase attrition (Loeb, Miller, & Wyckoff, 2014), and 
potentially reduce the pool of interested and potentially effective candidates in the teacher 
labor market. Though Hanushek (2009) and Staiger and Rockoff (2010) provide evidence 
that even personnel decisions based on “imperfect” information would yield large 
system-wide gains in student achievement, improving the accuracy of the test conditions 
upon which these decisions are made can make policies more politically palatable, less 
demoralizing to teachers, and more efficient in producing student gains with fewer 
unintended consequences for teachers, schools and education agencies.  
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Framing retention policy in terms of diagnostic accuracy 
As both the policies that propose to use value-added measures (VAM) of teacher 
effects on student achievement for personnel decisions and the responding reliability 
critique relate to the accurate prediction of performance for individual teachers,  teacher 
retention policy is primed for evaluation from the perspective of diagnostic accuracy 
(DA), a statistical framework applied widely in the field of epidemiology to assess the 
ability of diagnostic tests to accurately predict categorical outcomes based on categorical 
test results (Um, 2013). The methodology and language for determining the DA of tests 
have been primarily developed in the field of medical epidemiology, but have 
applicability to education research in cases wherein treatment decisions are binary and 
have significant associated costs (Scott-Clayton, Crosta, & Belfield, 2014). Scott-Clayton 
et al. (2014) use the epidemiological framework to evaluate the DA of placements of 
college students into remediation courses, noting the great cost to students who are 
wrongly placed into either remediation or college-level coursework. A similar application 
of the framework to consider teacher retention policies from the perspective of DA 
allows policymakers to understand effects at the individual-teacher level at which the 
policies are enacted and explicitly contrast the intended and unintended effects of policies 
defined by different test and target criteria.  
There are several steps in the framing of retention policy in terms of DA, each 
with specific vocabulary to be used throughout the current study: 
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1) The specification of test criteria which result in classifications of observations as 
positive or negative based on whether they meet or do not meet the test criteria. 
These classifications are called test conditions. 
2) The specification of target criteria, with observations’ status with respect to these 
target criteria being called the target condition. 
3) The determination of outcomes as combinations of test and target conditions. The 
four possible outcomes are true positive (satisfies test criteria and target criteria), 
true negative (does not satisfy test criteria or target criteria), false positive 
(satisfies test criteria but not target criteria), and false negative (does not satisfy 
test criteria but satisfies target criteria). 
4) The selection of diagnostic measures, or ratios of outcomes. Several measures 
have been developed for the assessment of diagnostic accuracy, including 
sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and false discovery rate.  
Putting the current discussion of teacher retention policy in these terms can clarify 
and advance the policy debate on retention reform. Indeed, many prior studies on 
potential performance-based retention policies have taken one or more of the steps above, 
but none has fully framed the issue using variables and vocabulary fitting each. In several 
cases, small differences between researchers’ choice of models and that which would 
have been specified under the diagnostic accuracy framework have resulted in analyses 
and conclusions that do not properly identify potential policy effects and fall short of 
addressing the concerns of reform skeptics. The following paragraphs situate 
performance-based retention policy within the DA framework following the steps listed 
and describe where prior work has aligned or departed from this framework.   
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Criteria, conditions, and classifications 
The first step in defining an evaluation under the DA framework is to specify test 
criteria, the result or threshold at which certain determination is made. In the case of 
retention reform, the test criteria are observed teacher performance measures that call for 
replacement rather than retention. Whether a teacher’s performance satisfies the test 
criteria is the test condition. Though not explicitly recognized as such, this step is 
included in every study of performance-based retention reform reviewed, usually as a 
percentile of value-added below which teachers are identified for replacement. Test 
criteria previously considered range from the fifth percentile (Chetty et al., 2011; 
Hanushek, 2009) to the eightieth percentile of novices (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). 
While the test criteria trigger actions, a corresponding target criterion must be 
specified in order to determine whether actions are in error and at what rate these errors 
occur. However, this second step in the DA framework—the specification of target 
criterion—is not always included in retention studies. A natural target criterion is teacher 
performance the following year.6 This is frequently omitted when effects of selective 
retention are measured in terms of student achievement as a continuous variable rather 
than in terms of the categorical accuracy of teacher-level decisions (e.g., Goldhaber & 
Hansen, 2010; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; Winters & Cowen, 2013a, 2013b). The fact that 
errors will exist with any decision rule for the replacement of teachers receives varying 
																																																								
6	Schochet and Chiang (2010) estimate Type I and Type II error rates in the measurement of teacher 
effectiveness using concurrent latent “true performance” as the target criterion, which is distinct from 
studies aiming to estimate the effects of performance-based retention decisions.		
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levels of acknowledgement, but definition of what would constitute such an error is not 
provided nor are the rates of such errors measured in this literature.  
Studies demonstrating instability in the quantile rank of teachers sorted by value-
added (Aaronson et al., 2007; Ballou, 2005) imply a target criterion of performing in the 
same quantile year in one year as in the previous year. In these studies, the division of 
teachers into quantiles of VAM serves as the diagnostic test; a teacher value-added score 
in the lowest quantile one year is the test criterion, and a similarly low value-added score 
the following year is the target criterion.  Ballou (2005) goes further, considering 
separately the proportion of teachers in the lowest-performing quartile one year who are 
in the same lowest-performing quartile the following year, and those who are above the 
median in performance the following year, demonstrating the flexibility of a target 
criterion in defining classification errors.  
Atteberry, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2015) make the most explicit consideration of the 
accuracy and error in the identification of low-performing teachers in existing literature, 
specifying test criteria, target criteria, and using the DA measures positive predictive 
value (PPV) and false discovery rate (FDR) to evaluate potential policy effects. Their 
study sets future performance in the bottom third of the performance distribution as the 
target criterion against which early test conditions classifications are assessed. Not only 
do the authors explicitly contrast the error rates of various value-added thresholds as test 
criteria, they also report error rates based on teachers later identified above two separate 
target criteria: those performing above the bottom third (that is, in the top two thirds) and 
those performing in the top third of the future performance distribution.  
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As the studies of quantile rank stability and the work of Atteberry et al. (2015) 
provide the only existing examples of research on teacher performance defining both test 
and target criteria, the following section on measures of accuracy focuses on these cases 
and why their explicit and implicit measures of accuracy are not ideal for the evaluation 
of performance-based retention policy. 
Selecting appropriate measures of diagnostic accuracy 
There are a number of measures of DA, each built on the binary classifications of 
the test and target conditions (Um, 2013). As the epidemiology table, or Punnett square, 
in Figure 1 shows, starting with the two binary classifications of the test and target there 
are four possible outcomes from which all other measures of DA are calculated: true 
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP), and false negatives (FN). In 
addition to the two correctly-identified “true” classifications, the two “false” 
classifications correspond to Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) errors. 
While in the case of teacher personnel decisions each of these four classifications 
constitutes a policy-relevant classification of teachers, given the immediate and directly 
observable consequences of replacing a teacher and the stated interest of teachers’ unions 
and reform skeptics to protect teachers from the threat of wrongful termination, it is 
likely that Type I errors (in this case the dismissal of teachers who are not ineffective) 
would receive greater focus than any other test outcome. Since any policy’s political 
viability likely depends on its ability to minimize wrongful terminations, this study 
intends to balance intended consequences with false positives, the replacement of 
effective teachers. 
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Figure 1. Epidemiological table. 
  Target Condition 
Te
st C
on
dit
ion
 
 POSITIVE (Met) NEGATIVE (Not Met) 
POSITIVE 
(Met) 
 
True Positive 
(Replacement of ineffective 
teachers) 
 
False Positive 
(Replacement of effective 
teachers) 
NEGATIVE 
(Not Met) 
 
False Negative 
(Retention of ineffective 
teachers) 
 
True Negative 
(Retention of effective 
teachers) 
 
 Once teacher retention policy is understood in terms of the four classification 
outcomes of the epidemiological table in Figure 1, the DA framework offers a number of 
potential measures for the evaluation of a retention policy’s intended and unintended 
effects. Within the context of teacher retention policy, both intended and unintended 
consequences stem from positive test conditions—teachers whose measured performance 
identifies them for replacement under the test criteria. The proposed benefits of retention 
reform rest on the ability of a policy to screen ineffective teachers—that is, maximize 
true positives. Conversely, to contain unintended consequences the policy would need to 
minimize false positives, or the number of teachers replaced who would have performed 
at acceptable levels the following year. Though this identification of the most relevant 
classification categories is rather straightforward, the denominators chosen to express 
these two outcomes as rate measures can lead to different policy interpretations. Rates of 
true positives can be expressed as either the proportion of all positive tests which are true 
positives (the positive predictive value or PPV), or as the proportion of all cases meeting 
the target condition (sensitivity). One way of describing the difference between the two 
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measures is that while PPV is a measure of the internal accuracy of the test, sensitivity is 
a measure of its external accuracy. Given the objective of using prior performance to 
screen ineffective teachers in the following year, sensitivity is more relevant in the 
evaluation of retention policy than PPV because it reflects the scope of the policy benefit 
for the entire teacher labor market rather than just the subset identified by the test criteria. 
 In terms of unintended consequences, the DA framework includes measures that 
express false positives as either the proportion of all positive test conditions that are 
incorrectly classified (false discovery rate or FDR) or as the proportion of all negative 
target conditions incorrectly classified by the test criteria (fall-out rate or false positive 
rate). Though both measures have policy relevance, FDR is primary because a minimal 
FDR necessarily minimizes fall-out, but fall-out can be low with high FDR under highly 
restrictive test criteria. For these reasons, sensitivity and false discovery rate are the two 
measures of diagnostic accuracy most appropriate for the evaluation of the intended and 
unintended consequences of performance-based retention policy. The following 
paragraphs discuss how existing literature has defined sample spaces and measures of 
unintended consequences that compromise their ability to fully evaluate potential 
retention policies in terms most relevant to policy advocates and skeptics. 
Ballou (2005) and Aaronson et al. (2007) use the stability of quartile ranks of 
value-added to assess the reliability of these measures and their potential limitations in 
the identification and screening of low-performing teachers. In the finding that only 40% 
of teachers identified as lowest-performing (as defined by observed performance in the 
bottom quartile) one year are also lowest-performing the following year (Ballou, 2005), 
40% (or 0.40) represents the positive predictive value (PPV) of the diagnostic test—that 
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is, the percentage of positive test results (teachers identified as low-performing in year 
one) that correctly predict a positive target condition (teachers identified as low-
performing in year two). The inverse, 60%, represents the false discovery rate, or the 
percentage of positive test results that incorrectly classify teachers who do not satisfy the 
target condition7 the following year. Ballou finds that 30% of low-performing teachers 
perform above the median the following year, suggesting this to be the false discovery 
rate when setting the median of future performance as the target criterion rather than the 
first quartile—that is, when the error rate is measured based on severe errors. Using data 
from Chicago, Aaronson et al. (2007) find similar results, with the PPV of the bottom 
quartile at a slightly lower 36% when the target criterion is also set at the bottom quartile, 
and a slightly higher 65% PPV when the target criterion is set at the median. 
Atteberry et al. (2015) estimate greater accuracy within more restrictive test 
criteria, finding 62% of early-career teachers initially in the bottom quintile subsequently 
performing below the 40th percentile. As in the Ballou study, the authors contrast this 
PPV of the test with its false discovery rate. However, Atteberry et al. go further, to 
explicitly examine the false discovery rate under a series of more restrictive test criteria, 
notably finding that teachers identified under a 5th-percentile test criterion have only an 
8% false discovery rate when the top third of future performance is set as the target 
																																																								
7	As in prior work, we use future value-added measures of teachers’ contributions to student gains on 
standardized tests as the target criterion for assessing the performance of potential retention rules. Other 
teacher performance outcomes could be used as target criteria using the methods in the present study, but 
measures based on student achievement are most relevant to the discussion of performance-based retention 
because calls for reform, including multiple court decisions against state education agencies (Leandro v. 
State of North Carolina, 1997, Vergara v. California, 2014),  most often cite student achievement as 
evidence that alternative policies could, or should, improve upon the status quo. As a test of the efficiency 
of proposed alternative retention policies, we ground our analyses in the same targeted outcome. 
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criterion, which they describe as “egregious errors” (p. 13), meaning a positive test result 
is only considered a false positive if the teacher is later observed in the top third of the 
performance distribution.  
The difference between PPV as an internal measure of accuracy and sensitivity as 
an external measure is somewhat inconsequential when the analysis sample is stable—
that is, both test and target conditions are assessed for all observations. In such situations, 
the sensitivity is necessarily equal to the PPV: if 36% of teachers in the bottom quartile 
one year are in the bottom quartile the following year as well, one can deduce that the test 
correctly identifies 36% of the bottom quartile of future performance. It is important to 
note that Ballou, Aaaronson et al., and Atteberry et al.—the only studies formally 
considering the accuracy of teacher identification—restrict their analysis samples to 
teachers with both observed test and target criteria. Natural teacher churn erases the 
equivalency between PPV and sensitivity and renders the PPV less than ideal in 
evaluating potential performance-based policies. Teachers who decide to leave teaching 
voluntarily complicate analyses, as attrition results in teachers with observed test 
conditions lacking observed target criteria, and their replacement hires result in teachers 
with observed target criteria but no observed test condition. Since voluntary attrition is 
not random with respect to teachers’ value-added performance (Gordon et al., 2006; 
Henry, Bastian, & Fortner, 2011), when simulating a retention policy based on observed 
data a disproportionately large proportion of teachers falling below a given performance 
threshold leave the field voluntarily, and the accuracy of their test results cannot be 
determined using performance the following year. Attrition can then bias the measured 
precision of the test in three ways. First, if the positive predictive value (PPV) is 
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measured as the number of all true positive tests divided by the total number of cases that 
satisfied the test condition, the inclusion in the denominator of positive tests that then 
exited the sample and thus cannot affirmatively satisfy the target condition due to 
attrition will attenuate the estimated PPV. Alternatively, if teachers who exit are excluded 
from the measure, as in the prior research discussed above, PPV is calculated using only 
those teachers observed in both years inform the measure of PPV, PPV will still be 
negatively biased (and false discovery inflated) to the extent that, among all positive 
tests, teachers exiting the sample were more likely to be low-performing again the 
following year than those who returned.  
Finally, restricting the sample to teachers observed in both time periods results in 
teachers being assigned percentile ranks within a population not representative of the 
teaching workforce in either time period. Given the non-random attrition of teachers and 
the lower performance of novices, teachers observed in consecutive years are likely to be 
higher-performing within the full population of teachers than reflected by their percentile 
rank in a restricted sample that excludes lower-performing quitters in the earlier period 
and lower-performing novices in the latter. Rank stability within this restricted sample 
may be misleading if teachers not present in either of the years are more likely to be low-
performing. As an example, if a teacher at the 5th percentile in the stable sample is at the 
11th percentile in the full sample, a policy that replaced this teacher would not have 
succeeded in replacing a teacher in the bottom five percent or bottom ten percent. If 
either the 5th or 10th percentile had been specified as the target condition for replacement, 
restricting the sample to teachers observed in consecutive years would incorrectly declare 
that the policy had succeeded in this case.  
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Similarly, the relatively low performance of novice teachers suggests that a 
disproportionately large proportion of teachers satisfying the target criteria will be 
novices for whom no test condition is observed. Since the objective of tenure reform is to 
replace the lowest-performing teachers, teachers with observed target criterion but no test 
criteria are relevant to the assessment of a policy rule’s sensitivity because the interest in 
classifying and replacing low-performing teachers applies to all low-performing teachers, 
and the proportion of low-performing teachers who cannot be correctly classified due to 
their lack of test criteria are as relevant to understanding a policy’s potential limitations 
as are those not correctly classified due to a lack of classification accuracy. At the 
extreme, a policy designed to use performance measures from the prior year to pre-
emptively replace teachers who will fall in the bottom five percent of performance the 
following year would realize none of its intended effects if the bottom five percent in the 
year ahead is comprised entirely of first-year teachers or other teachers without prior 
performance measures on which the retention rules were based. The following paragraph 
specifies the policy questions to guide both the selection and calculation of accuracy 
measures. Because policies’ potential intended effects depend on the ability of the test to 
identify and pre-emptively remove low-performing teachers, retention policy is better 
evaluated in terms of sensitivity—the proportion of low-performing teachers it can 
correctly identify and replace—than its PPV.  
 The statistical complement to sensitivity is specificity, which measures the 
proportion of effective teachers (as defined by the target condition) who are accurately 
classified by the test criterion. The critical flaw of specificity in the context of 
performance-based retention policy evaluation is that specificity can be monotonically 
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increased by specifying more restrictive test criteria, decreasing the number of positive 
test results even as the positive predictive value decreased among the remaining positive 
tests. A policy with high specificity but low PPV would offer little benefit at 
proportionately large costs and please neither the advocates for performance-based 
retention, who would see no low-performing teachers replaced, nor the skeptics of reform 
who would see that the few teachers flagged for replacement often would have performed 
at satisfactory levels the following year. Policies’ unintended consequences are thus 
better expressed in terms of a false discovery rate (FDR),8 which weighs true positives 
against false positives and considers the proportion of positive test results that incorrectly 
classify as ineffective those teachers who perform well the following year. In practical 
terms, it is the likelihood that a teacher identified as ineffective under the test criteria has 
been wrongfully classified. 
The most appropriate DA measures for evaluating the intended and unintended 
effects of performance-based retention policy are sensitivity and false discovery rate, 
respectively. First, sensitivity refers to the proportion of low-performing teachers in the 
target year t+1 that can be correctly identified for replacement based on test criteria in the 
test year t. The calculation for sensitivity defined below in Equation 1 is the number of 
true positives (PtaPvb), which is all teachers who both satisfy test criteria a in year t and 
also fall below the target threshold b in year v, divided by all teachers satisfying the target 
																																																								
8	In	environments	with	no	attrition	between	the	designation	of	test	and	target	conditions,	the	false	
discovery	rate	(FDR)	is	the	inverse	of	the	positive	predictive	value	(PPV).	Teacher	attrition	makes	
PPV	a	problematic	accuracy	measure	of	the	costs	of	inaccurate	retention	decisions	because	test‐
positive	teachers	who	do	not	return	the	following	year	decrease	the	proportion	of	true	positives	
among	all	positives.	This	type	of	attrition	reduces	the	PPV	even	though	test‐positive	teachers	who	
leave	do	not	represent	failures	of	the	retention	rule.	FDR	avoids	this	by	focusing	only	on	observable	
false	positives	as	a	proportion	of	all	positives.	
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condition (Pvb). Including teachers who satisfy the target condition in Pvb but do not have 
test criteria, and thus cannot be counted in PtaPvb will decrease the measured sensitivity of 
the test but more accurately reflect its policy-relevant effects. 
 
Equation 1. Sensitivity of potential performance-based retention policy. 
 Sensitivityvb = PtaPvb / Pvb 
 
 False discovery rate (FDR) is the measure of accuracy best suited to capture the 
potential costs of retention reform which occur when a performance-based policy 
replaces teachers who would have made acceptable contributions to their students’ 
learning gains in target year t+1. FDR is calculated as false positives divided by the sum 
of false positives and true positives. Teachers with positive test conditions who are not 
observed in the target conditions due to attrition are neither true nor false positives, but 
they are relevant for the practical purpose of the FDR defined above as the likelihood that 
a teacher identified as ineffective under the test condition has been wrongfully classified. 
Equation 2 specifies the calculation of false discovery as it will be calculated in the 
following analyses. It is estimated as the number of false positives (PtaNvb), defined as 
teachers with a positive condition on criteria a in year t and a negative test condition on 
criteria b in year v, divided by the number of total positive tests in year t. Including 
teachers without observed target criteria in Pta will decrease FDta, thereby improving the 
reported performance of the test in comparison to the restricted samples analyzed in prior 
literature. 
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Equation 2. False discovery rate of potential performance-based retention policy. 
 False Discovery (FD)ta = PtaNvb / Pta 
 
In implementing a performance-based retention policy based on measures of 
diagnostic accuracy, policymakers would need to consider acceptable false discovery 
rates below which a policy does only minimal harm, as well as the desired sensitivity at 
which a policy would be deemed worth enacting at all, let alone worth the unintended 
effects reflected by the FDR. The process of policy selection would then involve 
selecting the set of test criteria with the highest sensitivity at an acceptable false 
discovery rate. 
Improving diagnostic accuracy using multiple measures 
With the discussion of performance-based retention situated within the framework 
of diagnostic accuracy and appropriate measures selected, the paper now describes its 
contribution of using multiple measures of teacher performance to improve the DA of 
retention decisions. Currently, performance-based retention decisions are considered only 
with regard to test criteria defined by value-added measures (VAM).  VAM are covariate-
adjusted estimates of teachers’ influence on student achievement. By accounting for 
student characteristics including (and sometimes limited to) prior achievement scores, 
VAM attempt to separate teachers’ impact on student learning from that of 
contemporaneous and prior factors beyond teachers’ influence. As education agencies 
increasingly move from perfunctory, subjective teacher evaluation systems to reformed 
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systems that incorporate student test score gains as an evaluation criterion, VAM 
currently represent the most common metric for measuring teachers’ contributions to 
student achievement scores on state accountability tests (Harris, 2009). In comparison to 
alternative achievement-based measures of teacher performance, the statistical advantage 
of VAM is in their ability to account for the influence on achievement of students’ prior 
ability and other factors outside of a teacher’s control, attributing to teachers only the 
portion of achievement not accounted for by these observed factors. A weakness, 
however, is that the remaining variation in achievement attributed to teachers also 
includes any unaccounted for sources of variation that may disproportionately affect 
achievement for given teachers (American Statistical Association, 2014), a primary 
example of which is nonrandom sorting of students and teachers between schools 
(Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008; Clotfelter et al., 2007). As is frequently noted 
within the literature on performance-based retention, measurement error and instability in 
teacher VAM currently present challenges to early identification of teacher productivity.  
  Imprecision in single-year VAM estimates and instability in repeated VAM 
estimates for individual teachers casts doubt on the ability of these measures to reliably 
isolate between-teacher performance differences from a single year of data. Studies on 
the rank of teachers by VAM over consecutive years demonstrate considerable movement 
of individual teachers within the distribution of estimated teacher effects from one year to 
the next, with fewer than 40% of teachers identified as lowest-performing in one year 
identified again as lowest-performing the following year, though stability among highest-
performing teachers is better (Aaronson et al., 2007; Ballou, 2005; Koedel & Betts, 
2007). Bock, Wolfe, and Fisher (1996) conduct a variance decomposition of student 
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achievement in successive years and identify a varying teacher-by-year component 
roughly half the size of the time-invariant teacher effect (as described by Ballou, 2005), 
suggesting substantial change in teachers’ latent, “true” effectiveness from year to year, 
compounding the instability resulting from measurement error. 
Some of this variation in productivity owes to returns to experience. 
Associational, student fixed-effect, and teacher fixed effect studies all provide evidence 
that VAM increases significantly over teachers’ first five years on the job (Atteberry et 
al., 2015; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Harris & Sass, 2011; Henry et al., 2011; Kane et al., 
2008; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). This finding sets an expectation for meaningful growth 
in early-career teachers’ effectiveness as well as some year-to-year rank instability as 
novice teachers are disproportionately identified in the lowest ranks of VAM, but 
advance in following years due to improved performance, the voluntary attrition of less 
effective teachers, and new cohorts of novice teachers replacing them in the lower 
percentiles.  
More troublingly, some inter-temporal variability may not reflect real change in 
teacher effectiveness but owe instead to imprecision in the value-added measure. This 
imprecision is driven in part by sampling bias—in the sampling of students assigned to a 
teacher (Ballou, 2005) or in the sampling of content standards assessed on the 
achievement tests given to students in a given year (Papay, 2011). Winters and Cowen 
(2013b) examine the relationship between the reliability of teacher performance measures 
(operationalized as the year-to-year correlation for the measure) and the efficiency of 
performance-based retention and find that at any given performance threshold, increasing 
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the reliability of the underlying measure to 0.25 yields overall gains in student 
achievement two to three times as large as when reliability is only 0.10.  
The phenomenon of regression toward the mean dictates that classification errors 
will be more common with less reliable measures and occur more frequently at the tails 
of the distribution where retention decisions would be made under a performance-based 
policy. Estimates based on multiple years of observation have higher reliability 
(Goldhaber & Hansen, 2013; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010) and improve the ability of VAM 
to isolate the “permanent component” of teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber & Hansen, 
2013) necessary to predict the future performance of individual teachers (Ballou, 2005; 
Koedel & Betts, 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2009). Accordingly, most state education 
agencies that incorporate teacher performance measures in their retention policies rely on 
multiple years of observation to make personnel decisions (Winters & Cowen, 2013b). 
 Prior research on performance-based retention policies has relied on simulation—
either fully simulated data (Rothstein, 2012; Winters & Cowen, 2013b) or simulated 
effects on real administrative data (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; 
Winters & Cowen, 2013a)—to estimate the impacts of such policies on overall teacher 
productivity.  In each case, the authors take into account the inter-temporal instability of 
value-added estimates identified by prior research (Aaronson et al., 2007; Ballou, 2005; 
Koedel & Betts, 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2009) and consider the impact of making 
decisions with this “imperfect information” (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010) on overall teacher 
productivity. Winters and Cowen (2013a & 2013b) and Staiger and Rockoff (2010) 
formally consider the trade-off between the increased accuracy of decisions based on 
multiple years of data and the increased exposure of students to low-performing teachers 
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when decisions are delayed. In terms of DA, using a single year of data can increase the 
sensitivity of the test by including more teachers with test criteria, while it also increases 
the false discovery rate because of less reliable measures. When measured in terms of 
overall student achievement rather than DA, they find greater effects when decisions are 
made more quickly, even with less information. Staiger and Rockoff’s simulation implies 
that even with a relatively unreliable performance measure such as a single year of 
observed value-added, the group of dismissed teachers (including those incorrectly 
deselected) would be outperformed the following year by a group of novice replacements 
of unobserved prior effectiveness. This suggests that any value in the increased 
specificity of retention decisions based on multiple years of observation may be offset by 
the lower sensitivity associated with the extended amount of time that ineffective teachers 
are retained. However, no study yet has empirically modeled the benefits of combining 
multiple measures of teacher effectiveness in a retention policy. 
Improvements to the reliability of teacher evaluation may not require multiple 
years of value-added measures. Combining value-added with alternative measures of 
teacher performance may stabilize estimates and correct for measurement error within 
shorter observation periods. If the gains of reliability from multiple years of value-added 
measures can be alternatively realized using other data sources from a single year, 
personnel decisions could become more expedient without a corresponding drop in 
efficiency. Although correlations between value-added and external measures such as 
principal ratings, peer observation, and student surveys are typically only modest (Harris, 
Ingle, & Rutledge, 2014; Henry, Guthrie, Barrett, & Marks, 2015), these measures have 
been shown to predict future student achievement even when controlling for current 
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value-added (Henry & Guthrie, 2015b, 2015c; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). Incorporating 
external measures of teacher effectiveness —such as student surveys and principal 
ratings—in the specification of the test condition may correct for measurement error in 
VAM estimates based on a single year of student test scores by forming a composite or 
joint estimate of teachers’ performance closer to that obtained from the inclusion of 
multiple years of VAM.  
In addition to statistical considerations for including multiple measures of teacher 
effectiveness in performance-based retention decisions, multiple measures are 
conceptually aligned with reform advocates’ assertion that teachers targeted by 
performance-based retention would be those who “all parties agree [are] harming the 
students entrusted to [them]” (Vergara v. California, 2014). Parties in agreement may 
include principals, students, and parents, as well as objective sources of information such 
as statistical estimates of teachers’ contributions to their students’ achievement scores. 
Critiques of seniority-based retention policies, including the Vergara v. California ruling, 
assert that value-added measures identify teachers whose administrators would dismiss 
them for performance reasons if not limited in doing so by the teachers’ tenure 
protections. By triangulating evidence of teacher performance ability from student 
achievement, principal ratings, and student surveys, retention policy rules may be able to 
distinguish between perpetually, unambiguously low-performing teachers and teachers 
measured as low-performing due to measurement error in a value-added estimate. 
Simulating Policy Impacts 
 To estimate and contrast the effects of teacher retention policies formally framed 
as diagnostic tests, and which base decisions based on multiple measures of teacher 
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performance, this study simulates policy-induced teacher replacements along with 
observed attrition. Winters and Cowen (2013b) readdress prior simulations noting two 
flaws in their designs. First, whereas Staiger and Rockoff model voluntary teacher 
attrition as random, research has shown that voluntary attrition demonstrates inverse 
correlation with both performance and experience (Henry et al., 2011). That is, novice 
and low-performing teachers are more likely to leave the profession than their more-
experienced and higher-performing peers. Failing to account for this non-random 
attrition, the Staiger and Rockoff simulation overstates the impact of their retention 
policy by attributing to the policy departures of low-performing teachers that would have 
occurred naturally. When Winters and Cowen model voluntary attrition as conditional on 
performance and experience, they estimate much smaller benefits to formal deselection 
policy. The second contribution of Winters and Cowen’s work is in the simulation of a 
policy that treats consecutive years of poor performance as joint criteria for dismissal 
rather than using a single year’s performance (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010) or an average of 
multiple years of performance (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) as criterion for dismissal. 
The joint criteria model is more comparable to existing policies being implemented in a 
number of states (Winters & Cowen, 2013a, 2013b), and the authors estimate that it will 
have less impact on the distribution of teacher performance than would policies using 
average VAM across two years because of decreased sensitivity; that is, fewer teachers 
will be replaced under joint criteria policies.  
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DATA 
 The proposed study will draw from multiple data sources from public schools in 
the state of North Carolina. The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NC 
DPI) collects administrative records including students’ demographic information, 
educational accommodations, and achievement scores; teachers’ credentials, classes 
taught, student rosters, value-added, years of experience, and evaluation ratings from 
their principals. NC DPI provides these data to the Education Policy Initiative at Carolina 
(EPIC), a research organization located at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 
which maintains these data in the form of longitudinal databases capable of linking 
students, teachers, and schools over time. For the present study, teachers’ value-added 
scores, years of experience, and principal evaluation ratings from among the variables 
included in the EPIC dataset serve as test and target criteria for evaluating the efficiency 
of performance-based retention policy.  
 In North Carolina, SAS Institute calculates teachers’ official value-added scores 
in a proprietary model known as the EVAAS (Education Value-Added Assessment 
System). Teacher EVAAS scores can be calculated for all teachers of tested subjects and 
grades, which includes mathematics and reading end-of-grade exams in grades 5 through 
8; science end-of-grade exams in grades 5 and 8; end-of-course exams in algebra, 
English, and biology in high school; and beginning in the 2011-2012 school year several 
alternative examinations for social science, career-technical, elective, and advanced 
courses in high schools. In addition to the expansion of alternative tests, the state began 
calculating value-added scores for 3rd grade teachers in 2013-2014 and changed the high 
school courses with mandatory testing from Algebra I to Math I and from English I to 
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English II beginning in 2011-2012. Changing the courses represented with VAM scores 
changed the composition of the teacher sample for whom VAM scores are available. That 
is, English I teachers may appear to exit the sample in 2012-2013 because their course is 
no longer tested, while any 3rd grade teachers in the bottom five percent in the target year 
would be negatively bias estimates of sensitivity because nearly all of them (those who 
didn’t switch grades) will be unidentifiable due to missing test criteria. To maintain a 
consistent sample of teachers across two potential test criteria years and one target year, 
this study uses value-added scores from 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 for only 
EOG and EOC tests and drop 3rd grade teachers from the 2013-2014 data.  
The EPIC dataset has point-value estimates of teachers’ value-added scores which 
can be converted to percentiles to place teachers in the distribution of teacher effects in 
the state. For evaluation purposes, teachers are rated as “ineffective,” or not meeting 
expected growth, for EVAAS estimates below -2.0. Between -2.0 and 2.0, teacher are 
rated as “effective,” or meeting expected growth, and teachers with an EVAAS value 
above 2.0 are rated as exceeding expected growth or “highly effective.” The distribution 
of EVAAS scores is such that the threshold between ineffective and effective corresponds 
roughly to the 20th percentile of the performance distribution, and the threshold between 
effective and highly effective corresponds roughly to the 80th percentile.  
The EVAAS model employs a Bayesian shrinkage process in which teachers’ 
estimated effects on student learning are attenuated by dividing estimated effects by their 
standard errors to generate the EVAAS index. The adjusted index estimates are t-
statistics, which Ballou and Springer (2015) rightly point out do not generate values 
intended to compare teachers’ performance but are better viewed as hypothesis tests that 
83 
	
can determine if teachers perform significantly better or worse than average. Ballou and 
Springer (2015) offer the further critique that the shrinkage estimate could result in 
teachers with more data—and smaller standard errors—being more likely to be identified 
as either highly effective or ineffective.  
There are conceptual and statistical advantages to using the EVAAS index instead 
of the raw gain scores in this study. First, the index is the measure used in teachers’ 
evaluations which are reported to teachers and their principals. While the extent to which 
teachers and principals already respond to value-added evaluations is unclear, any current 
response would be to the reported index, and associated categorical ratings, rather than 
the gain score. A second conceptual advantage of the index relates to the Ballou-Springer 
critique teachers with more students are more likely to be identified as low-performing by 
the EVAAS index because smaller standard errors would result in estimates with greater 
absolute values.  
The index also has the statistical advantage of being a more reliable measure than 
the growth measure. The stability of the adjusted index may owe in part to the issue 
raised by Ballou and Springer that the number of students assigned to a teacher 
contributes to the calculation of the index; if the index is in part a reflection of a teacher’s 
contributions to student achievement and in part a reflection of their teaching assignment, 
the stability of teaching assignments could increase the stability of the index. On the 
other hand, adjusting the magnitude of value-added estimates in proportion to the 
standard error should also increase measured reliability by reducing the influence of 
extremely imprecise estimates. Outlier estimates driven by measurement error would 
otherwise be overly weighted in the estimation of year-to-year correlations, reducing the 
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reliability and increasing classification error rates. Further, the rank correlation between 
the index and the gain score is 0.97, and the decision to use the index or the gain score 
results in few differences in the teacher identified above or below any given threshold. 
Because of the statistical similarities, the greater reliability, and the current use in 
evaluation, adjusted EVAAS index measure is the value-added measure used in this 
study. 
 Teachers also receive evaluation ratings from their principals on five other 
standards of performance defined by the McREL Teacher Evaluation System, which 
include (1) demonstration of leadership, (2) setting a respectful classroom environment, 
(3) knowledge of content, (4) facilitation of student learning, and (5) reflection on 
practice. In addition the five individual standards, the teacher evaluation includes a 
composite measure equal to the median rating across the five individual standards. An 
independent evaluation of the state’s teacher evaluation system found the multiple 
standards to be largely redundant, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.93 suggesting there is little 
within-teacher variance in ratings across the five standards (Henry & Guthrie, 2015a). In 
the present study, the composite median represents the principal evaluation of teachers 
and is rounded down to the nearest integer for cases in which the median rating falls 
between two integer values.  
 In addition to administrative data from DPI that includes all K-12 teachers, this 
study also uses responses to student surveys administered during the 2011-2012 school 
year to a sample of 4,172 teachers. Students in these teachers’ classrooms took the Tripod 
survey, which asks students to rate their teachers on a suite of seven scales collectively 
referred to as the “Seven C’s”: Captivate, Clarify, Confer, Consolidate, Care, Challenge, 
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and Control (Ferguson, 2012). To collapse responses across the seven scales into a single 
composite measure, a multilevel generalized structural equation model (GSEM) creates a 
single value of the latent, between-teacher variable structure which represents teachers’ 
“student rating.” 
 The scope and timing of the student survey results in two sample adjustments that 
must be made for the analyses involving student surveys. As the proposed study is 
predicated upon predicting teachers’ future value-added performance, the sample of 
4,172 teachers for whom survey responses are available is further reduced to the 1,475 
teachers who also have value-added scores. These 1,475 teachers are taken as 
representative of all teachers in tested assignments in terms of current performance, 
future performance, and attrition rates.9  With this assumption, these analyses project the 
accuracy of performance-based decision rules in a system in which student ratings are 
available for every teacher with a value-added score rather than only five percent of 
teachers. This sample restriction only applies when evaluating the diagnostic accuracy of 
predictive models that include student survey responses.  
The student survey was administered in the 2011-2012 school year, so for 
analyses combining student ratings with value-added, the 2012-2013 school year is the 
target year instead of 2013-2014 as in the other analyses. The 2012-2013 school year is 
not used as the target year for the other analyses because the a change in tested high 
school subjects beginning in 2011-2012, the year of the survey, makes prior value-added 
																																																								
9	Balance	checks	between	teachers	with	and	without	student	survey	ratings	justify	this	assumption.	
Between	teachers	with	and	without	student	survey	ratings	in	2011‐2012,	standardized	differences	
between	the	two	groups	are	0.08	s.d.	for	current	performance,	0.05	for	future	performance,	and	0.06	
for	attrition,	with	teachers	in	the	student	survey	sample	slightly	higher	on	both	performance	
measures	and	slightly	lower	in	attrition.		
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measures unavailable for many high school teachers in the 2011-2012 school year,10 so 
analyses including student surveys cannot estimate the performance of decisions based on 
student ratings as well as two years of prior VAM.11  
METHOD 
This paper describes several potential parameters for teacher retention policies as 
contrasting diagnostic tests, reports the accuracy of these tests using multiple measures of 
diagnostic accuracy, and simulates policy effects to demonstrate the connection between 
the diagnostic accuracy of each set of test criteria and student achievement.  
 To answer the first research question (RQ1), which seeks the value-added 
retention threshold with the highest diagnostic accuracy, measures of accuracy are 
estimated for policies in which performance at or below the Nth percentile in year t is the 
test criterion, and performance at or below the Nth percentile again in year t+1 is the 
target criterion, defined by the same percentile threshold as the test criterion. These 
threshold-based retention policies are applied to classify observed performance in a given 
year as either satisfying or not satisfying the test criteria, with the subsequent 
																																																								
10	For	example,	English	I	teachers	with	value	added	in	2011‐2012	do	not	have	value‐added	scores	in	
2012‐2013	because	English	II	became	the	tested	subject	that	year,	and	many	English	II	teachers	with	
value‐added	scores	in	2012‐2013	do	not	have	prior	value‐added	from	2011‐2012	when	English	I	was	
the	tested	subject.	
11	A complication in the reduced sample is that the associated target data from the following year (2012-
2013) must be representative of a teaching workforce including new hires who would not have survey data 
from the prior year. Including these teachers in the target year is necessary to reflect the limitations of 
performance-based retention polices created by the presence of new hires among the bottom five percent. 
Ideally, only teachers who replaced teachers from the 2011-2012 survey sample in 2012-2013 would be 
included in the target data. Perfect identification of specific replacements for individual teachers is 
impossible, but we attempt to model this by retaining in the 2012-2013 target sample those teachers who 
enter a teaching assignment (defined by school and subject or grade) in 2012-2013 that was vacated by a 
teacher from the survey sample. This method results in a match for 89% of teachers from the survey sample 
who do not appear again in 2012-2013, but may not be representative of the new hires state-wide.  
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performance of teachers labeled for retention and replacement by the test criteria used to 
determine true positives, false positives, true negatives, or false negatives. In contrast to 
analyses presented in prior studies, effects are measured not only as the associational 
effects on student achievement as a continuous outcome measure, but the in terms of the 
diagnostic accuracy of each performance-based retention threshold to categorically 
identify low-performing teachers.  
Specifically, accuracy is expressed in terms of the sensitivity (true positives as a 
proportion of all cases satisfying the target condition) and false discovery rate (false 
positives as a proportion of all cases satisfying the test condition) of each set of test 
criteria. Unlike Staiger and Rockoff (2010), this approach considers costs as well as 
benefits and may identify points of diminishing marginal returns and determine trade-offs 
between unintended negative consequences and intended gains in student achievement. 
For example, if a test criterion of performance at or below the 15th percentile yields 95% 
of the performance gains of setting the test criterion at the 20th percentile, and has a 
substantially lower false discovery rate, the more restrictive test criterion (15th percentile) 
would have preferential characteristics not observable in the approach used by Staiger 
and Rockoff. Critical VAM thresholds considered for test criterion are the 5th (from 
Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2011),  Winters and Cowen (2013b), and Hanushek 
(2011)), 10th (from Hanushek (2011)), and 25th (from Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) and 
(Winters & Cowen, 2013a, 2013b)). 
 To answer research question #2 (RQ2), the same procedure described above for 
answering RQ1 is followed, but multiple years of value added (both 2011-2012 and 
2012-2013) are used to define test criteria, with observed performance in 2013-2014 
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defining the target condition. Similar to the approach of Winters and Cowen (2013b), this 
analysis contrasts the diagnostic accuracy of test conditions defined by consecutive years 
of performance below a given threshold to that of test conditions defined by a two-year 
average falling below a given threshold. Diagnostic accuracy is then contrasted to that 
found in RQ1 in terms of sensitivity, false discovery, and the simulated distribution of 
teacher effectiveness if each retention policy were enforced. 
 To answer RQ3, teachers’ value-added in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 are 
combined with external measures of teacher quality including principal observation 
ratings and student survey responses12 to define joint test criteria (i.e., performance below 
a given threshold on each measure).  Teacher experience is also treated as a test criterion, 
with the performance-based retention criteria applied to teachers with at least three years 
of experience, a subgroup with more stable performance and lower rates of attrition. The 
diagnostic accuracy of the joint performance thresholds are contrasted to the accuracy of 
value-added as a single criterion to estimate the benefits of using multiple measures of 
teacher quality in retention policy.  
 Judging policies in terms of their severe error rates, as in the work of Scott-
Clayton et al. (2014) on placement into college remediation courses, is often more 
relevant to policy analysis than using more strict definitions of true positives and true 
negatives. For example, prior research on the stability of VAM has divided teachers into 
quartiles (Aaronson et al., 2007; D. Ballou, 2005) and examined the percentage of 
teachers falling into one extreme category in one year (t) who also fall into the same 
																																																								
12	Principals or students may change their ratings of teachers if they know that these ratings will be used in 
formal retention decisions, and the statistical relationships between evaluation ratings and future value-
added may not hold when subject to this manipulation.	
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category the following year (t+1). However, for a teacher retention policy with a stated 
target of replacing the bottom twenty percent of teachers rated as “ineffective” by value-
added, policymakers would not consider the false positive of replacing a teacher at the 
24th percentile or the false negative of retaining teachers at the 17th percentile to be policy 
failures. The severity of misclassification is taken into consideration by both Ballou 
(2005) and Aaronson et al. (2007), who report percentages of teachers identified in the 
bottom quartile who later perform above the median, and more formally modelled by 
Atteberry et al. (2015) as “egregious errors” in which low-performing teachers later 
perform in the top third of the distribution. To use severe error rates for the evaluation of 
intended and unintended consequences requires defining separate target criteria when 
measuring false discovery rates. The following analyses calculate the severe error rate for 
sensitivity as the ability of the policy to replace teachers in the bottom five percent of 
performance in the target year, regardless of the test threshold. False discovery rates for 
severe errors are measured as the proportion of teachers flagged for replacement who 
perform above the median of the value-added distribution the following year. For 
comparison, these severe error rates for each test are listed beside corresponding 
measures of sensitivity and false discovery wherein the target condition for both is held at 
the same percentile of value-added used to define the test condition. 
Modeling multiple concurrent performance measures 
The inclusion of multiple measures13 of teacher quality in teacher evaluation is a popular 
																																																								
13 Additional measures of teacher effectiveness such as principal ratings, student surveys, or external 
observations require considerable additional resources to gather. Evaluation sources beyond value-added 
scores certainly have other, independent merits, but improvements to diagnostic accuracy from these 
measures would need to be substantial in order to justify their implementation solely to identify high- and 
low-performing teachers. The proposed study makes no effort to address this value question. 
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concept among policymakers, though usually toward the end of creating a composite 
measure to summate teachers’ performance (e.g. Mihaly et al., 2013). In the current 
study, multiple measures will be applied instead to improve the accuracy of predicting 
future target criteria of low teacher value-added. The shared variance between VAM and 
external measures (Harris et al., 2014) suggests that establishing joint test criteria can 
improve the accuracy in predicting future performance. In addition to correcting for 
measurement error, ratings from external observers may report on teacher practices or 
orientations predictive of future growth in value-added (Henry & Guthrie, 2015b), which 
could also increase diagnostic accuracy. If a test condition based on multiple measures of 
teacher effectiveness is more accurate in predicting future value-added than a single year 
of value-added data alone, multiple-criteria retention policies could operate with accuracy 
and efficiency similar to that of policies based on multiple years of value-added and 
could be implemented more quickly. Because adding additional sources of information as 
test criteria will necessarily decrease the number of teachers satisfying the test condition 
at a given value-added threshold, in order for the joint test to improve accuracy the 
additional data source must discriminate between true positives and false positives among 
teachers identified as low-performing by a value-added threshold alone. The joint test 
based on multiple measures would then have little downward effect on the sensitivity of 
the policy while greatly reducing its false discovery rate. 
 Simulating retention based on VAM along with principal ratings may 
approximate retention decisions made when low value-added performance acts as a 
trigger for retention decisions that are ultimately up to principals’ discretion. Jacob and 
Lefgren (2008) found that principals’ judgments of teacher quality and value-added 
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estimates of teachers’ contributions to student achievement agreed in identifying the best 
and worst within a school. An analysis of discretionary layoffs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Schools in North Carolina found that when given discretion in retention decisions, 
principals generally dismiss lower-performing teachers than are dismissed under inverse-
seniority policies, and that principals’ evaluation ratings of teachers were a powerful 
predictor of layoffs (Kraft, 2015). If principal ratings among teachers receiving low 
value-added ratings reflect the likelihood that the principal would replace or retain the 
teacher given the discretionary choice, higher measures of accuracy for a retention rules 
including VAM and principal rating would suggest that principals are likely to make 
efficient discretionary decisions—those that retain low value-added teachers whose 
measured performance is likely to improve the following year. Should principal ratings 
instead reduce the accuracy of identifying teachers with low future performance, this may 
suggest that retention policies based on VAM alone would be more likely to retain high-
performing and improving teachers than a system based on either VAM along with 
principal discretion or based on principal discretion alone. 
 A growing body of research is finding that student feedback on their teachers’ 
performance can provide valid and reliable ratings of instructional quality, with strong 
correlations between student ratings and outcome-based ratings such as teacher value-
added (Kane & Staiger, 2012; Maulana, Helms-Lorenz, & Van de Grift, 2015; Peterson, 
Wahlquist, & Bone, 2000). The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) study brought 
greater attention to the incorporation of student surveys into teacher evaluation systems 
by demonstrating strong and robust associations between student ratings and learning 
outcomes (Kane & Staiger, 2012). Student surveys responses have several advantages 
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over principal evaluation ratings. In comparison to principal ratings, student surveys have 
the conceptual benefits of being based on more exposure to teachers’ instruction and 
avoiding some of the sources of bias that affect principal ratings by being conducted 
anonymously and without future working relationships at stake. Student survey ratings 
also have the statistical benefit of being continuous and variable, in comparison to 
principal ratings which are largely concentrated in proficient and accomplished 
categories. The continuous nature of the student survey metric creates more flexibility in 
the designation of thresholds for retention decisions than categorical ratings from 
principals. The student survey measure for this study is a composite measure across the 
seven scales of the Tripod student survey, the same instrument used in the MET study. It 
is described in more detail in the “DATA” section below. 
Modeling adjustments for teacher Experience 
Finally, we adjust the test criteria of the diagnostic tests to account for teacher 
experience. Teacher experience has an empirically-demonstrated association with value-
added growth that accounts for some of the rank instability identified by other 
researchers. Experience is rightfully excluded from value-added models, but accounting 
for such information may substantially improve the diagnostic accuracy of test criteria 
seeking to predict teachers’ future performance. 
 Given the returns to experience early in teachers’ careers (Clotfelter et al., 2007, 
2010; Harris & Sass, 2011; Henry et al., 2011), it is especially necessary to anticipate 
growth from novice and early-career teachers in defining test criteria. Take, for example, 
a veteran and novice teacher each identified just under the threshold for dismissal under a 
policy that fails to account for experience. The early-career returns to experience suggest 
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that the novice teacher is likely to improve beyond the threshold the following year, 
while such improvement from a veteran teacher is less probable. By establishing separate 
test criteria based on experience, a more sophisticated policy would be able to retain a 
teacher predicted to become more effective while letting go of an ineffective educator 
unlikely to improve in the following years. 
 While veteran teacher performance is more stable and predictable, the design and 
intent of tenure and retention policies is to predict future performance early in teachers’ 
careers in order to make necessary personnel decisions such as offering support, 
reassigning or releasing the teacher, or offering additional incentives for high-performing 
teachers to stay. The competing interests of test accuracy and early identification of 
performance are discussed in more detail under the results of the tests incorporating 
experience. 
SIMULATION 
The simulation of teacher replacement draws on a comprehensive, longitudinal statewide 
dataset of teacher performance housed and maintained by the University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill’s Educational Policy Initiative at Carolina (EPIC). In addition to 
being able to rely on observed performance and retention decisions, the performance of 
novice teachers provides a model of reality which can be used to calibrate simulation of a 
synthetic labor pool.  
 Because voluntary attrition is observed in the performance dataset, only the 
performance of teachers who replace those removed by the retention policy must be 
simulated. The performance of these novice replacements is simulated by drawing 
94 
	
randomly from a synthetic pool of novice teachers with a mean and variance of value-
added effects calibrated precisely to that of novice teachers in the observed sample.14 For 
each performance-based retention rule considered, the simulation identifies teachers 
whose performance in year t falls below the criteria for retention and whose performance 
is observed in year t+1. The value-added scores of these teachers in t+1 is then replaced 
with a value-added score drawn from a random sample of value-added scores in a 
synthetic labor pool. The synthetic labor pool has a mean standardized value-added score 
(-0.347) and standard deviation (0.957) matching that observed for new hires in North 
Carolina across the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 school years, as listed in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1. First-year teacher value added performance by year, 2011-2012 through 2013-
2014. 
 
Year N Mean S.D.
2011-2012 1,593 -0.328 0.993
2012-2013 1,320 -0.329 0.952
2013-2014 1,876 -0.376 0.930
Average 1,596 -0.347 0.957
 
This simulation is based on an assumption that teachers’ observed performance is 
independent of the policy environment, and that novice teacher effectiveness is inelastic 
with respect to demand (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). The assumption that teacher 
																																																								
14	I model a potential teacher labor pool by generating a random variable for each teacher with mean and 
variance of value-added effectiveness mirroring that demonstrated by all first-year teachers in North 
Carolina in the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 school years. Based on the observed performance of 
first-year teachers in these years, the synthetic labor pool has a mean standardized value-added score (-
0.347) and standard deviation (0.957). For teachers satisfying test criteria for replacement in year t, I 
substitute their observed VAM in year t+1 with the random variable to represent the performance of a 
replacement novice teacher.	
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performance is independent of the policy environment could be violated if the 
introduction of a new teacher retention policy itself affected teacher attrition or 
influenced productivity either through motivation or demoralization. The assumption of 
inelasticity of novice teacher performance with respect to demand requires both that (1) 
the current hiring of novice teachers draws randomly from the available distribution of 
unobservable future performance of aspiring teachers, and (2) the supply of aspiring 
teachers is sufficiently large that under increased demand for novice teachers, education 
agencies could continue to hire randomly from this distribution indefinitely without 
diminishing the quality of novice teachers hired.15  
RESULTS 
For each set of test criteria, we present measures of accuracy calculated in two 
ways: with target criteria equal to the VAM threshold defining the test criteria, or with 
target criteria defined by severe errors. In the first test, summarized in columns II. and III. 
of Table 2, teachers falling below the test criteria in 2012-2013 (“One Year Prior”); 
below the test criteria in both 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (“Two Yrs-Joint”); or with an 
average percentile ranking below the test criteria in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (“Two 
Yrs-Average”) are identified as ineffective, and the target criterion for this flag is whether 
the teachers fall below the same percentile threshold again in 2013-2014. These results 
are listed under “Equal Cutoffs” because the thresholds for the target condition and test 
																																																								
15	Other researchers have noted, however, that such an assumption could only be true if the increased 
employment risk of teaching created by a new performance-based retention policy was offset by a 
corresponding increase in perceived benefit from salaries (Goldhaber	&	Hansen,	2010;	Hanushek,	2009). 
The assumption that novice teacher performance is inelastic with respect to demand is reflected in the 
simulation of novice teacher performance based on the observed distribution of novice teacher 
performance; in an environment in which this assumption did not hold, the distribution of novice teacher 
performance would depend on the number of novice teachers needed and the performance of these new 
hires would likely diminish as the number of new hires increased. 	
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condition are set at the same value. Sensitivity in these tests increases as the threshold is 
expanded, from 0.22 at the 5th percentile to 0.33 at the 25th percentile for a test condition 
based on one year of prior value-added, and false discovery decreases from 0.50 to 0.40. 
The increase in sensitivity and drop in false discovery reflect the greater rank stability 
within the bottom quintile or quartile than within the more restrictive bottom five percent 
due to increased attrition toward the lower tail of the performance distribution and larger 
regression toward the mean demonstrated by observations toward the tails of 
distributions.  
Column I of Table 2 displays the proportion of cases meeting the target criterion 
in 2013-2014 that do not have the required information to classify a test condition. 
Knowing the proportion of targeted teachers with missing test criteria can set an upper 
bound for the sensitivity of each diagnostic test. For the models based on one year of 
prior value-added, the value in Column I reflects the proportion of low-performing 
teachers in 2013-2014 (satisfying the target criterion) who do not have a value-added 
score from 2012-2013 (no test criteria). Rates of missing test information for these 
models are around 0.35 at every threshold, setting an upper bound on sensitivity at 0.65 
(1.00 minus the exit rate of 0.35). For the tests based on two years of prior information, 
low-performing teachers who are missing value-added scores in either 2012-2013 or 
2011-2012 are considered missing, which occurs in over half of the cases and bounds the 
sensitivity of the test to 0.47 or lower.  
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Table 2. Diagnostic accuracy of retention based on value-added as sole criterion. 
  Equal Targets Severe Errors 
 I. II. III. IV. V. 
Threshold & Criteria Missing Sens FDR Sens FDR 
One Year Prior VAM 
5th Percentile  0.37 0.22 0.50 0.22 0.13 
10th Percentile  0.36 0.26 0.46 0.33 0.16 
15th Percentile  0.36 0.29 0.44 0.38 0.19 
20th Percentile  0.35 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.20 
25th Percentile  0.35 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.22 
Two Year Average VAM 
5th Percentile  0.53 0.08 0.46 0.08 0.10 
10th Percentile  0.54 0.13 0.39 0.16 0.12 
15th Percentile  0.53 0.14 0.38 0.21 0.15 
20th Percentile  0.52 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.17 
25th Percentile  0.52 0.18 0.35 0.29 0.19 
Two Years Consecutive VAM 
5th Percentile  0.53 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.08 
10th Percentile  0.54 0.09 0.36 0.13 0.10 
15th Percentile  0.53 0.11 0.35 0.17 0.13 
20th Percentile  0.52 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.15 
25th Percentile  0.52 0.13 0.32 0.23 0.17 
 
 
At every level of the test criterion, sensitivity is highest for test criteria based on 
one year of prior value-added, reduced by 0.14-0.17 when taking an average of two 
years’ value-added, and reduced further by 0.02-0.06 under test criteria defined as falling 
below the threshold in consecutive years. The reduced sensitivity of policies based on 
consecutive years of value-added corroborates Winters and Cowen's (2013a) finding that 
such policies identify fewer low-performing teachers than when the threshold is based on 
average performance across multiple years, though the difference in sensitivity between 
policies based on average and joint test criteria appears to be marginal. Under equal 
target and test thresholds, false discovery rates decrease as the test threshold increases 
from the 5th to 25th percentile for each set of test criteria, are lower when a second prior 
year of VAM is included as a test criterion, and are reduced further when the test 
condition is defined by two consecutive years of VAM below the threshold rather than a 
two-year average falling below the threshold. As a result, the most precise option appears 
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to be the most restrictive condition (two consecutive years of low performance) at the 
most relaxed threshold (at or below the 25th percentile), which is wrong in roughly one 
third of all positive cases (0.32). The maximum false discovery rate occurs with a relaxed 
test criterion of one year below the 5th percentile—which produces a false discovery rate 
of 0.50 when the target criterion is similarly restricted to the 5th percentile of performance 
the following year. 
 In columns IV. and V. of Table 2, rather than increasing the target threshold in 
proportion to the threshold set by the test condition, the target condition is fixed to 
identify only severe errors—false negatives of teachers in the bottom 5% of 2013-2014 
value-added, or false positives of teachers in the top 50% of 2013-2014 value-added. 
Sensitivity increases under this specification as each threshold is assessed for its ability to 
identify a static number of cases, and the ability to identify these cases increases as the 
test condition is relaxed. The sensitivity of a test based on one year of observation ranges 
from 0.22 at the 5th percentile to 0.45 at the 25th percentile. False discovery is markedly 
lower when only considering severe errors, from a low of 0.08 for two consecutive years’ 
performance below the 5th percentile to a high of 0.22 for one year of performance below 
the 25th percentile.  
Although the false discovery rate is much lower when defined by a target 
condition above the median, we still find that retention thresholds would err severely in 
as many as 1 out of 5 teachers identified as low-performing. For the most precise test 
criterion, the corresponding 0.06 sensitivity suggests that the policy would successfully 
remove just 1 out of every 17 teachers comprising the bottom 5% of value-added, and a 
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0.06 sensitivity to identify lowest-performing teachers may not represent a sufficient 
benefit to warrant policy adoption.  
Figure 2 plots sensitivity on the y-axis against false discovery rates on the x-axis 
for the three possible criteria based on prior VAM scores. Points on each respective line 
represent the sensitivity and false discovery rates for performance-based retention polices 
with test criteria ranging from the 2nd to 100th, with critical values of the test criteria 
labeled. Such a plot should guide potential policy selection, as it allows a decision-maker 
to trace along the x-axis to a pre-determined maximum allowable false discovery rate and 
find the test criteria that optimize sensitivity at that rate of false discovery. Reference 
lines are provided at false discovery rates of 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.25. Beginning at a 
false discovery rate of 0.08, a decision rule based on one year of prior VAM 
demonstrates the highest sensitivity to identifying teachers at or below the 5th percentile 
the following year. However, this is the lowest false discovery rate possible for 
replacements based on a single year of VAM (found at a test threshold of the first 
percentile). For any lower false discovery rate, a two-year joint criterion in which 
teachers must fall below a given percentile threshold in consecutive years has slightly 
higher sensitivity than replacement dictated by a two-year average VAM. 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity and false discovery for alternative performance-based retention rules 
based on prior VAM. 
 
 
 
Principal Ratings 
 
Principal ratings refer to the median rating across five principal-rated standards of the 
North Carolina educator effectiveness evaluation. Table 3 reports the accuracy measures 
for the same retention policies defined above in Table 2 with the additional added 
criterion that teachers have a composite rating of “Proficient” or lower (3 or lower on the 
5-point scale).  
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Table 3. Diagnostic accuracy of retention decisions based on value-added and principal 
ratings as joint criteria. 
 
 Equal Targets Severe Errors 
I. II. III. V. VI. 
Threshold & Criteria Missing Sens FDR Sens FDR 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Principal Rating Below “Accomplished”  
5th Percentile 0.37 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.10 
10th Percentile 0.36 0.15 0.44 0.19 0.14 
15th Percentile 0.36 0.16 0.41 0.21 0.16 
20th Percentile 0.35 0.17 0.39 0.23 0.17 
25th Percentile 0.35 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.19 
Two Year Average VAM,  
Principal Rating Below “Accomplished”   
5th Percentile 0.53 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.08 
10th Percentile 0.54 0.07 0.38 0.09 0.10 
15th Percentile 0.53 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.13 
20th Percentile 0.52 0.08 0.33 0.12 0.14 
25th Percentile 0.52 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.17 
Two Year Consecutive VAM,  
Principal Rating Below “Accomplished”
5th Percentile 0.53 0.04 0.45 0.04 0.07 
10th Percentile 0.54 0.05 0.36 0.07 0.10 
15th Percentile 0.53 0.06 0.33 0.09 0.11 
20th Percentile 0.52 0.06 0.31 0.10 0.13 
25th Percentile 0.52 0.07 0.29 0.12 0.15 
 
The results demonstrate that incorporating principal evaluation ratings of teachers 
along with value-added into a performance-based retention policy decreases false 
discovery rates only slightly, but reduces the sensitivity of identifying low-performing 
teachers by almost half, from identifying 0.42 of the bottom 5% at a 20th-percentile 
threshold using only one-year of VAM, to identifying just 0.23 using the same VAM 
threshold and principal ratings as joint criteria. Similarly, comparing the accuracy of 
policies based on one year of value-added, the sensitivity of a 5th percentile threshold test 
condition to identify teachers at the 5th percentile the following year is 0.21 with false 
discovery of 0.13. When principal ratings are included in the decision, a more relaxed test 
criterion at the 15th percentile is necessary to achieve the same sensitivity, though with a 
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higher false discovery rate, 0.16. Taking the comparatively small reduction in false 
discovery and comparatively large reduction in sensitivity together indicates that among 
teachers falling below a given test criterion, principal ratings are close to evenly split 
between low and high, and the split largely fails to distinguish between those teachers 
who will and will not improve to perform above the median in value-added the following 
year. 
Severe error sensitivity and severe error false discovery for retention criteria 
based on prior VAM and principal ratings at or below “Proficient” are presented 
graphically in Figure 4. The results follow a similar pattern as those found for retention 
based on VAM alone, with a single year of VAM having greater sensitivity at every rate 
of false discovery but also demonstrating a minimum false discovery rate below which 
two years of VAM are necessary. As when VAM is considered as a sole criterion, when 
principal ratings are considered a test condition defined by two consecutive years below 
the test threshold has higher sensitivity than a two-year average at all rates of false 
discovery. 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity and false discovery for alternative performance-based retention rules 
based on prior VAM and principal ratings. 
 
  
 
 Comparing Figures 2 and 3, it appears that considering principal ratings in 
performance-based retention decisions decreases the sensitivity of test decisions at any 
given rate of false discovery. This is distinct from the equally true statement that 
including principal ratings decreases the sensitivity at any given test threshold. What 
Figure 4 also implies is that at any given rate of sensitivity in identifying teachers in the 
bottom five percent, incorporating principal ratings as an additional test criterion yields a 
higher rate of false positives.  
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 Experience 
 For the results in Table 4, the retention rule applied is that only teachers with at 
least three years of experience in year t (those in their third year on the job or beyond) 
who fall below the test threshold of value-added in 2012-2013 are replaced in their 
assignments. In the models in which two prior years of value-added performance are 
either averaged or taken as joint criteria, teachers defined as “experienced” by virtue of 
2012-2013 being their third year will have data from their second year of teaching (2011-
2012) included in the retention decision.  
 
Table 4: Accuracy of retention based on value-added with experience thresholds. 
  Equal Targets Severe Errors 
 I. II. III. V. VI. 
Threshold & Criteria Missing Sens FDR Sens FDR 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Min. 3Yrs Experience 
5th Percentile  0.46 0.19  0.51  0.19  0.13  
10th Percentile  0.45 0.22  0.47  0.28  0.16  
15th Percentile  0.45 0.24  0.45  0.32  0.19  
20th Percentile  0.44 0.26  0.42  0.36  0.21  
25th Percentile  0.44 0.27  0.41  0.38  0.23  
Two Year Average VAM,  
Min. 3Yrs Experience 
5th Percentile  0.56 0.08 0.44 0.08 0.10 
10th Percentile  0.57 0.12 0.38 0.15 0.11 
15th Percentile  0.56 0.13 0.37 0.19 0.14 
20th Percentile  0.56 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.16 
25th Percentile  0.55 0.17 0.35 0.27 0.19 
Two Years Consecutive VAM,  
Min. 3Yrs Experience 
5th Percentile  0.56 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.09 
10th Percentile  0.57 0.08 0.35 0.12 0.10 
15th Percentile  0.56 0.10 0.33 0.16 0.12 
20th Percentile  0.56 0.11 0.32 0.19 0.14 
25th Percentile  0.55 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.17 
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Column I. of Table 4 lists the proportion of teachers satisfying the target condition 
who could not be identified by the test criteria because of either missing prior value-
added scores on which to base the decision or because they are not yet eligible for 
replacement under the experience threshold. The high rate of missing or ineligible 
teachers, from 0.46 to 0.57 of all cases of the target condition, imposes an upper limit on 
the test sensitivity at 0.43 to 0.64. That is, policies based on these test criteria could 
identify and replace no more than about 0.40 to 0.60 of the bottom 5% of teachers even 
with perfect stability of the value-added measure. The sensitivity results in Column II. of 
Table 4. show that for a test condition based on teachers’ average value-added in their 
second and third years of teaching falling at or below the 25th percentile, 0.83 of the 
current bottom 5% of teachers would either be precluded from the test (0.56) or replaced 
by its criteria (0.27). However, the false discovery rate of 0.19 for such a test may make it 
too imprecise to be considered desirable for policy implementation.  
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Figure 4. Sensitivity and false discovery for alternative performance-based retention rules 
based on prior VAM for teachers with three or more years of experience. 
 
  
 
Figure 4, a graph of sensitivity against false discovery for retention decisions 
limited to experience teachers, shows that in comparison to VAM-based test criteria for 
all teachers or test criteria including principal ratings and VAM in retention decisions, for 
retention policies limited to teachers with at least three years of experience, there is less 
difference in accuracy between considering just one year of VAM scores or two. The 
diagnostic accuracy of retention policies based on one versus two years of VAM are less 
divergent in a sample limited by experience due the greater stability of VAM among 
experienced teachers reducing the benefit of a second year of VAM in predicting future 
performance. However, in comparison to other test criteria considered in this study, the 
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experience-limited models have lower sensitivity due to their inability to identify the 
portion of target condition teachers—those in the bottom five percent the following 
year—who fall into that category in their first, second, or third year of teaching. As a 
result, a policy that applies to early-career and experienced teachers alike can achieve a 
desired level of sensitivity with less false discovery; at a given maximum tolerable rate of 
false-discovery, including early-career teachers results in greater sensitivity.  
Student surveys 
Table 5 presents the results of performance-based retention policies based on joint test 
criteria of value-added measures and student survey ratings. Comparing these results to 
the other analyses based on one year of VAM and alternative ratings of teacher 
performance indicates that students may offer more accurate predictions of future teacher 
performance than principals or teacher experience alone. Specifically, the test criteria for 
the value-added retention threshold can be relaxed to capture more of the bottom five 
percent of teachers in the target, and student ratings largely prevent a corresponding 
increase in false discovery.  
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Table 5. Accuracy of retention rules based on value-added and student ratings as joint 
criteria. 
 
  Equal Targets Severe Errors 
 I. II. III. V. VI. 
Threshold & Criteria Missing Sens FDR Sens FDR 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Student Rating in Bottom 10 Percent
5th Percentile  0.28 0.13 0.37 0.13 0.09 
10th Percentile  0.28 0.10 0.31 0.15 0.10 
15th Percentile  0.28 0.08 0.29 0.15 0.09 
20th Percentile  0.27 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.10 
25th Percentile  0.26 0.07 0.27 0.18 0.12 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Student Rating in Bottom 20 Percent
5th Percentile  0.28 0.17 0.42 0.17 0.10 
10th Percentile  0.28 0.13 0.38 0.20 0.13 
15th Percentile  0.28 0.12 0.36 0.23 0.12 
20th Percentile  0.27 0.12 0.33 0.27 0.14 
25th Percentile  0.26 0.12 0.33 0.28 0.15 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Student Rating in Bottom 40 Percent
5th Percentile  0.28 0.19 0.42 0.19 0.11 
10th Percentile  0.28 0.17 0.40 0.22 0.16 
15th Percentile  0.28 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.14 
20th Percentile  0.27 0.19 0.35 0.33 0.16 
25th Percentile  0.26 0.19 0.34 0.34 0.16 
One Year Prior VAM,  
Student Rating in Bottom 50 Percent
5th Percentile  0.28 0.22 0.43 0.22 0.12 
10th Percentile  0.28 0.19 0.41 0.25 0.17 
15th Percentile  0.28 0.19 0.38 0.29 0.15 
20th Percentile  0.27 0.20 0.35 0.37 0.16 
25th Percentile 0.26 0.21 0.35 0.38 0.17 
 
 Comparing student ratings at or below the 40th percentile to principal ratings as 
test criteria added to value-added thresholds as in Table 6, student ratings consistently 
have higher sensitivity, and beginning at the 15th percentile and going up, student ratings 
have both higher sensitivity and lower false discovery rates than do principal ratings and 
the advantage of student surveys over principal ratings grows for both measures as the 
VAM threshold increases.  
 
109 
	
Table 6. Diagnostic accuracy of retention policies based on one year value-added and 
either student or principal ratings. 
 
 Principal Ratingsa  Student Ratingsb 
 I. II.  IV. V. 
VAM Threshold  Sens FDR  Sens FDR 
5th Percentile  0.13 0.10  0.19 0.11 
10th Percentile  0.19 0.14  0.22 0.16 
15th Percentile  0.21 0.16  0.26 0.14 
20th Percentile  0.23 0.17  0.33 0.16 
25th Percentile 0.25 0.19  0.34 0.16 
aThreshold for principal ratings is at or below “Proficient,” which corresponds with a rating of 3 on a 5-point scale. 
bThreshold for student ratings is the 40th percentile of a composite measure created from rating on seven scales of 
teacher performance. 
 
 
 In Figure 5, sensitivity and false discovery are graphed for potential decision rules 
that consider both value-added performance as well as student surveys. In this figure as in 
Table 5, rather than plotting alternative VAM test criteria defined by one year of VAM, 
two consecutive years, and a two-year average, the different specifications each include 
one year of value-added performance and student survey ratings falling below 
incremental thresholds of a composite student rating. The most accurate decision rule 
according to the chart below is one based on teacher value-added below a given VAM 
threshold and student survey ratings falling in the bottom half of a composite measure, 
though the 40th percentile of student ratings performs almost equally well.  
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Figure 5. Sensitivity and false discovery for performance-based retention rules based on 
prior VAM and student survey ratings. 
 
  
 
 Combined results 
 Figure 6 charts the sensitivity and false discovery from four of the retention rules 
considered above. For retention rules that consider principal or student ratings in 
conjunction with value-added, the Figure 6 presents the results of policies based on years 
of VAM and the external rating threshold. When considering principal ratings (in red), 
this threshold is a composite rating of “Proficient” or lower, or three or under on the five-
point ratings scale. From the student survey (yellow), the results are from a decision rule 
based on one year of VAM and a student rating falling the bottom fifty percent. 
Combining these external ratings with a value-added threshold taken from the same year, 
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we are directly comparing the gains in accuracy of including these ratings to the increase 
in accuracy when a second year of prior value-added is included in the test criteria. The 
accuracy of the two-year value-added criterion (blue) is an important reference for each 
of the other potential policy types. In Figure 6, the two-year VAM decision rule identifies 
low-performing teachers based on consecutive years of VAM below a test threshold as 
joint criterion. This model is chosen for its higher accuracy demonstrated in Figures 2.  
 
Figure 6. Sensitivity and false discovery for performance-based retention rules. 
 
  
 
 The lowest false discovery rates are found for decision rules based on two 
consecutive years of value-added. However, VAM-only decision rules do not produce 
sensitivity greater than 0.10 until reaching a rate of false discovery at which models 
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incorporating student feedback are more sensitive to future low performance. For most 
values of false discovery, incorporating student survey ratings with one year of value-
added results in higher sensitivity at the same false discovery rate as when a second year 
of value-added performance is considered. Diminishing returns for the student survey 
models occurs beyond false discovery of 0.20, and beyond 0.25 an experience-limited 
model performs close to equally well. However, given that the student rating model 
achieves a sensitivity of 0.40 when combined with a modestly lower VAM test threshold 
(21st percentile) than the threshold at which the sensitivity of an experience-limited model 
reaches 0.40 (32nd percentile), it seems that decisions incorporating value-added and 
student surveys would be preferred under the hypothetical policy goals.  
Simulated Effects 
 To simulate the potential effects of performance-based retention policies, we 
substitute the observed performance in the target year for teachers flagged for 
replacement by the test criteria of the policy in question with a value-added score drawn 
from a synthetic pool of novice replacements. Average treatment effects on the 
distribution of teacher performance under different retention rules can be expressed in 
two ways. First, Table 7 and Figure 7 present the average teacher VAM in the target year 
by retention threshold for each combination of test criteria. Each set of test criteria 
achieves a maximum system-wide teacher VAM between 0.020 and 0.040, consistent 
with estimates found by Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) and Winters and Cowen (2013b). 
When a single year’s VAM is used as a sole test criterion, or VAM and student survey 
ratings, or VAM for teachers with at least three years of experience, simulated teacher 
performance peaks at above 0.030. Of the three highest-peaking models, the model 
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combining VAM with student ratings produces the highest average VAM observed for 
any set of retention rules and test criteria at 0.036. The student ratings model performs 
best when student ratings are combined with a value-added threshold set at the 20th 
percentile, while a single year VAM alone produces an average VAM of 0.035 with a 
10th percentile threshold, and VAM reaches 0.031 at the 10th percentile for experience-
limited model. A 1-year VAM threshold achieves its maximum level of improvement in 
teacher performance at more restrictive VAM test criterion.  However, false discovery 
rate provides a better representation of a policy’s downside, as a higher performance 
threshold in the test criteria is only problematic to the extent that it falsely identifies 
teachers. As Figure 8 shows, although a retention policy based on VAM and student 
ratings produces its largest gains at a higher VAM threshold than when a single-year of 
VAM is considered alone, its false discovery rate is lower. Under the process for 
selecting optimal retention decision rules discussed earlier, in which policymakers would 
first define a maximum allowable false discovery rate and then select among policies 
meeting this qualification the policy producing the largest overall gains. In this process, 
performance-based retention based on value-added and student ratings appears to be 
optimal.  
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Table 7. Average teacher value-added in year following performance-based retention 
policies by retention threshold. 
 
 VAM Performance Threshold (Percentile Rank) 
Criteria 5th 10th 15th 20th 25th 
VAM – 1yr 0.028 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.029 
VAM – 2yrs Consecutive 0.007 0.015 0.021 0.024 0.026 
VAM, 3yrs Experience 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.027 
VAM, Principal Rating 0.017 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 
VAM, Student Rating 0.021 0.027 0.030 0.036 0.033 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average teacher value-added in year following performance-based retention 
policies by retention threshold. 
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Figure 8. Average teacher value-added in year following performance-based retention 
policies by false discovery rate. 
 
  
 
DISCUSSION 
Applying the principles and terminology of diagnostic accuracy advances current 
research on teacher retention policy both practically and semantically, providing both a 
new framework for future analyses and discussion and offering a number of preliminary 
findings. Results from this study have the potential to offer important insights for policy 
design and implementation.  
First, the application of diagnostic accuracy to retention policies provides a clear 
and comprehensive framework to detail these policies’ intended and unintended 
consequences in terms directly related to both the claims of advocates and the concerns of 
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skeptics. Under this framework, the most policy-relevant objective of performance-based 
retention is the policy’s sensitivity to identify and screen low-performing teachers, often 
defined as the bottom five percent of the value-added distribution, based on prior 
performance. Results suggest that natural teacher labor force dynamics limit the potential 
sensitivity of performance-based retention polices to identify and replace ineffective 
teachers, as a substantial proportion of the lowest-performing teachers have no prior 
performance measures based on which to be screened, and many of the teachers falling 
below designated performance thresholds appear to leave the profession voluntarily. This 
finding punctures the conceptualization of ineffective teachers as entrenched veterans 
who could be definitively identified and removed in the absence of tenure protections.  
False discovery rates for teachers flagged for replacement represent the most 
relevant metric for adverse unintended consequences and can be paired with sensitivity 
rates to make determinations of policies’ efficiency. As an example, these analyses 
indicate that a 20th-percentile value-added performance threshold for retention would 
accurately screen 42% of the bottom of next year’s teacher performance distribution. 
However, one out of five teachers identified for replacement under such a policy would 
have returned the following year and been among the top half of value-added 
performance. Such comparison allows policymakers to weigh the political and ethical 
consequences, both political and ethical, of retention reform. When accounting for the 
natural dynamics of teacher labor markets, including higher attrition of low-performing 
teachers and the overrepresentation of novices among the lowest percentiles of 
performance, results consistently suggest that retention policies based on value-added 
alone would remove well under half of the bottom 5% of the performance distribution 
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before the false discovery rate of such a policy went above one in five teachers 
misidentified.  
This study also demonstrates the potential benefits of incorporating external 
measures of teacher quality in retention policies in terms of both the diagnostic accuracy 
and achievement benefits associated with multiple-criteria policies. Notably, among 
multiple measures considered, incorporating ratings from student surveys into retention 
decisions could reach similar sensitivity—screening almost 40% of the bottom 5% of the 
performance distribution—with a false discovery rate closer to 15%. If policymakers seek 
lower rates of false discovery, the efficacy of performance-based retention to screen the 
bottom 5% of teacher becomes even more muted. 
The diagnostic accuracy approach to evaluating performance-based teacher 
retention policy has a number of extensions for future work. As one example, simulations 
of performance-based retention can be extended into multiple years of application. Such 
inquiry has important implications for the practical implementation of retention reform, 
as the stated targets of proposed performance-based retention reforms include teachers 
involved in the proverbial “dance of the lemons” (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010) or infamous 
“rubber rooms.” Persistently low-performing teachers would presumably be removed in 
the first year in which a performance-based policy took effect. The accuracy of 
performance-based retention may therefore be inflated in the first year of implementation 
by the presence of low-performing teachers from decades of lax retention standards and 
rigid tenure protections. If the most extreme depictions of low-performing teachers as 
long-term, tenure-protected, and chronically ineffective are accurate, after a sweeping 
one-time replacement of these teachers, performance-based retention policies would 
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likely have reduced efficacy in improving the quality of the teaching workforce through 
selective retention.  
In this study as well as in prior research, it is implied that performance-based 
retention would enact mandatory dismissal decisions for teachers below specified 
performance criteria. Such policies could disproportionately create adverse consequences 
in high-poverty and rural schools, or differential consequences across subjects or grade 
levels. While Staiger and Rockoff (2010) report evidence that the quality of new hires is 
independent of hiring rates, this finding comes from Los Angeles, an urban district where 
the labor pool may be sufficiently large that supply inelasticities that would exist in other 
locations do not come into effect. If the quality of teaching hires in smaller, rural labor 
markets is more sensitive to demand pressure, mandatory dismissal policies may have 
disproportionately adverse effects in these locations. Additionally, systematically 
different rates of natural attrition across different grade levels, subjects, and school 
settings may further the limit of retention reform to significantly alter the quality of the 
teaching workforce. Specifically, if low-performing teachers in rural settings are less 
likely to leave the profession than low-performing teachers in urban areas with more 
occupational alternatives, retention reform would disproportionately affect schools and 
districts in areas least able to recruit replacement hires.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TEACHING MORE STUDENTS VS. TEACHING STUDENTS MORE: 
A METHOD-OF-MOMENTS ANALYSIS OF VALUE-ADDED GROWTH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Value-added measures of teachers’ contributions to student achievement (referred to throughout 
this paper as “value-added” or “VAM”) hold multiple benefits over observation-based ratings, 
including a focus on empirical outcomes rather than inputs with only theoretical association with 
student outcomes and a common metric not subject to inter-rater reliability issues (American 
Statistical Association, 2014). VAM, in simple terms, offer a statistical summary of the learning 
gains of all students assigned to a given teacher. However, as a measure of central tendency of 
student learning gains, VAM do not fully describe the data available on the distribution of these 
individual-level student learning gains. Specifically, VAM do not describe the variability or 
shape of the distribution of gains for all students assigned to a given teacher as relevant summary 
statistics. When value-added models do account for variance in student learning gains, it is 
typically only as part of the standard error, and thus treated as a weakness of the estimation 
model rather than as another phenomenon also being measured. However, the variability and 
shape of the distributions of student learning gains by teacher may reveal important information 
related to heterogeneity in student learning responses to specific teachers or instructional 
formats. Such heterogeneity could be of practical significance; measures of the central tendency 
of teachers’ contributions to student achievement that ignore heterogeneity in student learning 
gains are incongruous with both popularly prescribed instructional methods—to individualize or 
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differentiate instruction for differences in student ability (Tomlinson, 2012)—as well as the spirit 
of prominent education accountability law—to have “no child left behind.” This study explores 
the potential for the VAM framework to measure the variability and shape of the distribution of 
student learning gains by teacher in addition to central tendency and tests for systematic 
differences in the distribution of student-level learning gains across teachers’ subject area, grade 
level assignment, and quintile of VAM performance.  
The methodology used to calculate teacher-level VAM implies estimates of student-level 
learning gains, but collapses them into teacher- or school-level means. Covariate-adjusted value-
added models of teacher effects set students’ current standardized test scores as outcome 
variables regressed on prior scores from the same student and, often, a set of observable 
individual student characteristics (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004; 
Rowan, Correnti, & Miller, 2002). Individual student residuals (ISR) from these regressions 
represent the deviations between each individual student’s score as predicted by the model and 
their actual score at the end of the course or year. Within the value-added framework, ISR 
represent individual student learning gains. Across all students within the state or district within 
which VAM are estimated, the expected deviation is zero.  
These models attribute to teachers the deviations between their students’ predicted and 
actual scores, with higher than predicted scores interpreted as above-average or positive teacher 
effects and scores lower than predicted by the model interpreted as below-average or negative 
effects. In most if not all current applications, teacher value-added scores for a given year are 
reduced to a single value – the average student-level deviation for students assigned to each 
teacher (McCaffrey et al., 2004). However, the calculation of ISR for each individual student 
also allows for a more thorough description of the within-teacher distribution of learning gains 
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through the calculation of other parameter estimates, or statistical moments of the distribution of 
ISR, including not only the mean as the first moment of the distribution, but also the variance 
(second moment) and skewness (third moment), which may help capture important heterogeneity 
of student learning responses to teachers’ instructional efforts.1 
This study is premised on the proposition that the distribution of student learning gains 
within classrooms—that is, the first three statistical moments of these distributions—contains 
valuable information that can contribute to a more complete description of how teachers 
contribute to student achievement. Specifically, this study asks (1) how the mean, variance, and 
skewness of teacher effects on student learning change with teacher experience, (2) to what 
extent these moments of teacher effects on student learning vary by grade level, (3) to what 
extent these moments vary across subjects, and (4) to what extent these moments in student 
learning vary by quintile of teacher value-added performance. 
BACKGROUND 
This section will begin with an overview of the theory and controversy behind VAM estimates of 
teacher effectiveness, summarize results of some examples of research on teacher effectiveness 
based on VAM (as measures of the central tendency of teachers’ effects on student learning), and 
describe how analogous investigations of the variance and skewness of teachers’ effects on 
student learning could add to this knowledge base before detailing the statistical properties and 
inferences supported by each statistical moment when applied to distributions of student learning 
gains.  
                                                            
1 Kurtosis, the fourth moment about the mean, is not examined in this study, as the variability and shape of the 
distribution are captured by the variance and skewedness. The additional information provided by kurtosis, 
including the peakedness and tail weight of the distribution, is then largely redundant for analyzing the distribution 
for the practical aims of the present study. 
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 “Value-added models” refer to a class of statistical methodologies for estimating the 
portion of student achievement attributable to teacher performance (Goldhaber & Theobald, 
2012). One popular model for estimating teacher value-added is the covariate-adjusted model 
(McCaffrey et al., 2004; Rowan et al., 2002), which can be thought of as a two-step process in 
which student test scores are first regressed on a set of predictor variables including (and 
sometimes limited to) prior achievement. Importantly, these predictors are factors or 
characteristics measured before the students’ first exposure to the teacher or otherwise outside 
the teacher’s control. With this first step, which is derived from the educational production 
function (Todd & Wolpin, 2003), every student has a predicted test score based on their values 
for the predictor variables, and a residual equal to difference between the predicted and actual 
scores. Since these residuals are specific to each student, I refer to them as the individual student 
residuals (ISR). In the second step, ISR are averaged for all students assigned to a given teacher 
(or teacher by subject), to estimate that teacher’s value-added. Simply stated, teacher value-
added in a covariate-adjusted model reflects the extent to which teachers’ students performed 
better or worse on year-end achievement tests—on average—than predicted by their prior test 
scores and other variables deemed to be outside the control of their teachers. 
Due to the sometimes controversial use of VAM in teacher evaluation, it is important to 
situate the use of the value-added statistical framework in this study within the emerging 
consensus on the method’s strengths and weaknesses. VAM hold a number of theoretical 
advantages over observational ratings for the assessment of teachers’ influence on student 
learning. Observation of instructional practices is resource-intensive, requiring either substantial 
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commitment of time from already busy principals, or the paid time of expert external evaluators.2 
Observational ratings can be subject to substantial positive rating bias, compression, and lack of 
inter-rater reliability (Ho & Kane, 2013; Weisberg et al., 2009), and draw from only a limited 
sample of teachers’ practice. Even if reliable measures of practice are obtained, these teacher 
inputs hold only a theoretical association with important outcomes such as student learning. By 
contrast, VAM purportedly reflect empirical variation in student achievement gains across 
teachers, focusing on a specific outcome and remaining agnostic with respect to instructional 
practices, eliminating rater bias, issues of inter-rater reliability, and allowing for multiple 
instructional methods to achieve the same end of supporting student learning.  
But do VAM scores measure anything meaningful, or are they simply statistical noise? 
Validation studies of VAM look for systematic variation in VAM scores among large samples of 
teachers as evidence that the scores capture meaningful information on teacher effectiveness. For 
example, research on value-added estimates have found these measures to reliably distinguish 
differences in teacher effectiveness: correlational studies have found value-added scores to be 
positively and moderately correlated with principal evaluation ratings (Harris, Ingle, & Rutledge, 
2014; Jacob & Lefgren, 2005) as well as with independent, rubric-based observational ratings 
(Hill, Kapitula, & Umland, 2010). These studies suggest that value-added estimates reflect, at 
least in part, the same latent construct of “teacher quality” as do the observations of principals 
and external reviewers. Concerns that value-added scores are systematically biased by the non-
random sorting of students across schools and teachers have been addressed by experimental 
(Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013) and quasi-experimental designs (Bacher-Hicks, 
                                                            
2 The calculation of value-added scores is less resource-intensive under the assumptions that it is done at a large 
scale, and that the student achievement tests used to calculate VAM would be developed and administered for 
school and student accountability anyway, not solely for the purpose of teacher evaluation.  
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Kane, & Staiger, 2014; Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2013) which have demonstrated that 
value-added estimates for individual teachers are valid predictors of future student achievement 
gains even when students are randomly assigned to teachers or teachers change schools. 
Additionally, participation in rigorous peer and administrator evaluation (Grissom, Loeb, & 
Master, 2013; Taylor & Tyler, 2012) and professional development programs such as National 
Board Certification (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2010) are positively associated with teacher 
effectiveness as estimated by value-added. That VAM as a measure of teacher effectiveness vary 
concomitantly with factors expected to influence effectiveness offers further evidence of the 
measures’ validity. Together, these findings support that value-added estimates reliably reflect 
both differences and changes in instructional effectiveness across teachers.  
There remains considerable disagreement over the appropriateness of using VAM in the 
evaluation of individual teachers (American Statistical Association, 2014; Darling-Hammond, 
Amrein-Beardsley, Haertel, & Rothstein, 2012; Goldhaber, 2015; Harris & Herrington, 2015), 
but its value in research for identifying systematic differences in the effects on student learning 
for broadly-defined categories of teachers or practices is more widely accepted (American 
Statistical Association, 2014). For example, research on teacher effectiveness has sought to use 
VAM to find teacher characteristics and practices associated with effective instruction. Efforts to 
link teachers’ characteristics or classroom practices to value-added effectiveness most often 
correlate value-added with directly-observed measures expected to improve students’ learning 
that are collected from systematic observations or surveys (Harris et al., 2014; Henry & Guthrie, 
2015a, 2015b; Hill et al., 2010), or contrast the qualifications and observed practices between 
teachers with substantial differences in value-added scores (Grossman et al., 2010). Another 
example of research using VAM, which has yielded fruitful findings, is the examination of the 
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returns to experience for early-career teachers. Value-added measures of teacher effectiveness 
provide evidence that teachers improve with experience, especially in the first five years of 
teaching (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2009; Chingos & Peterson, 2011; 
Clotfelter et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2014; Harris & Sass, 2011; Henry, Bastian, & Fortner, 2011; 
Henry, Fortner, & Bastian, 2012; Kraft & Papay, 2014), that these returns to early experience are 
greatest in STEM subjects (Henry et al., 2012), teachers who enter the profession from 
alternative pathways improve more quickly than their traditionally-certified peers (Kane, 
Rockoff, & Staiger, 2008), and teachers from out-of-state perform at lower levels than in-state 
traditionally or alternatively prepared teachers but improve at the same rates (Bastian & Henry, 
2015). Other work has explored the effects of school working conditions (Kraft & Papay, 2014) 
and professional development (Harris & Sass, 2011) on rates of early career teacher 
improvement.  
While each of these studies illuminate phenomena related to teachers’ mean contributions 
to student learning, analogous investigations of the variance and skewness of the distribution of 
gains can address important questions related to potential heterogeneity of teacher effects, such 
as whether this early career teacher improvement is likely to increase the proportion of students 
gaining above expectation, concentrate gains in a small number of students, or leave a small 
number of students behind academically. The prior findings suggest that both subject area taught 
and performance level are associated with factors that may differentially contribute to student 
learning outcomes and thus make the variance and skewness of student learning gains of interest 
under the proposed framework. Prior research has found that early-career teacher improvement 
varies by subject taught, with math and science teachers realizing greater early-career 
improvements than peers in non-STEM subjects (Harris & Sass, 2011; Henry et al., 2012), and 
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that teachers at different levels of value-added performance distribution demonstrate 
significantly different instructional practices (Hill et al., 2010). Therefore, in addition to 
exploring changes in the mean, variance, and skewness of teacher effects as teachers gain 
experience, tests for significant differences in these higher-order moments across grade level, 
subject area, and level of value-added performance will be conducted. The method-of-moments 
approach to value-added may shed light on early career teacher improvement by determining 
how the variance and skewness of student learning gains change with experience, and how both 
of these moments and their early-career change differ across subject and grades taught and 
quintile of VAM. 
Higher statistical moments of the distribution of student learning gains within teachers 
might reflect important elements of how instructional effectiveness operates within classrooms, 
especially the extent to which individual student learning responses are heterogeneous. First, as 
the mean of ISR across students assigned to a given teacher, value-added scores represent the 
central tendency or “expected value” of students’ learning gains (relative to the average gains 
predicted by the value-added model) when assigned to that teacher. If the mean ISR of a 
teachers’ students represents the central tendency of that teacher’s effectiveness, the variance of 
ISR distributions reflects the extent to which students benefit heterogeneously from that teacher, 
and skewness can reflect whether there exists either higher (positive, longer right tails) or lower 
(negative, longer left tails) than average gains by a small number of students assigned to the 
teacher. Either large variance or significant skewness could signal meaningful differences in 
learning gains between students such that some students are gaining much more or much less 
than others, respectively. Other factors, including those beyond a teacher’s control, may affect 
the mean, variance, or skewness of ISR for an individual teacher. But, as with VAM, significant 
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differences across discrete categories such as subject taught, grade level assignment, experience, 
or quintile of VAM, likely represent meaningful phenomena. Describing the distribution of 
student learning gains more thoroughly can deepen our understanding of what value-added 
estimates measure, how teachers’ effects on student achievement changes with experience and 
differs by subject and grade assignment.  
The variance of ISR, or the quadratic polynomial function of the distribution of ISR 
about the mean, reflects the extent to which learning gains vary across teachers’ students, with a 
low variance interpretable as most students having an ISR close to the average for that teacher 
and a high variance interpretable as many students having ISR quite different from the mean 
value, both higher and lower. Research and commentary on VAM have thus far addressed 
variance in ISR only in the context of standard errors (American Statistical Association, 2014; 
Ballou & Springer, 2015). Viewing variance in ISR only as error in the estimation of a parameter 
implies that teachers have a uniform effect on the learning gains of all students and that any 
variance in the residuals of the value-added model for a given teacher is the result of “reasons 
other than teacher quality (including test measurement error)” (Ballou & Springer, 2015, p. 
78).However, if a teacher is more effective with some students than others within his or her 
classrooms, this will lead to variance in ISR that is related to teacher quality. For instance, Loeb, 
Soland, and Fox (2014) find that teachers of English learners (ELs) who are not proficient in the 
students’ native language or do not hold a dual language teaching certificate are not as effective 
with these students as with their non-EL peers.   
Extending this question beyond differences between EL and non-EL students to other 
potential sources of heterogeneity in student learning gains, significant differences in the 
variance between highest- and lowest-performing teachers could represent an important finding 
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for how we conceptualize the positive effects of high value-added teachers and the negative 
effects of low value-added teachers. Within teachers, variance constriction may reflect veteran 
teachers’ ability to more effectively differentiate and individualize instruction to consistently 
contribute to each student’s achievement, as larger variance could be indicative of some students 
gaining more, perhaps as a result of receiving more concentrated instructional support from the 
teacher, while other students gain less. Similarly, systematic differences in within-teacher 
variance across subject areas and grade levels taught could reveal differences in the nature of 
teaching learning in these contexts with implications for professional development, teacher 
evaluation, and how value-added score are interpreted. A rubric for interpretations of variance 
measurements is provided in Table 1. For example, the third column describes ways observed 
increases in the mean ISR could be interpreted differently depending on how variance and 
skewness also change. An increase in average ISR with decreased variance would suggest that a 
teacher has both increased student learning and that students are more uniformly benefiting from 
instruction; conversely, a mean increase with greater variance would suggest that overall 
learning gains are experienced unequally within the classroom.   
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Table 1: Practical interpretations of distributional changes in student residuals. 
 Mean Decrease Mean Unchanged Mean Increase 
Variance Decrease 
Definitive decrease in 
in student learning 
gains, with less 
dispersion 
Less variance in student 
response to 
effectiveness 
Definitive increase in 
student learning gains, 
with less dispersion 
Variance Unchanged 
Students exhibit less 
learning across the 
distribution 
No discernable change 
in student learning 
gains  
Students exhibit more 
learning across the 
distribution 
Variance Increase 
Decrease in student 
gains not experienced 
uniformly  
Greater variance in 
student response to 
effectiveness 
Increase in student 
gains not experienced 
uniformly 
    
Skew More Negative 
Measured decrease in 
student learning driven 
by longer left tail 
Few students with 
negative changes offset 
by modest gains for 
more students 
Measured increase in 
student learning despite 
longer left tail of 
students falling behind 
Skew Less Negative 
Shorter left tail due to 
decreased overall lower 
student learning  
moving distribution left 
Gains from shortened 
left tail offset by lower 
gains for other students 
Measured increase in 
overall student learning 
driven by shorter left 
tail 
Skew Unchanged 
Decrease in student 
learning  with similar 
dispersion of gains 
No discernable change 
in student learning 
distribution 
Increase in student 
learning with similar 
dispersion of gains 
Skew Less Positive 
Measured decrease in 
overall student learning 
driven by shorter right 
tail 
Shorter right tail offset 
by greater gains for 
other students 
Shorter right tail due to 
overall increased 
student gains shifting 
distribution right 
Skew More Positive 
Longer right tail as 
decrease in student 
learning moves 
distribution left 
Longer right tail offset 
by lesser gains for other 
students 
Measured increase in 
overall student learning 
driven by longer right 
tail 
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Significant differences in ISR variance may also have practical importance in light of the 
Bayesian shrinkage method applied in several value-added models used in teacher evaluation 
systems. In this method, the model accounts for uncertainty in the size of individual teacher 
effect estimates by dividing the estimated effect size by the standard error of the estimate. By 
dividing less precise estimates by correspondingly larger standard errors, imprecise estimates are 
attenuated toward zero. This method of adjusting VAM estimates is preferred in cases in which 
rewards or sanctions are attached to the highest or lowest-rated teachers, respectively, because 
attenuating imprecise estimates toward zero reduces the probability of committing type I errors 
in the identification of either highest- or lowest- performing teachers. However, as noted by 
Ballou and Springer (2015), equally effective or ineffective teachers may receive different 
evaluation scores after shrinkage due to disparate class sizes. Systematic differences in variance 
would also have implications for evaluation systems in which Bayesian shrinkage is applied to 
effect estimates. For example, if the variance in ISR is systematically larger in English-Language 
Arts than science, VAM estimates for ELA teachers will be more attenuated than those of 
science teachers by the Bayesian shrinkage. Resultantly, ELA teachers with the same mean ISR 
(average effect on student learning) as science teachers will be less likely to be classified as 
highly effective (or not meeting expectations for effectiveness) due to the larger standard error of 
their effect estimates rather than actual effectiveness. Such a phenomenon could reduce the 
likelihood that ELA teachers are selected for either rewards or sanctions relative to their peers in 
the science department when such stakes are based on VAM scores. This example highlights the 
direct influence of variance in ISR on teachers’ value-added scores when EVAAS shrinkage 
methods are applied. Understanding systematic differences in ISR variance across teaching 
assignments is important for the interpretation of VAM scores.  
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Finally, the skewness of the distribution is the cubic polynomial function of a distribution 
about its mean and reflects asymmetry in the distribution usually described as either a longer left 
tail (negative skew3) or longer right tail (positive skew). A negative skew would reflect a 
distribution of ISR with students who gain substantially below the central tendency of other 
students assigned to their teacher. This may occur when some students fall behind and do not 
receive support they need to catch up to their peers, or may have been excluded from 
instructional activities for reasons such as illness or exclusionary disciplinary action. Table 1 
contains other interpretations for observed measurements and changes in skewness. 
When comparing skewness between groups of teachers, differences may suggest how 
teachers in these groups concentrate their efforts and attention across students. For instance, if 
individual student residuals for ELA teachers have a significantly more positive skew than math 
teachers, this would suggest that English teachers are more likely to have longer right tails in the 
distribution of student learning gains than are math teachers, indicative of concentrated gains in a 
few students that skews the mean to be higher than the gains for the median student within a 
classroom. Or, a finding that experience is associated with more positive (or less negative) skew 
would be consistent with novice teachers having longer left tails in the distribution of student 
learning gains, or being more likely to leave some students behind academically, as measured by 
                                                            
3 Of the distributional moments considered, a negative skew in particular may not necessarily reflect a given 
teacher’s instructional practices. Long left tails in the distribution of individual student residuals have the potential 
to occur for a number of reasons beyond a teacher’s control, including student illness (which could affect test 
performance either directly through diminished performance on test day or indirectly through missed time in 
school), or a social or familial trauma. Though any use of skewness for evaluation purposes should be mindful of 
these considerations, in the present study I only propose to test for systematic differences in skewness across factors 
such as experience, subject taught, and value-added performance level. That is, though negative skewness may occur 
by chance for an individual teacher, a significant difference in the skewness between groups defined by 
characteristics such as experience, subject taught, or performance level would signal that these contexts are 
systemically associated with skewed distributions of student learning effects. 
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those students’ performance on year-end achievement tests. Given that VAM (mean of ISR) 
reflect returns to experience for novice teachers, changes in skewness within teachers over time 
have the potential to indicate whether established patterns of early-career teacher improvement 
reflect teachers either doing an increasingly exceptional job with relatively few students (which 
would be reflected by a positive skew that grows in magnitude as the upper tail of the 
distribution moves further from the mean), or leaving fewer students behind from a learning 
standpoint (reflected by a negative skew that shrinks in magnitude as the left tail of the 
distribution moves closer to the mean).   
 Results from this study may be of practical significance to stakeholders at multiple levels 
of education systems. Systematic differences in the distribution of teacher effects across grades, 
subjects, and levels of value-added could also be of interest to school and district leaders for 
strategic human resource management by providing more detail on the nature of teacher 
development and illuminating ways the needs of teachers and students may differ across grade 
levels and subjects. Teacher preparation programs may be able to identify areas of weakness for 
novice teachers to become foci of classroom preparation and field experiences. In addition to the 
specific findings of this study, the approach of fully describing the distribution of ISR can have 
other practical applications. For teachers, the presentation of ISR distributions may increase 
understanding of VAM as evaluation measures and provide a useful source of formative 
performance feedback. Reporting the variance and skewness of individual student learning gains 
may also help teachers connect VAM to a conceptualization of their students as individual 
learners. For teachers who already hold a view of instruction as a collection of discrete 
relationships with individual students, reporting the distribution of individual learning gains may 
more closely align to their view of teaching than the reporting of a single overall mean. Measures 
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of the distribution of individual student learning responses may help teachers view student 
learning responses as heterogeneous as teachers’ self-perceived effectiveness can be largely 
driven by the “psychic rewards” (Lortie, 1975) of positive verbal feedback from a handful of 
students or parents. 
To review, in the proposed study I seek to investigate the extent to which the distribution 
of ISR within middle school teachers’ classrooms varies across grade levels, subject taught, and 
level of value-added performance, as well as how these distributions change with experience, 
and finally how change associated with experience differs across grade and subject. Specifically, 
I will use a variety of statistical approaches to empirically test differences in moments of the 
distribution of student residuals for early-career secondary teachers in North Carolina. This 
analysis will primarily consider differences in the within-classroom distribution of teacher 
effects over time for early career teachers. Results will be considered across three grades: 6th, 7th, 
and 8th, and three subjects: mathematics, English-Language Arts (ELA), and science, to allow 
different instructional practices across grades and subjects to result in different within-classroom 
changes. Specifically, I pursue the following research questions:  
1.) How, and to what extent, do the mean, variance, and skewness of the distribution of 
ISR for early-career middle school teachers change as these teachers gain experience? 
2.) How, and to what extent, do the variance and skewness of ISR differ between early-
career teachers in 6th, 7th, and 8th grades? 
3.) How, and to what extent, do the variance and skewness of ISR differ between early-
career middle school teachers in mathematics, English-language arts, and science? 
4.) How, and to what extent, do the variance and skewness of ISR differ between early-
career middle school teachers across quintiles of value-added performance? 
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Answers to these questions will strengthen our understanding of the relationship between 
teacher experience and value-added performance, how this varies across grades and subjects, and 
what both between-teacher differences in value-added and within-teacher improvement in value-
added mean for students in these teachers’ classrooms. Findings from this study have the 
potential to inform our understanding of the types of instructional effectiveness rewarded by 
value-added estimates, to add to our understanding of how students experience the effectiveness 
and growth of early-career teachers, and to illuminate areas for early-career supports so that 
beginning teachers enter the profession better-prepared to perform at levels currently 
demonstrated after one to two years of experience. 
DATA 
This study takes advantage of one of the richest educational research resources available, the 
statewide public school administrative dataset maintained by the Education Policy Initiative at 
Carolina (EPIC). The North Carolina dataset has a number of invaluable features for large-scale 
education research. The state administers annual math and reading end-of-grade exams in 3rd 
through 8th grades, science in 5th and 8th grades, and end-of-course exams in secondary grades to 
serve as common student learning outcome measures for all students across the state. Using 
unique student identification numbers, EPIC matches these test scores to students, in addition to 
individual demographic information such as race and economic disadvantage, as well as prior 
achievement scores. Using consistent student identification measures over time, students can be 
tracked longitudinally for performance growth even for students that transfer between schools 
and districts. Roster files link student data to their teachers, for whom EPIC also has rich 
demographic and professional information and the capability to track performance and 
movement over time. The ability to measure common student-level outcomes connected to 
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individual teachers within an entire state over several years provides a rare opportunity to 
estimate effects within a longitudinal sample partitioned by parameters of interest, without losing 
statistical power to detect modest effect sizes. As described in the following section, these 
partitions include years of teaching experience, grade level, subject, and number of students. By 
analyzing samples partitioned by these parameters, I preclude potentially spurious relationships 
in the data driven by differences across teaching cohorts, content area, or grade level. 
SAMPLE 
The analytic sample consists of teacher-by-grade-by-subject observations including all sixth, 
seventh, and eighth grade teachers for whom value-added estimates can be calculated and who 
served at least two of their first through fifth years of teaching during the 2008-2009 through 
2012-20134 school years. The teacher-by-grade-by-subject specification treats teachers’ efforts in 
multiple subjects or grades in the same year as separate observations. As a result, analysis of 
differences across grade levels may include multiple observations of the same teacher in 
different subjects within a grade, and the subject-area analyses may include multiple 
observations of the same teacher who teaches a given subject in two or more grades. For models 
estimating within-teacher returns to experience for early-career teachers, the sample is limited to 
teachers within their first five years on the job, where VAM-estimated returns to experience are 
greatest.  
                                                            
4 The 2012-2013 data introduces the state’s move to the Common Core-aligned assessments beginning in 2012-
2013. This important shift has the potential benefit of making the results of this study in North Carolina more 
generalizable to other states using the same or similar tests. There is also potential that the change in tests represent a 
disruption that compromises the longitudinal design. Not only do these more challenging tests compress the variance 
in student test scores—and thus the variance in the individual student residuals—but the change in content also 
creates a disruption in the ability of prior year scores to control for students’ beginning proficiency in the knowledge 
and abilities tested by the end-of-grade exams. However, including the 2012-2013 data does not change the findings 
but adds precision to the estimates. 
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This analysis focuses on the performance of sixth through eighth grade teachers for 
several reasons. First, teachers in these grades typically teach only classes within their subjects, 
unlike elementary school teachers who more frequently teach all subjects within self-contained 
classrooms. To the extent that distributions of student gains differ across subjects, analyzing a 
sample of teachers each specializing in a single content area (ELA, math, or science) will allow 
for a more detailed examination of the changes associated with teacher experience. The 
proportion of teachers in each grade who specialized in a subject5 in 2011-2012 (defined by 
having students linked to them for only one of the tested subjects) is displayed in Table 2. 
Second, sixth through eighth grade end-of-grade tests are linked to same-subject tests taken in 
the prior year6, which are used as controls in the value-added model, unlike high school end-of-
course exams which do not have a vertically-linked baseline test to use as a control. This is 
detailed in Table 3, which lists the R2 for predictive models of student achievement by subject 
and grade level. With this increased error in the estimation of students’ cognitive endowments 
and prior achievement in high school end-of-course exams, it is more problematic to attribute 
regression residuals from the predictive model to teachers’ instructional effectiveness. 
 
                                                            
5 Teachers are even more likely to work exclusively within a subject in high school grades (9-12), but this study 
examines sixth, seventh and eighth grade teachers because students’ prior test scores in these grades are vertically 
linked to their end-of-grade tests and thus more accurately control for prior inputs and unobservable student 
characteristics. For instance, 8th grade mathematics and ELA students took same-subject tests the prior year as 7th 
graders. Controlling for these prior test scores along with student demographic information, I attribute students’ 
within-subject growth to their teacher in that subject. High school courses are generally narrower in content (e.g. 
biology, chemistry, geometry), and students do not have prior (baseline) test scores in these specialty areas. As a 
result, 8th-grade math and reading test scores are not as effective in controlling for student performance on high 
school end-of-course exams in courses such as chemistry and geometry as 7th-grade test scores in math and reading 
are in controlling for 8th-grade math and reading scores. This is partially demonstrated by decreases in the variance 
explained (R2) when using 8th-grade scores to predict high school performance.  
6 The eighth grade science exam does not have a same-subject score from the prior year, so students’ 7th grade ELA 
and math tests are used as controls for prior achievement. As shown in Table 3, this results in less explanatory 
power for the model predicting 8th grade science achievement compared to the tests with same-subject prior year 
scores as controls. 
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Table 2. Subject assignments of students’ teachers, by grade level (2011-2012). 
 
      Single-Subject Specialists 
 TOTAL Multiple Subjects Math Only ELA Only Science Only Count Percentage 
6th Grade1 4,316 889 1,344 2,083  3,427 79% 
7th Grade1 4,170 516 1,605 2,049  3,654 88% 
8th Grade 5,169 469 1,553 1,983 1,164 4,700 91% 
Totals 13,655 1,874 4,502 6,115 1,164 11,781 86% 
1 6th & 7th grade counts exclude science  
   
 
Table 3. R2 for predictive models of student achievement by grade and subject (2011-2012). 
 Math  ELA  Science  
4th Grade 0.715  0.707  N/A  
5th Grade 0.732  0.705  0.631  
6th Grade 0.736  0.722  N/A  
7th Grade 0.751  0.733  N/A  
8th Grade 0.742  0.738  0.651  
9th Grade 0.512 1 0.683 2 0.670 3 
10th Grade 0.267 1 0.477 2 0.523 3 
11th Grade 0.163 1 0.415 2 0.382 3 
1 Algebra 1 End-of-Course Exam 
2 English I End-of-Course Exam 
3 Biology End-of-Course Exam 
 
Summary statistics in Table 4 describe the sample sizes in terms of the number of 
teacher-subject-grade observations in each analysis group, as well as the central tendency and 
distribution of the key outcome variables—the mean, variance, and skewness of ISR within 
teacher-subject-grade. For instance, the first row of Table 4 shows that the full analytic sample 
includes 62,739 teacher-subject-school observations. The average number of tested students by 
observation is about 75, with a standard deviation of 43. Not surprisingly, the statewide average 
for teachers’ mean ISR is close to zero at -0.007. Given that the average residual is bound to zero 
across all tests, the slight negative value when ISR are aggregated to the teacher level suggests 
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that positive residuals are more concentrated in larger classrooms, leading to a slightly greater 
number of teachers with negative means. Though the ISR have an average of zero, they are not 
standardized as forcing the variance of the residuals for each test to 1.0 would preclude 
comparisons across grades or subjects. The average teacher-level variance of ISR across all 
subjects and grades is 0.301, with a standard deviation of these variances of 0.13. As seen in 
Table 4, the variance of ISR increases slightly from 6th through 8th grades, and across subjects is 
greatest for science (0.339) and lowest for math (0.272). Finally, the average skewness of ISR by 
teacher-subject-school is -0.042 with a standard deviation of 0.51. Patterns within the summary 
statistics, such as skewness tending to be negative among teachers in the bottom three quintiles 
of the performance distribution and positive among teachers in the top quintiles, are formally 
tested for statistical significance in the following analyses. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics: Within-classroom mean, variance, and skewness (2008-2009 through 
2013-2014). 
 
 N No. Students Mean (μ) Variance (σ) Skewness (γ) 
All 62,739 74.78 (42.72) -0.007 (0.21) 0.301 (0.13) -0.042 (0.51) 
       
GRADE LEVEL      
6th Grade 19,549 69.90 (44.00) -0.001 (0.21) 0.293 (0.14) -0.054 (0.50) 
7th Grade 18,820 76.28 (43.04) -0.008 (0.20) 0.297 (0.13) -0.041 (0.52) 
8th Grade 24,370 77.53 (43.48) -0.010 (0.21) 0.312 (0.13) -0.033 (0.50) 
       
SUBJECT      
Math 27,002 74.96 (40.86) -0.005 (0.23) 0.272 (0.11) -0.060 (0.52) 
ELA 29,796 72.88 (44.34) -0.009 (0.18) 0.321 (0.14) -0.031 (0.51) 
Science 5,941 83.50 (41.65) -0.002 (0.24) 0.339 (0.09) -0.013 (0.37) 
       
PERFORMANCE      
Q1 12,550 66.411 (42.22) -0.265 (0.17) 0.326 (0.17) -0.102 (0.54) 
Q2 12,548 78.475 (42.68) -0.082 (0.08) 0.296 (0.11) -0.123 (0.47) 
Q3 12,548 80.870 (43.95) -0.003 (0.08) 0.294 (0.11) -0.052 (0.47) 
Q4 12,547 78.526 (41.38) 0.074 (0.08) 0.291 (0.10) 0.023 (0.49) 
Q5 12,546 69.611 (41.45) 0.242 (0.15) 0.301 (0.13) 0.045 (0.53) 
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METHOD 
The present study involves the analysis of within-teacher distributions of individual student 
residuals (ISR) resulting from value-added estimations of teacher effectiveness. I must first 
calculate the value-added models from which I will obtain the ISR. Because the ISR values 
cannot be recovered from North Carolina’s official value-added estimates known as “EVAAS” 
(Education Value-Added Assessment System), I use an approach that follows from the research 
literature on VAM. My analysis begins by modeling student test scores in each subject as a 
function of prior test scores and binary indicators of demographic information including race, 
gender, National School Lunch Program eligibility, and special education status. From this step, 
I obtain a prediction of each student’s end-of-grade test scores, and a residual representing the 
difference between students’ actual and predicted scores in each subject area. The model is 
specified as:  
Equation (1): ௜ܻ௝௚௧ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܻ௧ିଵ 	൅	ܤଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅	ݑ௜௝௚௧  
Where the achievement score (Y) for student (i) in subject (g) assigned to teacher (j) in year (t) is 
a function of the student’s prior scores (Yt-1) and a vector of demographic indicators listed above 
(Xit). Note that the prior year scores, Yt-1, are not specific to subject i. That is, both math and 
reading scores from the prior year are used to predict current achievement in either math or 
reading. Including the additional subject area scores helps to correct for potential measurement 
error in the prior year’s same-subject score and to control for students’ cognitive endowments 
that generalize to multiple subjects. Notably, 8th grade science does not have a same-subject 
score from the prior year and is predicted by 7th grade math and reading tests. The lack of a 
same-subject prior year control may account in part for the lower predictive power of the model 
for 8th grade science shown in Table 3. The residual from this model, uijgt, is of greatest interest, 
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as it captures any variation in test scores not explained by Yit-1 and Xit to students’ teachers. As 
with most value-added models used in teacher evaluation (Goldhaber & Theobald, 2012),  the 
model does not include school-level covariates.7 Although this may bias teacher estimates by 
attributing school effects to teachers, it avoids the reverse problem of modeling systematic 
differences in the distribution of teacher quality between schools as a “school effect” rather than 
as the collective effects of individual teachers. I make this decision in light of persistent evidence 
regarding the self-sorting of teachers across schools (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008; 
Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Lankford, Loeb, & 
Wyckoff, 2002; McCaffrey et al., 2004) and findings that teachers’ value-added estimates are 
robust to transfers to different schools and the random assignment of students (Kane et al., 2013). 
These findings jointly suggest school-level controls would attenuate real differences in teacher 
effects. Further, the primary analysis of the study involves estimates of within-teacher change in 
which school, subject, and grade assignments are held constant to control against any bias 
between these designations. 
 To address my research questions, I use three statistical measures of the distribution of 
ISR for each unique combination of teacher, test, and year: the mean, variance, and skewness. 
The mean ISR is the average deviation of students’ actual test scores from their expected level of 
achievement based on the prediction model. For each test, by year, the ISR for all students will 
have a mean of zero. A teacher whose students, on average, outperform their expected level of 
achievement will have a positive mean ISR, while a teacher whose students generally under-
performed their expected achievement will have a negative mean ISR. The mean ISR is 
effectively the teacher value-added as is currently used in teacher evaluation systems, and 
                                                            
7 An exception is the AIR model in Florida, which uses school fixed effects.  
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although this first moment of the ISR distributions provides a useful baseline measure for my 
analyses, it receives less attention than the other moments in this study because it continues to 
receive extensive attention in other studies.  
Skewness is a scaled measure of the symmetry of a distribution (Glass & Hopkins, 1996), 
indicating the extent to which a mean is skewed by asymmetrical tails in the distribution and 
belies the central tendency. This study uses the skewness index proposed by Karl Pearson, γ1 in 
which γଵ ൌ 	∑ ௭೔
య೔
ே  , with Σ zi3 representing the sum of cubed, standardized observations, and N 
representing the number of observations in the sample (Glass & Hopkins, 1996). Skewness 
reflects an asymmetrical tail on one side of the distribution not balanced by a similar tail on the 
other end of the distribution. When symmetrical, long tails contribute to larger variances without 
affecting the skew; skewness is therefore a measure of the shape of the distribution, independent 
of its variance. Symmetrical distributions, such as the normal distribution, have a skewness of 
zero. Symmetry is the opposite of skew.  For example, in the present context, a positive skew 
would exist where some students gain far above the central tendency of ISR for other students 
assigned to the same teacher, without a similar group of students exhibiting gains equally far 
below the classroom mean. Such a situation could arise when a teacher focuses attention on a 
small number of students. Other implications and interpretations of skewness in the distribution 
of student learning gains are discussed later. 
   My first research question explores within-teacher change in the distribution of ISR 
associated with increased teaching experience. For each distributional measure—mean, variance, 
and skewness—I use a teacher-school-grade-subject fixed effect (within-teacher, -grade and -
subject estimator) to isolate the association between each outcome and teacher experience while 
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holding constant any time-invariant characteristics of teachers or the schools in which they teach 
that could be associated with student performance or the distribution of teacher effects. By 
specifying a teacher-school-subject-grade fixed effect, some teachers will have value-added 
estimates for multiple subjects or grades. The model is specified as:  
 Equation (2A): ߤ௜௝௧ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅ ߣ௜௝ ൅	݁௜௝௧  
Equation (2B) : ߪ௜௝௧ଶ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅ ߣ௜௝ ൅	݁௜௝௧ 
Equation (2C) : ߛ௜௝௧ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅ ߣ௜௝ ൅	݁௜௝௧ 
Where μijt represents the mean, σ 2ijt represents the variance, and γijt the skewness of teacher (by 
grade and subject) i at school j in year t, Xijt is the teacher’s experience in years (with a first year 
teacher’s experience set to 0). The set of teacher-subject-grade fixed effects is captured by λij and 
eijt is a teacher-specific error term. This model will be able to demonstrate the magnitude of 
average changes in the distributional measures of interest as teachers gain experience, as well as 
whether these changes are distinguishable from those we could expect to occur as random 
deviations from a null association.  
In addition to the within-teacher analysis of teacher experience, to answer the second, 
third, and fourth research questions requires tests for differences across grade level, subject, and 
performance level. In contrast to the within-teacher change explored in the first research 
question, my second through fourth research questions explore between-teacher differences in 
ISR distributions. For the test of distributional differences across subjects, I set English-
Language Arts as the excluded category to allow for testing of effects for Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) subjects against the one non-STEM subject (ELA), as 
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this contrast has been found to be significant in other studies of teacher effectiveness (Henry et 
al., 2012). The equations for these models are: 
Equation (3A) : ߪ௜௝௧ଶ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅	ܤଶܭ௜௝ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
Equation (3B) : ߛ௜௝௧ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅	ܤଶܭ௜௝ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
The specification for Xijt in models 3A and 3B is the same as models 2B and 2C, respectively. 
Models 3A and 3B also include an indicator, Kij, for subject taught. With English-Language Arts 
coded as the excluded category, the intercept term B0 will reflect the estimated value of the 
outcome variable of first-year ELA teachers. The terms for teacher experience, Xijt, now become 
control variables, allowing B2 to contrast the variance and skewness of ISR for math and science 
teachers against that of ELA teachers without the potential for differences in average teacher 
experience by subject taught to bias these estimates.   
When testing for significant differences across grade levels, I test returns to experience for 7th 
and 8th grade teachers against returns for 6th grade teachers.  
Equation (4A) : ߪ௜௝௧ଶ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅	ܤଶܩ௜௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
Equation (4B) : ߛ௜௝௧ ൌ ܤ଴	 + ܤଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅		ܤଶܩ௜௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
Equations 4A and 4B are respectively similar to equations 3A and 3B, though with an indicator 
G for grade level where the previous equations had indicators for subject taught. Setting sixth 
grade as the excluded category, the coefficient B2 will exhibit any differences in either the 
variance or skew of teachers in 7th or 8th grade.   
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 To test for differences across level of performance, I define quintiles of value-added 
using the median ISR by teacher, school, grade, subject, and year. The median is preferable to 
the mean as a measure of central tendency in this analysis because the mean, unlike the median, 
is sensitive to asymmetrical outliers that also affect the skewness. By using the median student-
level effect to define levels of value-added performance, I avoid the potential bias arising from 
the dependence between one moment of the distribution, skewness, and performance categories 
defined by another moment, the mean. In the performance-level analyses, I exclude the middle, 
or third, quintile and contrast the first, second, fourth, and fifth quintiles (in order of lowest 
performance to highest) against the median quintile. The equations are:  
 Equation (5A) : ߪ௜௝௧ଶ ൌ ߚ଴	 + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅	ߚଶܳ௜௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
Equation (5B) : ߛ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴	 + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝௧ 	൅ 	ߚଶܳ௜௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ 
 The Q indicator represents quintile of value-added performance, with β2 capturing 
differences in the variance (5A) and skewness (5B) compared to that of teachers in the median 
performance quintile. 
RESULTS 
 To answer the first research question, regarding changes in the within-classroom 
distribution of individual student residuals (ISR) as teachers gain experience, I estimate teacher 
by subject by school fixed-effect models with the mean, variance, and skewness of ISR 
distributions as outcomes and the independent variable of interest is years of experience within 
teacher. The sample is restricted to value-added observations in teachers’ first five years of 
experience in order to focus on early-career improvements. The first row of Table 5 shows the 
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results of these fixed effects estimates across middle-school teachers in all grades and subjects. 
Consistent with prior research on returns to experience for early-career teachers, I find positive 
and significant change to the mean ISR of 0.023, representing annual returns to experience of 
about one tenth8 of a standard deviation within the first five years of teachers’ careers.   
 
Table 5. Returns to experience within first five years. 
 Mean (μ) Variance (σ) Skewness (γ) 
 I. II. III. 
1. All 0.023 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.001 (0.01) 
      
2. 6th Grade 0.021 (0.00) 0.011 (0.00) -0.001 (0.01) 
3. 7th Grade 0.021 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) -0.010 (0.01) 
4. 8th Grade 0.026 (0.00) -0.013 (0.00) 0.005 (0.01) 
      
5. Math 0.039 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.019 (0.01) 
6. ELA 0.005 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) -0.022 (0.01) 
7. Science 0.029 (0.01) -0.021 (0.00) -0.003 (0.01) 
      
8. 6th Math 0.035 (0.01) 0.010 (0.00) 0.014 (0.02) 
9. 6th ELA 0.008 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) -0.013 (0.02) 
      
10. 7th Math 0.033 (0.01) 0.005 (0.00) 0.009 (0.02) 
11. 7th ELA 0.007 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.033 (0.02) 
      
12. 8th Math 0.048 (0.01) -0.012 (0.00) 0.034 (0.02) 
13. 8th ELA -0.001 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.021 (0.02) 
14. 8th Science 0.029 (0.01) -0.021 (0.00) -0.003 (0.01) 
Beta coefficients are reported for a variable representing within-teacher years of teaching experience. Standard 
errors are listed in parentheses.  
 
 
                                                            
8 Student-level test scores were standardized, but residuals and thus means (VAM) could not be because naturally-
occurring variances needed to be analyzed—standardization would result in variance of 1 for every test. Without 
standardizing, the s.d. for VAM is about 0.20 (see Table 4). 
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Variance decreases significantly, albeit slightly (-0.002), with experience, and there is a 
very small and statistically nonsignificant overall change in the skewness (-0.001). In summary, 
when looking at all early-career middle-school teachers across the 6th, 7th, and 8th grades in 
mathematics, English-Language arts, and science together, the most prominent change in the 
distribution of student learning effects is the positive change in the mean. This is consistent with 
teachers’ improving their ability to contribute positively to their students’ performance on 
achievement tests without much change in how these contributions are distributed across 
students. However, this overall finding could mask heterogeneity in these trends by grade and 
subject as described in the following paragraphs.  
 
Figure 1: Mean ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by grade taught. 
 
  
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 5 present results by individual grade levels. As shown in 
Column I of Table 5 and Figure 1, returns to experience vary from 0.021 for 6th and 7th grade 
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teachers to 0.026 in 8th grade. Changes in variance and skewness of ISR also have distinct 
patterns across grade levels. Variance in ISR increases less for 7th grade teachers (0.002) than 6th 
grade (0.011), and compresses for 8th grade teachers (-0.013). These patterns are also 
demonstrated in Figure 2. Skewness does not change significantly with experience, though the 
point estimate suggests that skewness decreases with experience for 7th grade teachers (-0.010), 
but increases slightly for 8th grade teachers (0.005). None of the coefficients on experience for 
skewness is statistically different from zero at p<0.05. Changes in the skewness of ISR over 
teachers’ first five years of experience, by grade taught, are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2: Variance in ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by grade taught. 
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Figure 3: Skewness of ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by grade taught. 
 
 
 Early-career changes in the distribution of ISR across subject areas are described in rows 
5 through 7 in Table 5. Confirming prior work by Henry et al. (2012) for high school teachers, I 
find greater change in the mean of ISR for middle school math (0.039) and science (0.029) 
teachers than for teachers of English-Language Arts (0.005). These results are demonstrated in 
Figure 4. Variance shows little change with experience for math and ELA teachers (0.001), and a 
comparatively large compression of variance for science teachers (-0.021). The trajectory of the 
variance in ISR for early-career teachers by subject taught is demonstrated in Figure 5. Change 
in the skewness of the distribution of ISR associated with early-career teacher experience, shown 
in Figure 6, ranges from -0.022 in ELA to 0.019 in math. Referring back to the descriptive 
statistics by subject area on Table 4 that found negative skewness for each subject supports an 
interpretation that the positive coefficient on experience for change in the skewness of ISR for 
math teachers suggests that the distribution of teacher effects becomes less negatively skewed 
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during teachers’ first few years on the job. Conversely, the distribution of English-Language Arts 
teachers’ ISR becomes more negatively skewed early in their careers. 
 
Figure 4: Mean ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by subject taught. 
 
 
Figure 5: Variance in ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by subject taught. 
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Figure 6: Skewness of ISR over teachers’ first five years of experience by subject taught. 
 
 
 In rows 8 through 14 of Table 5, subject-grade combinations are considered individually. 
Subject-specific patterns in rows 5, 6, and 7 described above are more pronounced among 8th 
grade teachers, including even greater gaps in the returns to experience for the mean of ISR 
between STEM teachers and teachers of ELA (0.048 for math, 0.029 for science, and -0.001 for 
ELA), decreases in variance associated with experience in all subjects, and wider difference 
between math (0.034) and ELA (-0.021) in terms of early-career changes in the skewness of ISR.   
 Interpreting early-career fixed-effect regression results from Table 5 in terms of the 
practical interpretations matrix in Table 1 leads to the following conclusions: 1) Overall, early-
career returns to experience are marked by a definitive increase in average student-level learning 
effects that become more consistent, or less dispersed, across students. 2) Gains in value-added 
contributions to student learning and the increased consistency of effects associated with 
experience are greater in higher grade levels. 3) Value-added returns to experience for ELA 
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teachers may be offset by an increasingly negative skewness in student-level effects indicative of 
a longer left tail in the distribution of student learning gains. 4) Returns to experience among 8th 
grade teachers across mean, variance, and skewness of ISR suggest that teachers improve 
average student-level effects and become more consistent in doing so. 5) Experience leads to 
larger average ISR increases for middle-school math and science teachers than English-
Language arts (ELA) teachers. 6) As they gain experience, middle school teachers in math, ELA, 
and science become more consistent in their student-level achievement effects.   
Table 6 presents the results of between-teacher analyses of differences in mean, variance, 
and skewness of ISR across subjects and grades. In each case the results control for teacher 
experience and the sample includes only teachers with value-added observed at least three times 
in the five years of data. Setting 6th grade as the excluded category, I find significantly lower 
mean ISR for 7th (-0.012) and 8th (-0.011) grade teachers. Because these models control for 
teacher experience, this finding is consistent with greater returns to experience in higher grades, 
as less-experienced teachers in 7th and 8th grade will have lower value-added than similarly 
inexperienced 6th grade teachers. Variance is greater among 8th grade teachers (0.016), and the 
skewness is more positive for both 7th (0.009) and 8th (0.021) grade teachers than among the ISR 
of students assigned to 6th grade teachers. This pattern is consistent with Figure 2, which shows 
the variance of 7th grade teachers’ ISR as being greater than that of 6th grade teachers in four out 
of the five years of experience depicted, and greatest variance for 8th grade teachers across all 
years. 
When looking at across-grade differences by subject, in rows 4 through 9 of Table 6, I 
find lower mean ISR in 7th (-0.017) and 8th grade (-0.026) than in 6th for math teachers, and a 
similar but still somewhat attenuated pattern for ELA teachers. Given that at the individual 
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student residuals themselves have a mean of zero within each subject and grade, a negative mean 
across teachers suggests that teachers whose student perform below their predicted scores on 
achievement tests outnumber the teachers whose students gain more than predicted, on average. 
More low-performing teachers than high-performing teachers may result from higher-performing 
teachers being assigned larger class sizes as a strategic human resources decision by middle 
school administrators. Compared to 6th grade math teachers, there is less variance in student 
learning effects in 7th grade classrooms (-0.009) and greater variance within 8th grade math 
classes (0.009). Variance in ELA classes is greater in both 7th grade (0.012) and 8th grade (0.009) 
than in 6th grade ELA. The skewness of math teachers’ ISR is 0.001 greater for 7th grade math 
teachers and 0.014 greater for 8th grade math teachers, though neither difference from 6th grade 
math teachers is statistically significant. In ELA, 7th (0.017) and 8th (0.021) grade teachers’ ISR 
are more positively skewed than those of 6th grade ELA teachers, with the difference between 6th 
and 8th grade teachers statistically significant at p<0.05.  
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Table 6. Differences in distribution of individual student residuals by grade and subject. 
 Mean (μ) Variance (σ) Skewness (γ) 
 I. II. III. 
GRADE ANALYSIS     
All Subjects  
  1. 6th Grade --------------------------------- Excluded ----------------------------------  
  2. 7th Grade -0.012 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.009 (0.01) 
  3. 8th Grade -0.011 (0.00) 0.016 (0.00) 0.021 (0.01) 
      
Math      
  4. 6th Grade --------------------------------- Excluded ----------------------------------  
  5. 7th Grade -0.017 (0.01) -0.009 (0.00) 0.001 (0.01) 
  6. 8th Grade -0.026 (0.01) 0.009 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01) 
      
English-Language Arts     
  7. 6th Grade --------------------------------- Excluded ----------------------------------  
  8. 7th Grade -0.008 (0.00) 0.012 (0.00) 0.017 (0.01) 
  9. 8th Grade -0.006 (0.00) 0.007 (0.00) 0.021 (0.01) 
      
SUBJECT ANALYSIS     
All Grades      
10. ELA --------------------------------- Excluded ---------------------------------- 
11. Math 0.015 (0.00) -0.049 (0.00) -0.018 (0.01) 
12. Science 0.024 (0.01) 0.020 (0.00) 0.016 (0.01) 
      
6th Grade      
13. ELA --------------------------------- Excluded ---------------------------------- 
14. Math 0.025 (0.01) -0.044 (0.00) -0.012 (0.01) 
      
7th Grade      
15. ELA --------------------------------- Excluded ---------------------------------- 
16. Math 0.016 (0.01) -0.064 (0.00) -0.027 (0.01) 
      
8th Grade      
17. ELA --------------------------------- Excluded ---------------------------------- 
18. Math 0.004 (0.01) -0.041 (0.00) -0.019 (0.01) 
19. Science 0.025 (0.01) 0.019 (0.00) 0.007 (0.01) 
      
PERFORMANCE     
20. Q1 -0.257 (0.00) 0.034 (0.00) -0.045 (0.01) 
21. Q2 -0.078 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) -0.079 (0.01) 
22. Q3 --------------------------------- Excluded --------------------------------- 
23. Q4 0.078 (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) 0.071 (0.01) 
24. Q5 0.246 (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) 0.089 (0.01) 
Beta coefficients are reported for a variable representing within-teacher years of teaching experience. Standard 
errors are listed in parentheses.  
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 In the subject analyses, described in rows 10 through 19 of Table 6, I find significantly 
higher mean ISR, controlling for experience, in math (0.015) and science (0.024) than ELA. The 
variance of math ISR is less than the variance in ELA (-0.049), while science has significantly 
greater variance in ISR (0.020). This stratification of within-teacher variance in ISR is consistent 
with the pattern observed for early-career teachers in Figure 5. Contrasting math and ELA by 
grade level, the variance of ISR is significantly lower in math than in ELA in each grade (-0.044 
in 6th, -0.064 in 7th, and -0.41 in 8th). The pattern of variance across subjects suggests that student 
learning experiences, even among students assigned to the same teacher, are most individualized 
in science, and the least so in math. The skewness of math ISR is significantly more negative 
than ELA overall (-0.018), and in each grade across 6th (-0.012), 7th (-0.027), and 8th (-0.019). 
The difference in skewness between science and ELA is nonsignificant (0.007).  
 Rows 20 through 24 of Table 6 compare the mean, variance and skewness of ISR for 
teachers across performance quintiles defined by the median ISR by teacher, school, subject, 
grade and year. Quite obviously, the mean ISR follows the performance quintile, from -0.257 for 
the lowest quintile to 0.246 for the highest. Comparing the highest two and lowest two 
performance quintiles to the middle quantile, I find the largest difference in variance between the 
lowest quintile and the middle (0.034), while the other quintiles differ from the 3rd Q group from 
between -0.004 to 0.004. Skewness has a more distinct pattern across performance quintiles, as 
both the lowest (-0.045) and next-lowest (-0.079) quintiles have more negatively skewed ISR 
than the median group, and the highest (0.089) and next-highest (0.071) are more positively 
skewed than the median. The pattern of within-teacher skewness of student learning effects 
across performance quintiles offers evidence that teachers identified with the poorest average 
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influence on their students’ learning also frequently have some students perform far below even 
the below-average classroom expectation.   
DISCUSSION 
As a measure based on student achievement scores, VAM attempt to reflect teachers’ 
contributions to student learning rather than attempting to document behaviors theoretically 
characteristic of effective instruction. However, focusing solely on the average of student 
learning gains for a teacher forfeits valuable information generated from the calculation of VAM 
that can more descriptively discriminate teachers’ ability to differentiate instruction and 
personalize student learning. A more complete value-added approach to achievement cannot only 
show the extent to which these practices and skills contribute to student achievement for a given 
teacher, the same models can also measure heterogeneous responses to these dynamics across 
students assigned to a given teacher. That is, value-added models already in place in many 
teacher evaluation systems report the extent to which teachers contribute, on average, more or 
less to their students’ gains on standardized tests than teachers of academically and, in some 
cases, demographically similar students. In addition to this information, the mechanics of these 
value-added models can also report on how consistently teachers produce these effects at the 
individual student level. Potentially meaningful measures of the within-classroom distribution of 
student learning gains include the second and third moments of their distribution, the variance 
and skewness.  
 In this study, I find significant differences in the distribution of individual student 
achievement residuals (ISR) between grade levels, subject areas, and levels of teacher 
performance that are masked by value-added estimates of the mean ISR for each teacher. 
Specifically, I find greater variance in ISR across students in English-Language arts and science 
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than in mathematics, and greater variance in ISR at successively higher grade levels. These 
patterns of variance suggest differences in the way students experience instructional routines 
across subjects, with learning experiences becoming more individualized as students mature and 
most individualized in science and ELA, but least individualized in mathematics. Student 
residuals also vary most for students assigned to teachers in the lowest quintile of value-added 
performance. One practical implication is that in systems such as EVAAS, in which uncertainty 
in value-added is accounted for by dividing point estimates by their standard errors, value-added 
estimates may be systematically more attenuated for teachers of science and ELA, teachers of 
older students, and lowest-performing teachers.  
 The skewness of individual student residuals also varies systematically. Other than for 
teachers in the top two quintiles of performance, student residuals are negatively skewed, 
reflecting distributions with longer left tails—or more students who actually gain much less than 
average. Skewness becomes less negative in higher grades (less negative in 7th and 8th than 6th 
grade), is more negative in math than in ELA and science, and more negative among students 
assigned to teachers with value-added below the median.  
 Additionally, this study finds significant changes in not only the average student-level 
achievement effect as middle school teachers gain experience, but also significant changes in the 
variance and skewness at which these effects are distributed for students assigned to these 
teachers. Specifically, I find that variance in ISR decreases as teachers gain experience and that 
improved consistency is greatest in 8th-grade teachers and teachers of science. While 
distributions of ISR for early-career teachers are, on average, negatively-skewed, the left-tailed 
skew decreases with experience for teachers of math, while teachers of middle-school ELA have 
increasingly negatively skewed distributions of ISR as they gain experience. Considering 
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changes in distributions associated with experience against differences in distributions across 
grades and subjects, it appears that between-grade and between-subject distinctions decrease as 
teachers gain experience. That is, variance decreases most in the subject with the greatest 
variance (science), and skewness becomes less negatively skewed in the most skewed subject 
(math) but more negatively skewed in the least skewed subject (ELA). The overall increased 
consistency and normalization of individual student residuals as teachers gain experience may 
indicate differences in novice teachers’ preparation for the unique contexts of learning 
environments presented by different grades and subjects.  
 Further research is needed on the implications and interpretation of the distribution of 
individual student residuals. However, the significant findings in the present study for 
differences in the variance and skewness of residuals for teachers in different grades, subjects, 
and levels of performance, and differences in how these distributional moments change as 
teachers gain experience, offer a promising start to this analysis. Moving forward, the individual-
level value-added effects of teachers on students could be considered in greater depth than 
simply the mean ISR to deepen our understanding of how students experience and benefit from 
instructional practices and routines, how teachers improve, and what current value-added 
measures fail to fully reflect in the complex environment of the K-12 classroom. 
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